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ABSTRACT  
Intelligence failures have been attributed to an inability to correlate many small pieces 
of data into a larger picture.  This thesis has sought to investigate how the fusion and 
analysis of uncertain or incomplete data through the use of Bayesian Belief Networks 
(BBN) compares with people’s intuitive judgements.  These flexible, robust, graphical 
probabilistic networks are able to incorporate values from a wide range of sources 
including empirical values, experimental data and subjective values.  Using the latter, 
elicited from a number of serving military officers, BBNs provide a logical 
framework to combine each individual’s set of one-at-a-time judgements, allowing 
comparisons with the same individuals’ many-at-a-time, direct intuitive judgements.  
This was achieved through a series of fictitious and historical case studies.   
 
Building upon this work, another area of interest was the extent to which different 
elicitation techniques lead to equivalent or differing judgements.  The techniques 
compared were: direct ranking of the variables’ perceived importance for 
discriminating between given hypotheses, likelihood ratios and conditional 
probabilities.  The experimental results showed that individuals were unable to 
correctly manipulate the dependencies between information as evidence accumulated.  
The results also showed varying beliefs about the importance of information 
depending upon the elicitation technique used.  Little evidence was found of a high 
correlation between direct normative rankings of variables’ importance and those 
obtained from the BBNs’ combination of one-at-a-time judgements.  Likelihood 
values should only be used as an elicitation technique by those who either regularly 
manipulate uncertain information or use ratios.  Overall, conditional probability 
distributions provided the least troublesome elicitation technique of subjective 
preferences.   
 
In conclusion, Bayesian Belief Networks developed through the use of subjective 
probability distributions offer a flexible, robust methodology for the development of a 
normative model for the basis of a decision support system for the quantitative 
analysis of intelligence data. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION.  
 
1.1 Background. 
Since the attacks on September 11th 2001, it has become public knowledge that 
intelligence failures happen and when they do so the consequences can be 
catastrophic.  Nevertheless, ‘intelligence failure’ is a phrase which must be used with 
some caution.  Undoubtedly history is littered with examples of military intelligence 
failures.  However, rarely is it the lack of information which prevented the unfolding 
events from being identified by intelligence analysts and government departments.  
All too often the signs of an impending event were picked up.  As such, there was no 
‘failure’ to gather the intelligence.  What occurred was an inability to piece the 
information together; to correlate the many small data pieces into a larger picture from 
which direct action could have been taken.  Indeed, consider the consequence of the 
Germans correctly interpreting all the information they had collated on the D-Day 
landings.  In some part, the misinterpretation of information can, on this occasion, be 
put down to information passed on by double agents.  With hindsight, the reason for 
misinterpreting information can always be found: an insufficient intelligence service 
(one of the main reasons for the failure to detect the impending attack on Pearl 
Harbour), underestimating enemy strength (the fall of Singapore in 1942) and simple 
failure to react to the known threat (Yom Kippur war).  For a detailed account of these 
and other intelligence failures the reader is referred to Hughes-Wilson (2004). 
 
Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, Director General of the UK Security Service, 
beautifully illustrated why intelligence can rarely provide all the desired information: 
“Often difficult decisions need to be made on the basis of intelligence which is 
fragmentary and difficult to interpret.  In sum, some is gold, some dross and all of it 
requires validation, analysis and assessment.  When it is gold, it shines and 
illuminates, saves lives, protects nations and informs policy.  When identified as 
dross, it needs to be rejected: that can take some confidence.  At the end of the day, it 
requires people of integrity not only to collect it but also to prioritise, sift, judge and  
use it.” (Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller in a speech to the Dutch Security Services at 
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Ridderzaal, Binnenhoff, The Hague, Netherlands, 1 September 2005, cited in Report 
into the Terrorist Attacks in London 7 July 2005, page 7). 
 
1.2 Why do we collect intelligence? 
In ‘The Art of War’, Sun Tzu makes a valuable observation about the importance of 
intelligence: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result 
of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained 
you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will 
succumb in every battle.” (Tzu, 1995, page 26). 
 
The sentiment of the writing which is over 500 years old still holds relevance today.  
The collation, analysis and communication of intelligence is undertaken as an integral 
part of risk management.  Commercial and military organisations utilise intelligence 
in an attempt to gain an advantage over their adversaries and support strategic 
decision-making.  Based on the intelligence reports available, what enemy weakness 
can be exploited in order to maximise the desired gain or output?  Possibly of more 
importance, however, is the use of intelligence reports to show where an organisation 
should be developing contingency plans against potential attack or loss.  However, 
such insights come at a price.  It is vitally important not to underestimate the financial, 
resourcing costs associated with the long term gathering of intelligence.  However, the 
potential gains from correctly interpreting a situation and thus being the first to react 
can be equally substantial.  It is difficult, and often painful, to place a cost on a missed 
opportunity.   
 
Military intelligence is gathered from two main sources: open and covert.  Within 
these the resources available can be further sub-divided into those provided directly 
by an individual (human intelligence) and those provided electronically (signals 
intelligence).  Open source intelligence relates to information gathered from publicly 
available sources such as the world’s media, academia and released government 
reports.  Conversely, covert, or secret, intelligence is gathered without the knowledge 
of the person or organisation upon which the information is being collated.  For both 
open and covert sources, the information gathered may be incomplete, hard to verify 
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and have political or security implications attached to them.  These latter two issues 
will dictate who the information can be disseminated to.  Ultimately, who has access 
to the information dictates who will be able to make a decision based on the 
information.  It is important to remember that intelligence reports are simply mere 
data until they are acted upon. 
 
1.3 What happens when intelligence fails? 
The most recent intelligence ‘failures’ which have been reported on the international 
level are: the attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001; the search for weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq; and the attacks in London on July 2005.  The search 
for WMD in Iraq could be considered a traditional military intelligence operation.  
Conversely, the attacks on New York and London were asymmetric attacks carried 
out by people living amongst the civilian population.  Predicting attacks by 
conventional forces is highly complex even when it is cons idered that the enemy 
mindset and general overall abilities are known.  Therefore, predicting and preventing 
asymmetric attacks by groups of people whose overall access to technology and 
military training is uncertain adds additional levels of complexity.  The ability to 
predict attacks in both cases will be based upon information which may be: 
fragmentary, incomplete, provided from diverse sources and presented over a 
sustained timeline.  How can intelligence analysts be helped to improve their 
intelligence estimates across such a diverse area? 
 
The intelligence cycle comprises five parts (Hughes-Wilson, 2004).  Firstly the 
intelligence requirement is stated.  Following this there is the collection, collation, 
interpretation and dissemination of the information.  This thesis focuses on the 
analysis and subsequent interpretation of any collated information. 
 
One of the first major reports on recent intelligence failures was provided by The 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (commonly 
referred to as the 9-11 Commission).  The report presented the fact that intelligence 
suggesting an attack was becoming increasingly imminent had been collated.  
Between January and September 2001, the Presidential Daily Brief given to President 
4 
George W Bush contained 40 reports relating to Osama Bin Laden (9-11 Commission 
Report, 2004, page 254).  The 9-11 report also comments that during the spring of 
2001, the number of reports being received within the intelligence community relating 
to potential terrorist threats and attacks reached a peak not seen since the millennium.  
With hindsight, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet is quoted in 
the 9-11 Commission Report (2004, page 259) as stating that ‘the [intelligence] 
system was blinking red’. 
 
The collation of the intelligence relating to the potential attacks of September 11th 
2001 had been carried out by the fifteen intelligence agencies within the United 
States.  The analysis of the available intelligence reports had been hampered by the 
fact that there was no way of ‘pooling intelligence and using it to guide planning and 
assignment of responsibility for joint operations’ (9-11 Commission Report, 2004, 
page 357).  This weakness in the intelligence system meant information may not have 
been readily or easily accessible to personnel who would have had most need for it.  
Furthermore, within the intelligence community information is often distributed on a 
“need to know” basis.  Indeed the 9-11 Commission noted that intelligence “agencies 
uphold a “need-to-know” culture of information protection rather than promoting a 
“need-to-share” culture of integration.” (9-11 Commission Report, 2004, page 417).  
Analysts interviewed by the 9-11 commission reported frequent difficulties in 
accessing information on areas to which they were assigned to analyse.  To some 
extent the answer to several of the above issues could have been developed during the 
1990s.  In 1998 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) devised a plan for a 
‘nationwide automated system to facilitate information collation, analysis and 
dissemination.” (9-11 Commission Report, 2004, page 76)  However, for numerous 
reasons including underinvestment and lack of human resources the plan did not 
succeed.  
 
Overall, the 9-11 Commission report made a series of wide-ranging recommendations 
relating to changes to the intelligence community (many of the recommendations 
were passed in a USA Congress bill in December 2004) which lead to the largest 
restructuring of the community in nearly 60 years.  However, the 9-11 Commission 
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report did not make any recommendations relating to the intelligence process, nor the 
tools or techniques used within it.  This is an interesting point to consider.  The 
commission’s final report notes that the intelligence community had failed to 
fundamentally adapt its gathering and analyses since the end of the cold war.  
Consequently, the intelligence process did not sufficiently consider the new threats 
posed by numerous entities which could attack the USA  using advanced technology 
and potentially WMD (e.g. terrorist organisations, extremist factions, rogue nations).  
Simply put, the processes could not suitably analyse the new threats.  Therefore, the 
USA intelligence community was not able to fully respond to the challenges of the 
twenty first century.   
 
The second large intelligence failure within the last decade occurred both within the 
USA and British intelligence communities.  The failure relates to the perceived 
presence and subsequent search for WMD within Iraq under the regime of Saddam 
Hussein.  The failure to find WMD in Iraq led to major reviews on the available 
intelligence upon which government decisions and claims were made in both the USA 
(The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, commonly known as the WMD report) and the UK 
(The Review of Intelligence of Weapons of Mass Destruction, also known and 
hereafter referred to as The Butler Review).  
 
Within the UK, the main reasons stated by (at the time) Prime Minister Tony Blair for 
the invasion of Iraq was the belief that “Saddam has continued to produce chemical 
and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, 
and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile programme….his 
[Saddam’s] military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 
minutes of an order to use them.” (Iraq’s Weapons Of Mass Destruction – The 
assessment of the British Government, 2002, page 3)  The United States government 
also “asserted that Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear weapons 
programme, had biological weapons and mobile biological weapon production 
facilities, and had stockpiled and was producing chemical weapons. All of this was 
based on the assessments of the U.S. Intelligence Community.”  (The Commission on 
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the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction 2005, page 3, hereafter referred to as the WMD report)  However, 
following the invasion and subsequent search by allied forces the WMD report (2005, 
page 1) states that “not one bit of it [the assertion] could be confirmed when the war 
was over.”   
 
The WMD report asserts that the failure to find WMD is “in large part the result of 
analytical shortcomings; intelligence analysts were too wedded to their assumptions 
about Saddam's intentions. But it was also a failure on the part of those who collect 
intelligence… agencies collected precious little intelligence for the analysts to 
analyze, and much of what they did collect was either worthless or misleading. 
Finally, it was a failure to communicate effectively with policymakers; the 
Intelligence Community did not adequately explain just how little good intelligence it 
had--or how much its assessments were driven by assumptions and inferences rather 
than concrete evidence.” (WMD report, 2005, page 3)  Overall, the report notes that 
for the intelligence community to respond to the ever-changing threats it must become 
more integrated and flexible.   
 
Of most interest to this thesis are the recommendations made by the WMD report 
(2005) in the area of intelligence analysis, specifically:   
 
· “The [Intelligence] Community must develop and integrate into regular use 
new tools that can assist analysts in filtering and correlating the vast quantities 
of information that threaten to overwhelm the analytic process. Moreover, data 
from all sources of information should be processed and correlated 
community-wide before being conveyed to analyst.” (WMD report, 2005, 
page 402). 
 
· “The Director of National Intelligence [within the USA] should encourage 
diverse and independent analysis throughout the Intelligence Community by 
encouraging alternative hypothesis generation as part of the analytic process 
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and by forming offices dedicated to independent analysis.”(WMD report, 
2005, page 405). 
 
The above recommendations are interlinked: analysts did not consider a sufficient 
number of alternative hypotheses, nor were they able to clearly communicate the 
confidence associated to specific assessments.  Based on these findings the WMD 
report notes that “As much as they hate it, analysts must be comfortable facing up to 
uncertainty and being explicit about it in their assessments” (WMD report, 2005, page 
408).   
 
These recommendations are supported by the findings of the Butler review which 
suggests a review of the intelligence assessment staff which “in particular considers 
whether they have available the volume and range of resources to ask the questions 
which need to be asked in fully assessing intelligence reports and in thinking 
radically.” (The Butler Review, 2004, page 159).   
 
Of course, the development and implementation of additional or novel tools and 
techniques must be supported by new training (currently out of the 16 week FBI 
training course, only three days are given to counter terrorism, 9-11 Commission 
Report, 2004).   
 
Since 9-11 there have unfortunately been further high profile terrorist attacks across 
the globe including bombings in Bali, Istanbul, and Madrid.  All of these attacks were 
seemingly planned and executed without active intervention from the local 
intelligence authorities.  On July 7th 2005, London was also subjected to a terrorist 
attack culminating in the deaths of fifty-two people.   
 
Following the attacks in London, the British Government Intelligence and Security 
Committee produced the Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005.  
The report concedes that different decisions in the years prior to the attack could have 
increased the chances of identifying the planning and therefore preventing an attack.  
However, the report concludes that “in light of other priority investigations... the 
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decision not to give greater investigative priority to these two individuals was 
understandable.  In reaching this conclusion we have been struck by the sheer scale of 
the problem that our intelligence and security Agencies face and their comparatively 
small capacity to cover it.” (Report into the Terrorist Attacks in London on July 7th 
2005, 2006, page 16). 
 
1.4 How does this thesis support the analysis of intelligence? 
This thesis investigates the development of a support tool for analysts working with, 
and reasoning about information which is uncertain, incomplete or imprecise.  
Although a range of mathematical techniques may be used as the basis of such a tool, 
this thesis focuses on the use of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN).  These flexible, 
robust, graphical probabilistic networks are able to incorporate values from a range of 
sources including empirical values, experimental data and subjective values.  
Furthermore, the nature of the models requires all the associated uncertainties to be 
explicitly stated throughout the analysis procedure.   
 
The use of a Bayesian methodology has another advantage in that it  “provides a 
formal framework for assessing the odds of hypotheses in light of evidence.” (Burns, 
2006, page 1570).  Consequently, a BBN will also show the change in likely outcome 
of the generated series of hypotheses based on the evidence available over a given 
timeframe.  Of course, the BBN can only show the variation in those hypotheses 
identified by the model developer (the generation of hypotheses and development of 
BBNs are discussed in Chapter Three).  That said, such a tool could indicate when a 
given hypothesis is increasing in likelihood even when an analyst (or team of 
analysts) perceives the situation to be moving in another direction.  Such information 
could prompt the analysts to look again at the assumptions, data and information upon 
which any predictions have been based.  This thesis considers various aspects of the 
development of such a support tool through the use of BBNs.   
 
Overall it is important to remember that whilst BBNs have the ability to represent 
patterns of evidence in a wide range of scenarios, including asymmetric attacks, to be 
fully effective, senior management and decision-makers must understand the basic 
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principles behind the technique and have confidence in the results obtained through 
the use of BBNs.   
 
A support tool for analysts working with uncertain or incomplete information is an 
active field of research.  The outputs of such research will begin to fulfil some of the 
recommendations highlighted from the WMD report (2005).  This thesis asserts that 
an appropriate basis for the development of such a tool is BBNs.  At its core, this 
research is  a very practical application of mathematics in an area of huge relevance in 
today’s ever changing world climate. 
 
1.5 Why use Bayesian Belief Networks? 
Bayesian Belief Networks are flexible, graphical models which incorporate formal 
probabilistic and statistical methodologies enabling uncertainty to be logically and 
consistently represented.  The networks coherently update the beliefs in a set of given 
hypotheses as additional information is entered into the system.  This unique 
combination of factors makes BBNs an ideal choice for use in systems designed for 
the fusion and analysis of uncertain or incomplete data.  As such, they show use for 
the quantitative analysis of multiple intelligence reports.  The use of Bayesian 
approaches within decision support systems is already well established within the 
medical profession (Luciani et al, 2007 Hamilton, 1994), and in diagnostic tools 
within the automotive and IT industries (Crossman, Hong, Murphey and Cardillo, 
2003). 
 
Whilst the specific mathematical basis for this research is the BBN which has its roots 
in probability theory, the wider aspects of this research rest in the area of decision 
analysis.  This mathematical discipline encompasses many techniques for the 
structuring, representation and analysis of those aspects identified as the most 
important in a given decision situation.  As such, decision analysis provides a means 
for individuals and organisations to assess important decisions within a structured, 
formal methodology.  
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Analysis of the decision situation is frequently undertaken utilising mathematical 
models.  For example, the model could be a graphical representation of the problem 
space, such as a decision tree or influence diagram.  Certain mathematical models, 
such as BBNs can be populated with probability estimates, either derived from 
historical data or elicited from personal beliefs.  This allows for a quantitative analysis 
of outcomes related to each identified strategy or piece of information. 
 
In addition to the mathematical techniques outlined above, this research has also 
considered the strands of psychology and sociology which describe the decision-
making process.   
 
1.6 Value of the research. 
This thesis reports upon the development and use of BBNs for the fusion and 
assessment of intelligence reports within a series of fictitious and historical case 
studies.  As such, all the data and evidence included within the scenarios is either 
fictitious or has been obtained from publicly available open source reference material.  
Not withstanding this fact, the findings of this research do show advantages in the use 
of BBN for the analysis of multiple intelligence reports.  In particular, this research 
highlighted differences between direct intuitive judgements of complex events and 
normative combinations of judgements relating to simpler events. 
 
For each case study considered, a supporting scenario and BBN were developed.  
Within the scenario, a series of intelligence reports were presented over a defined 
timeline.  Initially, the research focused on how the participants' beliefs about the 
hypotheses changed in response to the information provided.   
 
For each scenario, a series of conditional probability distributions and direct 
subjective estimates for various propositions involving diagnostic reasoning for each 
scenario were obtained.  The probability distributions were used to populate the 
BBNs.  Subsequently, the evidence presented within the scenario was sequentially 
entered into the networks.  The BBN combined the various data and evidence 
available to calculate the Bayesian values relating to the direct probabilistic estimates.  
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The deviations between the Bayesian and direct values provided a measure of the 
participants’ own logical inconsistencies. 
The development of a BBN as the basis of a decision support tool for intelligence 
analysis is necessarily undertaken in conjunction with an appropriate elicitation 
technique.  All elicitation techniques have their own strengths and weaknesses.  
Therefore, it is important to understand which technique should be used in a given 
situation.  Consequently, the final part of this research centred upon an experiment 
comparing three elicitation techniques: direct rankings of the variables’ perceived 
importance for discriminating between hypotheses, likelihood ratios and conditional 
probabilities.  The aim was to ascertain the extent to which the different elicitation 
techniques lead to equivalent or different judgements.  BBNs were used to provide a 
normative model for each participant which coherently combined the participant’s 
initial judgements.  This allowed for comparisons to be made with each participant’s 
direct subjective estimates based on their intuitive reasoning. 
 
1.7 Scenarios used within the research. 
The scenarios used within this research are solely focused on military situations.   
 
A fictitious scenario was developed for use in investigating the impact of information, 
as it became available on the participants’ perception of a situation.  The scenario 
developed considered a land-based section attack against an enemy outpost which 
may have been reinforced.  It is important to note that this scenario only considered 
the UK army due to the influence junior army officers have upon the decision to 
engage in hostilities.  All of the UK armed forces employ the concept of mission 
command.  This philosophy, which states what to achieve and why, flows down from 
the Chief of Staff to the non-commissioned officers; to anyone who can influence 
mission success.  British Air Power Doctrine AP300 defines mission command as 
being ‘articulated through a statement of commander’s guidance and intent together 
with articulation of subordinates’ mission in the context of the overall plan.’(British 
Air Power Doctrine, 1999, page 1.3.4)  Simply put the UK orders process describes a 
mission objective but is not prescriptive about how this should be achieved.   
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A military campaign can be broken down into a series of missions.  Each of these 
mission will be subsequently divided until individual troop commanders receive their 
orders.  It is at the level of troop commander (a troop commander normally manages a 
section of approximately 12 personnel) that this research initially focused.  The 
decisions taken by troop commanders will impact upon their ability to achieve success 
and subsequently the higher mission, and finally upon campaign success.   
 
This research required a scenario in which an individual could take a decision on 
when and how to enter hostilities.  In addition to this the scenario had to contain a 
sufficiently small number of influencing factors affecting the decision as to be 
amenable to analysis.  When considering the army it can be relatively simple to 
identify the factors influencing, for example, a section attack led by a 2nd Lieutenant 
who will decide when and how to attack.  In comparison it is extremely complex to 
capture the multiple factors involved in the decisions taken by a Royal Navy Captain 
whilst executing their orders.   
 
A historical scenario was used to further the investigations into the impact of 
information upon the perception of a situation and for the comparison of elicitation 
techniques.  The case study chosen for use in this research was the historical case of 
the Arab Israeli conflict of 1973 (commonly known as the Yom Kippur War).  Using 
open source material, a timeline based upon the main events observed leading up to 
the start of hostilities was developed.  This scenario was chosen for the Israelis well 
documented incorrect interpretation of the gathered intelligence and subsequent 
conflict.   
 
1.8 How Bayesian Belief Networks help generate alternative hypotheses. 
The initial development of a BBN requires identification of all plausible hypotheses.  
The main node of interest within a BBN contains an exhaustive set of mutually 
exclusive hypotheses.  If the analyst does not identify all possible hypotheses, the true 
answer may not be identified by the subsequent analysis procedure.  As such the 
hypotheses generation procedure often requires analysts to ‘think outside of the box’.  
Indeed as already noted, support and encouragement for the generation of alternative 
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hypotheses was included within the WMD report (2005).  Some of the techniques 
used to generate hypotheses such as the analysis of competing hypothesis are 
presented in Chapters Two and Three.  
 
1.9 How Bayesian Belief Networks help process intelligence. 
The previous discussions have shown the limitations of the intelligence community to 
effectively manage the potentially overwhelming volume of available information.  In 
essence the problem is one of preventing information overload.  Information overload 
occurs when an individual is unable to cognitively, or emotionally, effectively manage 
all the data available to them.  At this point an individual is unable to keep abreast of 
the situation and as such cannot take a fully informed decision.  
 
To operate at peak performance a commercial organisation desires information which 
arrives at the right time and in the right format, matching the quality requirements of 
its potential users (Marcusohn, 1995, cited in Hall 1998). How can the intelligence 
community operate at peak performance when they have virtually no ability to 
influence any of the above factors within the information they receive?  It is also 
important to remember that the processing of information within the intelligence 
community frequently refers to processing large volumes of disparate data. 
 
Bayesian Belief Networks have several features which can assist with the processing 
of large volumes of information.  The networks themselves are graphical and 
represent the current understanding of the situation based on the analysed information.  
The structure of a network is intuitive and even those with no experience of BBNs 
will be able to identify which factors have been included and which have been 
excluded from the analysis.  In addition to this it is relatively easy to amend the 
structure of the network to include additional nodes as required.   
 
BBNs can incorporate the uncertainty associated with information including the 
possibility of false positives and false negatives.  Even information which does not 
support the current perception of the situation can be entered and its impact upon the 
belief of each competing hypothesis be easily evaluated.  As information or 
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intelligence becomes available it is easily integrated into a BBN.  The networks 
logically and consistently fuse new information with the understanding of the 
situation immediately prior to the information being available through the use of 
probability theory.  One main advantage of BBNs is that, depending on the 
information available the networks can be used to support different kinds of 
reasoning, e.g. for diagnosis or to predict future events. 
 
1.10 How Bayesian Belief Networks can help analysts be explicit about the  
uncertainty within their assessments. 
In his Review on Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction Lord Butler states that 
“The most important limitation on intelligence is its incompleteness.  Much ingenuity 
and effort is spent on making secret information difficult to acquire and hard to 
analyse.  Although the intelligence process may overcome such barriers, intelligence 
seldom acquires the full story.  In fact it is often, when first acquired sporadic and 
patchy and even after analysis may still be at best inferential.” (The Butler Review, 
2004, page 14)  Two years after these words were published, the Report into the 
Terrorist Attacks in London on 7 July 2005 noted that “the issue of addressing the 
limitations of intelligence in intelligence assessments…had not yet been fully 
implemented.” (Report into the Terrorist Attacks in London on 7 July 2005, 2006, 
page 32). 
 
BBNs have defined techniques to incorporate for representing uncertainty associated 
with any information within a network.  The processes required for formulating a 
network, deriving the required distributions and finally entering new information are 
all transparent processes open to audit and debate.  Throughout the analysis 
procedure, analysts are constantly forced to consider the uncertainty associated with 
any inferences drawn from the results.  The numerical results obtained from the 
network at the end of the process are defendable, open to scrutiny and amenable to 
sensitivity analysis.   
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1.11 Overview of the chapters. 
Following on from this introduction, the thesis continues with a wide ranging 
literature survey focused on decision support systems within intelligence analyses.  
Consequently, this chapter begins with a discussion on decision-making and theories 
of decision-making models.  For completeness a comparison of the normative 
decision-making model and Klein’s descriptive Recognition Primed Decision model 
is made.  This discussion also introduces common cognitive heuristics and how they 
lead to bias and error in human judgement.  The second part of the literature review 
centres upon decision support systems: the need for them; potential designs and 
applications; evidence for the success and failures of decision support systems and the 
mathematical basis for the tools themselves are presented.  Finally, the literature 
survey concludes by considering the tools and techniques commonly used for decision 
support systems within intelligence analyses.   
 
Chapter Three introduces Bayesian Belief Networks and commences by presenting 
the development of the networks.  In support of this thesis Chapter Three gives a 
mathematical description of how uncertainty is included within, and how new 
evidence propagates throughout the networks.  The third chapter explains how this 
research interlinks with work already carried out in the field of tools for intelligence 
analysis.   
 
A detailed presentation of the developed BBNs and case studies considered are 
presented within Chapters Four to Six.  Within these Chapters the results of 
experiments are discussed alongside the associated sensitivity analyses.  The 
performance of the BBNs and possible reasons for differences between the network 
and individual direct results obtained are discussed.  Factors which were found to 
affect the model are presented along with strategies for improving the quality of 
overall results obtained. 
 
Finally Chapter Seven considers potential future applications for Bayesian Belief 
Networks in tools for intelligence analyses and makes recommendations for the 
inclusion of these systems within the intelligence community.  
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CHAPTER 2   LITERATURE SURVEY. 
 
2.1 Decision-making. 
 
2.1.1 Introduction. 
When a decisive turn of events leads to the winning of a strategic battle, social change 
or an increase in company profits, the decisions taken by those in authority are often 
deemed visionary or courageous.  However, history is written by the victors, in the 
fullness of hindsight and out of the context in which the original decision was made.  
Often what is exalted or derided is the outcome of the decision, not the decision itself.  
There are all too many examples of ‘good’ decisions resulting in bad outcomes and 
‘bad’ decisions leading to a desired outcome: many a man has made and lost a fortune 
from making first lauded and subsequently ruinous decisions.  So what separates such 
decisions and their outcomes?  Luck plays its part along with all the component parts 
of a decision which the individual cannot alter for example: terrain, weather, or 
unforeseen events.  Importantly, and of interest to this thesis there is the impact of 
human judgemental error upon the decision-making process.   
 
Many complex decisions may involve: numerous interacting factors, uncertainty, 
multiple stakeholders (with their differing perspectives and opinions), and subjective 
opinions from various experts.  Often a complex problem will have no single clear 
outcome.  Instead, the preferred outcome will require the decision maker to make 
trade-offs between the contributing factors.  Thus selecting the ‘right’ course of action 
is not always easy as Heller (1989, page 25) writes about Montgomery “No decent 
person likes hurting other human beings, whether they come singularly or in 
battalions…..The really tough decisions taken by Montgomery included fighting the 
purely defensive action at Alam Halfa which halted Rommel in his tracks, and the 
refusal, against heavy pressure from Churchill, to launch El Alamein until the Eight 
Army was very good and very ready.”   
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Montgomery had to take decisions in an incredibly complex environment, the output 
of which was perilous for the men under his command (and Montgomery was known 
for being careful with the lives of men under his command).  The decisions taken by 
Montgomery beautifully illustrate the importance of the context in which a decision is 
taken.  For as well as the geographical, logistical and myriad of factors which affected 
his fighting ability in North Africa, political pressure also came to bear.   
 
Following D-Day (6th June 1944) some of the decisions taken by Montgomery’s 21st 
Army Group were supported by the Number 2 Operational Research Section (No 2 
ORS).  For an engaging read of a large collection of the reports produced by No 2 
ORS, the interested reader is referred to Copp (2000) and, for comparison to collated 
personal papers of Rommel by Hart (1953). 
 
During the Second World War, and over previous millennia, wars have been fought 
against a known, identifiable enemy.  Even when engaging multiple opposition forces, 
much was known about their location and aims.  From this, a clearly defined end point 
– that at which victory would be achieved – could be defined.  Today battles are 
fought in a more complex environment.  Battles of attrition are rarely fought.  Rather, 
highly trained yet irregular forces skilled in guerrilla warfare tactics are engaged 
across the globe.  It is now far harder to define the end point of hostilities – many 
conflicts are fought not on territorial gain but upon ideological grounds for political 
advantage.  For all of the dramatic changes in warfare, the military environment 
provides fascinating examples of decision-making in which (paraphrased from 
Noorderhaven 1995, page 2): 
 
· The means of achieving an objective may radically alter (e.g. from an 
offensive to defensive stance) whilst the overall objective does not. 
· Subjective assessments are based upon imperfect or incomplete information. 
· The implementation of a strategy leads to unexpected results. 
· The decision-making is not always based upon rational calculations but upon 
moral values, emotion and perhaps intuition. 
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2.1.2 Decisions – a cycle or process? 
What is a decision?   There are a multitude of answers.  A logical explanation is that a 
decision is a rationally based choice between at least two alternative courses of action.  
If a decision-maker perceives only one choice of action is available, it can be argued 
that there is in fact no decision to be made.  However, to have arrived at such a point 
is the outcome of many previous decisions.   
 
This simple explanation of a decision conceals many of the intricacies and judgements 
within the intertwined decision-making and problem solving processes.  Firstly a 
decision-maker must identify a need to make a decision.  Often the decision-making 
process is instigated by a change in the status quo or driven by the desire to move 
towards an identified goal (e.g. improved company performance). 
 
Simply identifying the need to make a decision does not guarantee that one will be 
made.  Before the presumption of choice can be applied, the decision-maker must 
have considered the problem space and have identified a preferred end state 
(MacKenzie, 1975; March, 1994, and Hogarth 1980).  Following this, the decision-
maker must formulate and evaluate courses of action which could potentially achieve 
the desired end state.  The cognitive workload required to assess numerous, possibly 
complex, courses of action should not be underestimated.  Complex courses of action 
may not be easily compared and contrasted (Lindsay and Norman, 1977) particularly 
as the human short term memory can only store around seven pieces of information 
(Miller, 1956).   
 
Once all the courses of action have been evaluated, it is critical that the decision-
maker feels able to select and, crucially, implement the preferred course of action.  
Intent is rarely sufficient to gain a desired outcome.  Once implemented, the progress 
of the chosen course of action should be monitored and controlled.  There are a 
plethora of factors which may affect a decision which are hidden from the decision-
maker until they unexpectedly alter the outcome and create uncertainty.   
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This procedurally based explanation of decision-making is contested by Hollnagel 
(2007, pages 4–5) who argues that decision-making should be considered as an 
activity based not upon the assumptions of a rational decision-maker but upon the 
assumptions that: 
 
· “Decision making is not a discrete and identifiable event, but rather represents 
an attribution after the fact. 
· Decision making is not primarily a choice among alternatives.  It is very 
difficult in practice to separate decisions from what is otherwise needed to 
achieve a decision maker’s objectives, that is, what is required to implement 
the chosen alternative. 
· Decision making is not usually a distinct event that takes place at a specific 
point in time, or within a certain time window and which therefore can be 
dissociated or isolated – even if ever so briefly – from what goes on in the 
environment.”   
 
The consideration of decision-making as an activity, rather than a process moves the 
emphasis of a decision from being ‘what should be done’ to that of ‘how and when’ to 
undertake an activity.   
 
2.1.3 Decision-making models. 
Decision-making models are generally classified into three broad categories: 
descriptive, normative and prescriptive.  It is argued that the latter of these descriptors 
is not in fact a decision-making model, but rather a framework which seeks to identify 
how decision-makers may be best supported (Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, 1988). 
 
2.1.3.1 Descriptive decision-making models.  
Developed within the field of psychology, descriptive decision-making models seek to 
portray how and why rational people make decisions.  This immediately raises the 
question ‘what is rational?’.  Within the field of economics, rational people are taken 
to be those who seek to maximise their gain and as such seek to make optimal 
decisions.  To genuinely make such a decision requires perfect knowledge of all 
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possible alternatives and the probability of both the alternative and any associated 
outcome occurring (pure theory of rational choice).  Rarely does this happen.  Indeed 
in many situations, the cost and time requirement to gather the information required to 
provide all possible alternatives and their outcomes would, if not impossible, be 
prohibitively expensive.  Hollnagel (2007, page 5) raises an important point on the 
topic of time and information in that “decision making, whatever it is, takes time and 
therefore logically requires that the information it uses remains valid whilst the 
decision is made.”   
 
In contrast to the theory of pure rationality, Simon (1957) made two important 
observations.  Firstly, that individuals are only rational for part of the time and 
frequently make less than optimal decisions.  Secondly, that individuals make use of a 
series of heuristics to simplify the decision-making process.  These observations play 
an important part in Simon’s widely accepted bounded rationality model (work for 
which he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics).   
 
Bounded rationality accepts that both time and cost constraints can limit the data 
available upon which to base a decision.  These constraints when combined with a 
decision-maker’s intelligence, cognitive ability and perception of the situation prevent 
an optimal solution from being selected (Bazerman, 1986).  The bounded rationality 
model simplifies the decision space by only requiring a decision-maker to consider 
the consequences of the current actions being considered.  The requirement of perfect 
knowledge for alternatives and outcomes is removed.  This allows uncertainty to enter 
into the decision-making process.  Furthermore, by removing the necessity to select 
an optimal course of action, the assumption of bounded rationality allows for a 
satisficing decision to be taken (March and Simon 1958, and Simon, 1988).  Such a 
decision does not seek the optimal course of action but rather that for which the 
predicted outcome exceeds a personally defined threshold for each attribute of the 
decision (note that the threshold level can vary between attributes). 
 
The use of a threshold allows this theory to be applied in situations where alternative 
solutions can be assessed sequentially.  Once a solution is found which surpasses the 
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defined threshold for each attribute, the search stops and a satisificing solution has 
been found.  It is feasible that an individual’s thresholds will vary over time and, 
consequently, a decision may be defined as being acceptable, reasonable, rational or 
sensible when fully considered within the context in which it was taken.  If the 
context or constraints in which it was taken are removed or misrepresented then the 
decision may no longer be thought of as sensible.   
 
The choices taken by individuals within the constraints they find themselves in are 
defined by March (1994, page 2) as being conditional upon four basic questions: 
 
· “The question of alternatives:  What actions are possible? 
· The question of expectations:  What future consequences might follow from 
each alternative?  How likely is each possible consequence, assuming that 
alternative is chosen? 
· The question of preferences: How valuable (to the decision maker) are the 
consequences associated with each of the alternatives? 
· The question of the decision rule:  How is a choice to be made among the 
alternatives in terms of the values of their consequences?” 
 
By providing a representation of what people actually do, descriptive models must 
consider a myriad of interlinking factors including (Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, 1988): 
perception of uncertainty, decision-making biases; how problems are decomposed and 
decisions made; the impact of tradition, intuition and culture.  Of course not every 
model will consider all of these factors in detail.  Indeed it may not be possible to 
incorporate some of the above ideas into computer models.  Yet, all of these factors 
will impact upon real people’s decisions and a descriptive model will be evaluated 
based upon how well its selected course of action matches those taken by individuals 
in the same circumstance.   
 
2.1.3.2 Normative decision-making models. 
In contrast to descriptive decision-making models, normative decision making models 
are based in philosophy, yet developed through the fields of economics and 
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mathematics.  These models do not seek to describe what real individuals do but 
rather provide a mathematical model of an idealised decision-maker taking an optimal 
decision.  Essentially normative models show what a ‘rational’ decision-maker should 
do.  The results of such a model provide a normative standard against which real life 
decisions can be evaluated and compared.  Deviations from the normative standard 
are considered to have been caused by biases within individual decision-making.    
 
The idealised representations of decision-making within normative models allows 
decisions to be assessed outside of their original, or any, context.  Consequently, 
normative decision-making models do not consider an individual’s core values, 
beliefs or perception.  Such models do assume that the decision-maker is rational and 
in line with the economic definition of such a person, will seek to maximise their gain 
and minimise losses.  One of the fundamental principles of normative models is that 
of transitivity.  The property of transitivity should hold anytime objects / events are 
compared and its basic rules are: 
 
· If A> B and B> C then A > C. 
· If A = B and B = C then A = C. 
· If A = B and C > 0 then A + C > B. 
 
The above rules may be considered as ‘just being common sense’.  Indeed the use of 
these rules enables the development of a logical flow of cho ice and decisions within a 
mathematical framework.  Yet, the principle of transitivity assumes an individual’s 
preferences will not change which simply may not be true.  Furthermore, individuals 
evaluate gains differently and not always numerically.  So whilst these rules do form 
the basis of many decision models it can be seen that they do not always apply. 
 
One commonly used mathematical technique for the analysis of normative decision-
making models is utility theory (French, 1989).  The psychological basis of utility 
theory is that a value, or utility, can be placed upon the perceived outcomes of each 
possible course of action.  This classical economist view of utility, was expanded by 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) to portray the decision-maker’s attitude 
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towards the concepts of risk and uncertainty within decisions.  Leading on from this 
early work, Savage (1954) developed the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model in 
which the decision-maker assigns not only a utility to each identified outcome, ( )ixu , 
but also the probability that the outcome will occur, ( )ixP .  The subjectivity of the 
measure lies in the fact that the probability of an outcome occurring is rarely known 
objectively, and therefore must be subjectively assessed by the decision-maker.  
Combining the utility and probability values of each subjective outcome i  the 
subjective expected utility of each alternative is defined as: 
 
( ) ( )å
i
ii xPxu
   
Equation 2.1:  Subjective Expected Utility. 
 
Overall, the decision-maker would be expected to select the alternative with the 
highest SEU.  One commonly used method to assign utilities is through the use of 
hypothetical lotteries.  The use of such lotteries determines the shape of the utility 
function by varying the values included within the lottery.  Based upon the decision-
maker’s stated preferences, the values associated with the lottery outcomes are altered 
until the decision-maker expresses no preference between the guaranteed result and 
that of the potential gamble.  The shape of the finalised utility function is 
representative of the decision-maker’s attitude to risk.   
 
Of course, not all values associated with an outcome are monetary or have utilities 
which can be easily compared.  The factors which must be considered when buying a 
house include not only cost but the size of the house, its location, local amenities and 
many more besides.  A fair consideration of all these factors will require the use of 
Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) (Belton, 1990; Guitouni and Martel, 1998, 
and Goodwin and Wright, 1999) techniques which include Multi-Attribute Utility 
Theory (MAUT) the Simple Multi Attribute Rating Technique (SMART), (Edwards 
1971, and Edwards and Barron, 1994 advanced by Roberts and Goodwin, 2002) and 
the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty 1990 and Sinunay-Stern, Meherz and 
Hadad, 2000).  Such techniques are compensatory (that is the overall strength of a 
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potential solution is found through evaluation of its weak and strong attributes) and by 
evaluating all options simultaneously, not sequentially.   
 
Although widely used, many decision-makers often express preferences, particularly 
in situations of risk, which are at odds with the fundamental principles of utility 
theory.  In an extension of utility theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed 
prospect theory to take account of these sometime contradictory preferences. 
 
Within utility theory a worth, as expressed through its utility, is associated with each 
outcome.  Prospect theory replaces the notion of utility with a value expressed in 
terms of losses and gains relative to a reference point.  The value of each alternative is 
assessed through a two stage process defined as editing and evaluation. 
 
The focus of the editing phase of prospect theory is to ‘frame’ the decision which is, 
according to Tversky and Kahneman (1981, page 25) “the decision-maker’s 
conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular 
choice.  The frame that a decision maker adopts is controlled partly by the formulation 
of the problem and partly by the norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the 
decision maker.”  Importantly, decisions can frequently be framed in more than one 
way.   
 
The framing of the decision also comprises two parts: simplification and coding.  
Firstly, the decision-maker creates a simplified mental model of the situation being 
considered.  This is achieved through the use of heuristics such as cancellation 
(discarding common components of all potential courses of action and is related to the 
‘sure-thing’ principle of utility theory as developed by Savage, 1954) and detection of 
dominance (which, if any, course of action is preferable in all aspects to every 
alternative (Noorderhaven, 1995).   
 
Following the development of a simplified mental mode, the decision-maker codes 
each course of action.  Wright (1985, page 5) defines coding as the “perception of a 
decision maker of each of the gamble outcomes as being either a gain or a loss, with a 
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gain or loss being defined relative to a reference point.”  The reference point chosen 
by the decision-maker can be influenced by previous decisions, but is generally 
defined by a level of aspiration.   
 
The overall value of a course of action is determined on the basis of a value function.  
A hypothetical function is shown below in Figure 2.1.  It can be seen that the 
reference point is assigned a value of zero, above the reference point the function is 
concave, and below the reference point it is convex.  Another important feature of the 
value function is that it is steeper for losses than for gains – this expresses the notion 
that individuals feel losses more keenly than gains.   
 
 
Figure 2.1:  Hypothetical value function for prospect theory. 
 
The positioning of the reference point also affects an individual’s attitude to risk.  If 
an outcome is considered to be a gain, then the decision-maker will tend to be risk 
averse.  Conversely, for an outcome perceived to be a loss the decision-maker will be 
risk seeking.  Prospect theory leads to a fourfold pattern of risk attitude, namely 
(Noorderhaven, 1995, page 90) 
 
· “Risk aversion for gains of moderate to high probability. 
· Risk seeking for gains of small probability. 
· Risk seeking for losses of moderate to high probability. 
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· Risk aversion for losses of small probability.” 
 
An individual’s attitude to risk will be influenced not only by whether the outcome is 
a loss or gain, but by the probabilities associated with the outcomes.  In utility theory 
the probability is used to weight the utility.  However, in prospect theory a value is 
multiplied by a decision’s weight which is a function of but not the actual, probability.   
Overall decision weights tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight 
moderate and high probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). 
 
There are two more main differences between utility and prospect theory, both of 
which relate to the perception of risk: the certainty and pseudocertainty effect.  The 
certainty effect is “a reduction in the probability of an outcome by a constant factor 
[and] has more impact when the outcome was initially certain than when it was 
merely probable.” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, page 455, cited in Plous 1993 page 
99)  In essence, individuals prefer to remove rather than simply reduce risk.  Linked to 
this effect is the pseudocertainty effect, which differs only from the certainty effect in 
that the certainty is apparent rather than real.  Within the original work carried out by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981), individuals were shown the potential outcomes of two 
treatments in response to an epidemic.  In one scenario treatment A was presented 
only in terms of the number of survivors and treatment B in terms of the probabilities 
of those who would survive and those which would die.  An alternative scenario 
presented treatment A only in terms of those which would die and treatment B again 
as probabilities of those which would die or survive.  The actual values used in the 
experiment meant that each treatment had the same outcome in terms of those which 
would survive.  However, the framing of the question revealed an interesting result 
about risk perception.  In the first scenario, participants preferred treatment A, 
presented only in terms of survivors – the individuals were risk adverse.  Conversely, 
in the second scenario, individuals were more risk-seeking, preferring the option B 
which gave the possibility of avoiding a perceived definite negative outcome.   
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2.1.3.3 Naturalistic Decision-Making. 
In contrast to the study of decision-making in laboratory based situations, Naturalistic 
Decision-Making (NDM) is “the study of how people use their experience to make 
decisions in field settings” (Klein, 1997, page 11).  Developed through extensive 
observations, NDM is mainly used in pressurised situations where experienced 
decision-makers are faced with ill-structured problems (Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood 
and Zsambok, 1993, Zsambok and Klein, 1997, and Shapira, 2002).  One of the main 
differences between classical decision-making models and NDM is the assumed time 
available in which a decision can be made.  The focus of NDM is upon time 
pressurised situations in which an expert simply ‘knows what to do’.  In contrast, 
normative and descriptive decision-making models centre on decisions in which the 
decision-maker has sufficient time to assess the available options. 
 
Within NDM the initial focus of effort is upon assessing the situation to fully 
understand the problem with which the decision-maker is faced (for similar work see 
Cohen, Thompson, Adelman, Bresnick, Tolcott and Freeman, 1995).  Subsequently, 
any potential courses of action are considered sequentially with options being rejected 
when a problem is identified, and eventually a satisficing, rather than optimal solution 
being accepted.  In total, NDM comprises six main approaches (Shapira, 2002): Image 
theory, decision cycles, explanation based decision-making, cognitive continuum 
theory, the dominance search model and situation assessment and recognition.  
 
This latter model is of particular interest to military decision-making.  Much of 
Klein’s work for the development of the Recognition Primed Decision-making (RPD) 
model was based upon observations of fire fighters, who often work in stressful, 
rapidly fluctuating situations.  The fluid nature of the environment necessitates that 
the fire fighter continually evaluates the situation changing their priorities as required.  
Klein (1999) claims that experts (fire fighters or not) are able to quickly assess a 
situation based upon previous, similar situations encountered and hence can easily 
disregard irrelevant information and focus only on that which is important.  However, 
a certain amount of deliberation may occur with decision-makers whose expertise or 
experience does not enable them to immediately recognise a situation and therefore be 
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able to rapidly filter the available information.  Potential courses of action which are 
not applicable to the situation being considered are swiftly ruled out and a course of 
action likely to succeed is selected.  In essence, the expert is acting at an almost 
subconscious level as they simply know what to do (Klein, 1999).  From the previous 
discussion, within RPD decision making is considered an activity, not a process 
(Hollnagel, 2007).   
 
2.1.4 Cognitive heuristics and uncertainty. 
 
2.1.4.1 Cognitive heuristics. 
Following on from the work of Simon (1957), seminal work by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) reported on how three (robust) heuristics (representativeness, 
availability and adjustment and anchoring) were used to simplify the assessment and 
prediction of probabilities.   
 
For the most part, heuristics are seen as being helpful in decision-making (Hastie and 
Dawes, 2001).  Not only are heuristics used to provide a simplified representation of a 
problem, they may also be considered as being both ‘fast and frugal’ (Gigerenzer, 
Todd and the ABC Research Group, 1999).  This latter definition has been applied to 
heuristics for their ability to reduce the time taken to process the available (and 
sometimes incomplete) information associated with a decision.  Yet, the prevalent use 
of heuristics throughout decision-making can also lead to the introduction of biases 
and errors within human judgements.  Beginning with initially assessing the size of 
problem being faced, Nutt (1989, paraphrased from page 69) notes that: 
 
· “Decision-makers recognize information selectively and give information that 
is readily available too much weight. 
· Errors in recognizing and weighing information stem from: 
o Difficulty in accurately estimating the frequency of events. 
o Giving events with which one has a kinship too much weight. 
o Emphasizing information consistent with past experiences. 
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o Being drawn to vivid information and discounting the value of pallid 
information. 
o Order effects, in which information that is initially recognised has 
more weight than information recognized later.” 
 
2.1.4.1.1 The availability heuristic. 
The availability heuristic utilises the ease with which instances can be recalled to 
gauge the probability of an event occurring.  This heuristic can be advantageous when 
considering large classes which are usually more easily recalled than instance from 
less frequent classes.  That said, events which have an emotional attachment, or have 
vivid imagery associated with them will be more easily recalled than mundane every 
day events (Bazerman, 1986).  Yet the ease and vividness with which an event is 
remembered does not mean these events have any relevance to the events for which 
an estimate is being derived (Lichtenstien, Slovic, Fishhoff, Layman, and Coombs, 
1978).  Therefore, it can be seen that the availability can introduce biases into 
judgements through (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974): retrievability of instances 
(affected by the decision-maker’s familiarity with the class being considered and 
salience); the effectiveness of the search set (the search set identified is dependent 
upon the task and it may often be easier to identify contexts in which abstract 
concepts appear as opposed to placing concrete concepts in context); imaginability 
(when the frequency of a class is not assessed by the number of instances recalled but 
through the use of a given rule) and the illusory correlation (when the assessment of 
the frequency of two events occurring is based upon the perceived bond between 
them). 
 
2.1.4.1.2 Representative heuristic. 
Many probabilistic assessments require decision-makers to determine the relative 
frequency of an event or object from a given class.  When arriving at an estimate, 
individuals commonly use the heuristic of representativeness and thereby base their 
value upon how similar, or representative, a person, event or object is to a specific 
class or ‘type’.  Consequently, this heuristic inevitably brings to the fore an 
individual’s preconceptions about the characteristics of a given class. 
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The bias of representativeness can lead to people displaying gambler’s fallacy, that is 
predicting that an event that has not occurred for a while is more likely to occur in the 
near future (Lindsey and Norman, 1977). 
 
The gambler’s fallacy may be observed when someone believes that an independent 
result is more likely to happen based upon a recent series of events, for example: the 
roulette wheel has stopped on three blacks in a row therefore it is more likely that on 
the next spin it will stop on a red.  This, of course, is simply not true.  The bias of base 
rate neglect arises when the underlying relative frequency of some condition is 
ignored or not taken fully into consideration.  In addition to base rate neglect, the 
representativeness heuristic can also lead to insensitivity to sample size.  Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) note than when making an estimate, individuals effectively ignore 
data relating to sample size from which any information has been taken.  Finally, the 
representative heuristic can lead to the regression fallacy.   This fallacy occurs when 
an individual ascribes cause to an event for which none exists by failing to consider 
the natural variation in a series of events.  Examples include the variation in the value 
of commodities in a stock market or grades of a student over differing semesters.  The 
fallacy occurs when a prediction is made based upon an exceptional point in the 
series, for example a very high price for a given commodity.  Most people naturally 
assume that future outcomes will be representative of past outcomes and assume that 
the exceptional point in the series will continue.  When, over time the value returns to 
that which is cons idered more normal, individuals start to believe their actions created 
the peak value, when in fact it was not causal but simply a natural variation in the 
series.   
 
2.1.4.1.3 Anchoring and adjustment. 
The final heuristic considered by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) was that of 
anchoring and adjustment in which decision-makers arrive at an estimated value by 
adjusting their belief from an initial value, known as an anchor.  As a result, different 
starting points will return different estimates – this is known as anchoring.  The biases 
associated with these heuristics are: insufficient adjustment away from the initial 
anchoring value (which occurs both when the decision-maker is told the anchor value 
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and when they are free to select their own) and in the evaluation of conjunctive and 
disjunctive events (overall, people tend to overestimate the probability of conjunctive 
events and underestimate the probability of disjunctive events). 
 
Additional heuristics impacting upon individual decision-making are (Gross, 2001; 
Dawes, 1988, and Villejoubert and Mandel, 2002):  
 
· Belief perseverance (the tendency to cling to a belief even in the face of 
contradictory evidence),  
· Overconfidence,  
· Expectations and hindsight,  
· Entrapment (also known as the sunk cost fallacy, this is the feeling of no 
choice but to continue in an investment as the costs of withdrawal cannot be 
justified.  For additional information refer to Arkes and Blumer, 1985),  
· The inverse fallacy.   
 
The overconfidence heuristic is often shown by individuals being overconfident that 
the true value they are estimating lies within the bounds they have provided.  As such, 
events with a low probability of occurring are overestimated, and those with a high 
probability of occurring are underestimated (Lichtenstien et al, 1978)  Furthermore, 
individuals tend to overestimate the probability of events which have a favourable 
outcome to them (also known as the misconception of chance, for additional 
information see Weinstein, 1980) 
 
The last noted fallacy, the inverse fallacy, is of particular importance when seeking 
subjective probability judgements.  When asked to provide the probability of an event 
given an observed piece of data, for example given that is has rained what is the 
probability that the grass is wet, individuals inadvertently respond with the probability 
that it has rained given that the grass is wet.  Although this is a simple example, there 
are of course differences in the stated values.  Ensuring that the required probabilities 
have been elicited for further use and analysis is important.          
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Although heuristics are a source of error in human judgement making, Goodwin and 
Wright (1999, page 263) note that the results of research into the psychological 
aspects of decision-making has “largely carried out on inexperienced decision makers 
carrying out artificial tasks in psychological laboratories, rather than real-world 
decision makers making real decisions.”  Perhaps then, the results of human 
judgement making are not that bad.  Indeed, Stewarts, Roebber and Bosan (1997) 
found that there was negligible bias within human judgements on forecasts when high 
quality information was available and the forecast was based upon a predictable task. 
 
2.1.4.2 Uncertainty. 
The use of cognitive heuristics to simplify a problem and thus reduce cognitive 
workload comes to the fore in decisions involving uncertainty.  Uncertainty can enter 
a decision in many ways including (Nutt, 1989): being unable to predict future 
conditions and the consequences of trends (e.g. an economic slow down) or the 
inability to evaluate alternative courses of action.  In essence, uncertainty enters a 
decision when the decision-maker is unable to make predictions due to the desired 
information being unavailable (e.g. the information is incomplete, of low fidelity or 
may not yet have been collated).   
 
A combination of ambiguity and uncertainty can lead to conflict (for example 
disagreement between stakeholders as to how to deal with uncertainty) and “tough” 
decisions (Nutt, 1989).  Additional factors which complicate the decision-making 
process include time pressure, poorly defined goals and the presence of multiple 
stakeholders.  The effects of uncertainty and time pressure impact a decision-maker’s 
choice as when (Goodwin and Wright, 1999, page 65) “under pressure to reach a 
speedy decision, non-compensatory strategies become dominant and when 
information on an attribute is missing, people may infer [italics in original quote] an 
attribute value if they believe it is strongly related to another attribute.  For example, 
price may be used to infer quality.”  Additional factors affecting time pressured 
decisions are the quality, timeliness and order in which information is presented 
(Horvitz and Barry 1995, Reneau and Blanthorne, 2001). 
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Of course, most real world decisions are taken with varying levels of uncertainty.  
When there is real difficulty in predicting the outcome of a decision, it is common to 
refer to the risk associated with the identified courses of action (Williams, 2007 and  
Radford, 1975).  How the risks associated with a decision are viewed is dependent 
upon the framing of the problem being considered: is the problem couched in terms of 
losses or gains? (Purkitt and Dyson, 1987)  Yet, the acceptance of risk (and thus 
definition of an acceptable level of risk) is dependent upon an individual decision-
maker’s personal perceptions of risk (Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby and 
Keeney, 1981).  A review of normative models for risky decision-making is given in 
Gilhooly (1988). 
 
2.1.4.2.1 Subjective probabilities. 
One method of expressing risk and uncertainty is through the use of probabilities.  
There are two ways in which to assign probabilities: objectively through analysis of 
experimental or extant empirical data, or by subjective judgement.  When uncertainty 
prevails within a problem, frequently no data exists from which to derive the required 
probabilities (such as the effect of locating high level nuclear waste as discussed in 
DeWispelare, Herren, Clemen, 1995).  Consequently, decisions involving uncertainty 
often rely on the use of subjective probabilities.  By relying upon their expertise, 
subjective probabilities elicited from experts are, obviously, quantitative expressions 
of belief personal to the individual in the context presented (Sanders and Ritzman 
1992).  Early work on subjective probability was developed by De Finetti in the 1920s 
in which he defined probability as being “simply a question of making mathematically 
precise the trivial and obvious idea that the degree of probability attributed by an 
individual to a given event is revealed by the conditions under which he would be 
disposed to be on that event” (De Finetti 1937, page 101).  However, this definition 
rests upon the assumption that decision-makers are rational and will show coherence 
in any bets placed.  It also assumes that uncertainty can be represented quantifiably 
through a probability (O’Hagan and Oakley, 2004). 
 
Each of the many subjective probability elicitation techniques and methods differ in 
their approach to engaging an expert in order to elicit the required knowledge (van der 
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Gaag, Renooij, Witteman, Aleman and Taal, 2002; Hoffman, Shadbolt, Burton and 
Klein 1995; Wright and Ayton 1987; Hart, 1985; Shadbolt and Burton 1995, and 
Savage, 1971).  There is no universally accepted technique, with the specific choice 
usually being left to the researcher.  Many of the techniques are designed for the 
elicitation of rules to be used within expert systems and are therefore context specific 
(Moody, Will and Blanton 1996, and Oritz, Wheeler, Breeding, Hora, Meyer and 
Keeney, 1991).  With this in mind, it is important to remember that there is evidence 
to suggest that probability assessments are not always invariant between elicitation 
techniques (Keren, 1991, and Pöyhönen and Hämäläinen, 2001).  However, research 
by Breivik and Supphellen (2003) showed that method bias was not considered to be a 
serious problem when eliciting evaluative attributes.  Therefore, whilst it is possible to 
elicit tacit knowledge, the techniques used should provide some validation of the 
experts (and novices) used in the process (Bradley, Paul and Seeman 2006). 
 
There are two main types of elicitation techniques: natural and contrived (Shadbolt 
and Burton, 1995).  Natural elicitation techniques include observing an expert in their 
work or the use of interviews (structured, semi-structured and unstructured) and 
protocol analysis (verbal and behavioural).  To be of most use, the interview process 
must: define the aim and importance of the task; clearly define the required 
probability and identify and so remove cognitive biases in the responses before finally 
encoding and verifying the given probability distributions.  (Spetzler and Stäel von 
Holstein, 1975 cited in Goodwin and Wright, 1999, and Lau and Leong, 1999).  In 
essence, natural techniques use situations and expressions which are familiar to the 
expert.  Contrived techniques use processes with which the expert may not be 
accustomed to, including conceptual mapping and goal decomposition.   
 
Elicitation techniques can also be defined as those which require the expert to provide 
explicit statements of probability including the median and the range, or spread, of 
results about this value (commonly referred to as the inter quartile range, Garthwaite 
and O’Hagan, 2000, and Moody et al, 1996) and those which infer probabilities (often 
based upon the theoretical bets suggested by De Finetti) (Goodwin and Wright, 1999).  
Other commonly used techniques include direct numerical assessment, probability 
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wheels and scaled probability bars.  Wang, Dash and Druzdel (2002) developed a 
framework for the comparison of such commonly used elicitation techniques based 
upon machine learning of experts’ beliefs.  They concluded that the most accurate and 
least time consuming technique was a scaled probability bar.  That said, the results 
from such comparison studies have not been conclusive.  Renooij and Wittemen 
(1999, page 268, cited in Wiegmann, 2005 page 4) writes that “What is lacking are 
large multi-method studies where experts are asked to assess a large number of 
probabilities with every single method.”  Wiegmann (2005, page 4) goes on to state 
that “There is a need to determine which methods are best, or whether certain methods 
work better in different contexts.”   
 
Whichever technique is used, O’Hagan (1998) notes that eliciting expert beliefs 
should be done as simply as possible and in a way which is familiar to the expert.  In 
addition to this any technique used should identify and separately elicit the main 
sources of uncertainty to reduce expert overconfidence (O’Hagan 1998).  This is one 
of the main causes of poor quality subjective probability distributions (van Lenthe 
1993).   It is important that consistency checks are applied to the elicited distributions.  
Often, this can be achieved by calibrating the expert.  In contrast to using an 
elicitation technique to minimise the biases within subjective values, O’Hagan and 
Oakley (2004) suggest explicitly stating the imprecision associated with subjective 
distributions.  This could be achieved by specifically considering aleatory (caused by 
natural variation in the situation being assessed) or epistemic (caused by the expert 
having insufficient knowledge about a situation to provide the required value) 
uncertainty.  Whilst the use of expert opinion can, in theory, reduce the instances of 
epistemic uncertainty it cannot reduce aleatory uncertainty. 
 
 
2.1.4.2.2 Elicitation as part of risk analysis. 
Risk analysis is a diverse field encompassing all areas of life from national defence, 
construction (Adams, 2006), power generation (Oritz, Wheeler, Breeding, Hora, 
Meyer, and Keeney, 1991), health, and transport to name but a few.  Fundamentally, 
risk analysis is about quantitatively, or qualitatively, determining the likelihood of an 
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event and its subsequent outcome occurring.  For many situations, particularly when 
assessing the risk of rare or extreme events historical data may not be available, or if 
available be open to multiple interpretations  (Parent and Bernier, 2003).  
Consequently, subjective opinion is commonly used within risk analysis.   
 
When eliciting subjective values, care must be taken not only in the selection of 
experts but also on the interview procedure used.  Cohene and Easterbrook (2005) 
developed a framework through which an appropriate interview could be designed, 
dependent upon the elicitation process to be used.  Forester, Bley, Cooper, Lois, Siu, 
Kolaczkowski and Wreathall (2004) developed an elicitation technique specifically 
designed for use in estimating probabilities for unsafe human actions.  The technique 
centres on the probabilistic risk assessment, the knowledge and experience of experts 
and the translation of information into probabilities which can then be used.  Some 
verification of the experts used to provide estimates is gained through direct 
questioning of their expertise and knowledge relevant to the probability of interest.  
The approach can be applied to both groups and individuals.  Galway (2007) suggests 
that any protocol aimed at eliciting probability distributions should elicit the 
minimum, upper, and most likely values to which a triangular distribution should be 
applied.  In addition to this, Parent and Bernier (2003) write that subjective 
distributions can be usefully elicited by being based upon quantities with a practical 
application to an expert’s own field.   
 
Subjective values can be used to define prior distributions within Bayesian techniques 
to analyse risk.  Wiegmann (2005) reports on the development of a methodology 
specifically focused on improving the accuracy of subjective expert values for use in 
risk analysis.  The finalised tool integrated a variety of techniques to elicit values  
with (Wiegmann, 2005, page 7) “probability elicitation questions in frequency format, 
which has been shown to suppress overconfidence, base rate neglect, the conjunction 
fallacy, control bias and over-estimation of single-event probabilities.”  The tool 
elicited the required values based upon the expert’s opinion of how a product 
influenced the level of accident precursors within the risk model.  Comparing the 
output of a model against predictions made by experts is a common verification 
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methodology.  Laskey (1995) developed a framework designed to support the 
elicitation of probabilities based upon such a comparison.  Through the use of 
sensitivity values the most influential parameters within a network were identified.  
Support was subsequently targeted at the elicitation of the values supporting these 
parameters.  
 
The use of Bayesian techniques is particularly useful when data is scarce.  Adams 
(2006) concluded that although experts appeared to have some difficulty in estimating 
intermediate and tail values of probability distributions, the values which were given 
could be used to develop prior distributions, and when coupled with sample 
information, this enabled a Bayesian analysis of risk.  Coolen, Mertens and Newby 
(1992) used a Bayesian approach to risk analysis due to a lack of, and the poor quality 
of, available data.    
 
For a comprehensive review of elicitation of subjective values in risk analysis and 
where appropriate their combination with Bayesian techniques, the reader is referred 
to Mosleh, Bier and Apostolakis (1988). 
 
The following second section of this literature review moves on from the 
consideration of decision-making theories to discuss how decision-makers can be 
supported.   
2.2 Decision support systems. 
 
2.2.1 Is there a need for decision support systems? 
Savešek, and Pavešic (2007, page 293) comment that “Complex systems and ill 
defined information are one of the most influential factors in the decision-making 
process.  When making a decision, one has to face the uncertainty of future events and 
the uncertainties which accompany the transmission, transfer and reception of 
information.”  When faced with complexity and uncertainty, Jarupanthirun and 
Zahedi (2007, page 1533) note that “individual decision makers are often incapable of 
making the best decisions when the problem is complex”.   
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Uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity are inherent parts of the military domain and 
intelligence analysis. The collation, fusing and interpretation of data to support 
informed decision-making has been an important part of the military campaign 
throughout history.  Of course, there have been dramatic changes in the information 
available to commanders.  Wellington relied mainly upon information he could see for 
himself.  Today, intelligence can be gained from many sources.  Such information can 
support a vast array of decisions through the provision of situational awareness, 
warning of potential or immediate threats through to analysis and identification of 
organised crime. 
 
In a complex environment where priorities may rapidly change, decision-makers may 
feel compelled to respond quickly, frequently making strategic, tactical or operational 
decisions (Turbain, Aronson, Liang and Sharda, 2007).  In such an environment, the 
speed of decision-making is limited by an individual’s information processing 
capabilities (Silver, 1991).   
 
The sheer volume of information, or the number of contributing factors create 
decisions which are simply too complex to be made without some form of support, 
whether that be procedural, informational or computational (Rhodes 1993).  In such 
situations, there remains the possibility of automating the decision-making process.  
However, Zack (2007) remarks that this is only possible in situations where there is 
sufficient information about possible outcomes, and their likelihood, to be included 
within a model.  This information is not always available, and in the absence of an 
automated decision-making rule set, the individual will use heuristics to simplify the 
decision problem.  At this point a Decision Support System (DSS) may be of help.   
 
By using a DSS a decision maker can “minimize the chances of (1) making a poor 
decision, (2) missing a good alternative, (3) making a decision at a bad time, or (4) 
focusing on the wrong issues or problems.” (Carter, Murray, Walker and Walker, 
1992).  In his seminal work, Sprague (1980, taken from reprint in Sprague and 
Watson 1986, paraphrased from page 10) proposes 6 performance objectives for a 
DSS in that it should: 
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· Provide support for decision making, but with emphasis on semi-structured and 
unstructured decisions. 
· Provide decision-making support for managers at all levels, assisting in 
integration between the levels whenever appropriate. 
· Support decisions which are interdependent as well as those that are 
independent. 
· Support all phases of the decision making process. 
· Support a variety of decision making processes, but not be dependent upon any 
one. 
· Be easy to use. 
 
All of the benefits listed here are achievable by individuals given the appropriate 
amount of time and data.  Yet a DSS can achieve these benefits quickly, accurately 
and cheaply.  Even so, Reneau and Blanthorne (2001) note individuals are unlikely to 
base important decisions solely upon a statistical model.  Therefore, the real benefit of 
using a DSS is to facilitate the combining of human and computational capabilities to 
enhance the decision-making process.   
 
2.2.2 What is a decision support system? 
The term DSS was initially used in the early 1970’s.  However, during the 30 year 
research into the field of DSSs no universally accepted definition has been agreed.  
Frada and George (2007, page 1647) write that “The term…DSS has since been 
treated as an “umbrella” term in that it represents a variety of techniques and 
technologies usually borrowed from a range of disciplines which aim at improving 
access to necessary information for more effective decision-making.”  Regardless of 
the tool, technique or process used, the general aim of a DSS is to provide access to 
“the right knowledge…to the right processors, in the right representations and at the 
right time.” (Holsapple and Joshi, 2003, page 91 cited in Frada and George, 2007, 
page 1647) 
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Such broad definition of a DSS encompasses both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ techniques within 
the realm of operational research.  Carter et al (1992, page 9) separated all techniques 
into three broad areas:  
 
· “Procedures (e.g., checklists) to organise his or her thinking or provide a 
framework within which specific analytical methods can be used. 
· Methods and techniques (e.g., simulation) to help examine alternative 
solutions. 
· Presentational forms (e.g., charts and graphs to help display and review data, 
inter relationships and outputs).” 
 
Stenfors, Tanner Syrjänen, Seppälä, and Hasapalinna (2007) found that the most 
commonly cited DSSs were the simplest.  Overall, SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities, and Threats) analysis and those presented in spreadsheet applications 
were the most cited.  This result is most likely due to the decision-makers who 
participated in the study citing the decision support systems they themselves used.  
More complex DSS (such as simulations or business intelligence systems) which may 
provide input for decisions taken at managerial or board level were not actually 
manipulated or run by the decision-makers questioned.  Consequently, complex DSS 
were not cited as the most used.  Undoubtedly, techniques such as SWOT analysis 
and brain storming are commonly used.  However, the growth in computing power 
has inevitably lead to a focus on the development of interactive DSS software.     
 
The first computer based DSS was developed during the Second World War to assist 
with the analysis of data in support of wartime needs (Silver 1991).  However, it was 
not until the rapid development of computing capabilities in the 1970’s and onwards 
that computer based DSSs became viable.  Edwards, Phillips, Hays and Goodman 
(1968) designed a probabilistic information processing system (PIP) to support 
decision-making.  The system itself was Bayesian based and required participants to 
provide a likelihood ratio (probability of an event occurring given that the hypothesis 
is true versus the probability of the event occurring given that the hypothesis is not 
true) for each hypothesis being considered.  Edwards et al (1968, page 248) write that 
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“a computer aggregates these estimates by means of Bayes’ theorem…into a posterior 
distribution that reflects the impact of all available data on all hypotheses being 
considered.  Such a system circumnavigates human conservatism in information 
processing, the inability of men to aggregate information in such a way as to modify 
their opinions as much as the available data justify.”  Although the PIP was shown to 
be efficient and improve operator performance, it was restricted by the computational 
power available at that time. 
 
Many early decision support systems built upon developments in Management 
Information Systems (MIS) which were capable of providing basic reports based upon 
the extant data collection protocols.  DSSs differ from MISs in that whilst MISs 
respond to ‘what if’ queries with a rule based ‘if …then’ response “fundamental to the 
notion of a DSS is assistance provided in assessing the situation, identifying 
alternative courses of action, formulating the decision situation, structuring and 
analyzing the decision situation, and then interpreting the results of analysis of the 
alternatives in terms of the value system of the decision-maker.” (Sage 1991, pages 4-
5). 
 
From this work, if one relatively narrow definition of a computer based DSS persists, 
it is that it should contain a (Sage 1991, page 1):  
· “Database management system. 
· Model base management system. 
· Dialogue generation and management system.” 
This definition, although not incorrect, does not convey the wide range, nor the 
complexities of many computer based DSSs.  Today, in addition to these three core 
components a DSS may have some form of knowledge or intelligence components 
(Turbain et al, 2007).  Developments on DSS means they are now capable of fusing 
information from a range of sensors and data sources using differing media types 
(digital, graphical, maps, as well as numerical and written text).  The DSS techniques 
include: decision models, visualisation technologies, data collection sensors, rule 
based engines (Bhargava, Power and Sun, 2007), as well as techniques from the arts 
42 
such as story telling (Paradice, 2007) and artificial agents (Van Tol and AbouRizk, 
2006, and Brynielsson, 2007).   
 
The broad definition and relatively young age of the field of DSS has lead to a 
fragmentary approach to support decisions (Arnott and Pervan, 2008).  Indeed, the 
field has many sub-divisions.  In 1995, Eom carried out citation analysis and 
identified seven informal clusters of decision support systems.  Building upon this 
work, and again trying to understand the discipline of DSS Arnott and Pervan (2008, 
pages 657-658) report the seven major sub-fields of DSS as being: 
 
· “Personal Decision Support Systems: usually small scale systems developed 
for one manager, or a small number of independent managers to support a 
decision task; 
· Group Support Systems:  the use of a combination of communication and  
DSS technologies to facilitate the effective working of groups; 
· Negotiation Support Systems:  DSSs where the primary focus of the group 
work is negotiation between opposing parties; 
· Intelligent Decision Support Systems:  the application of artificial intelligence 
techniques to decision support; 
· Knowledge Management-Based DSS: systems that support decision making by 
aiding knowledge storage, retrieval, trans fer and application by supporting 
individual and organizational memory and intergroup knowledge access; 
· Data Warehousing: systems that provide the large-scale data infrastructure for 
decision support; 
· Enterprise Reporting and Analysis Systems: enterprise focused DSS including 
executive information systems (EIS), business intelligence (BI) and more 
recently, corporate performance management systems (CPM).”   
 
2.2.3 Designing and basis of decision support systems . 
It is clear that it is not possible to have a single definition of a DSS.  The focus of 
much research is now on how a DSS can be designed to be of most use to a decision-
maker.  Arnott and Pervan (2008) identified a widening gap between research into 
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DSS and the actual practical use of DSS: only 10.1% of DSS developed were 
considered as having high or very high practical relevance.  More worryingly 49.2% 
of DSS were considered to have low, or no practical relevance.   
 
Even if the DSS is considered to have practical relevance, the system may still 
provide answers which are correct but are not palatable or acceptable to others.  
Outputs from a DSS which are at odds with the generally perceived view of a problem 
may be seen as a threat to an individual’s credibility or simply be disregarded.  This is 
an important point.  The use of a DSS stops at the end of the analysis.  A DSS does 
not implement a decision; the ultimate responsibility for taking a decision still rests 
with an individual.  If they do not understand the results of the DSS, do not believe in 
its credibility or reliability then they may exercise their judgement and not use the 
results of the analysis.  This is their prerogative and ultimately a decision will still be 
taken. 
 
To try and mitigate such an outcome it is important that a DSS is not seen simply as a 
‘black box’ into which data is fed and output magically produced.  When determining 
how to design a DSS, Sage (1991, paraphrased from pages 161-162) suggests strong 
consideration is given to four issues: 
 
· The specific task to be performed that influences the nature of the system’s 
design. 
· The environment into which the task is embedded, which includes both 
internal organizational issues and external issues surrounding an organization. 
· The DSS user or problem solver’s familiarity with the task at hand and the 
environment into which this task is embedded influences if the problems or 
tasks are structured or unstructured. 
· The extent of designer knowledge and availability, and the extent to which 
there is a group within the organization that might potentially use a DSS.   
 
These points are still relevant.  Wherever possible, the decision-maker should be 
considered in all aspects of the design and development of a DSS.  It is, of course, the 
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decision-maker who drives the process, from data collection, through analysis and 
course of action selection. It is their knowledge and expertise which are critical to the 
use and guidance of the DSS and implementation of any outcome produced by the 
system.  This will be most fruitfully achieved when the DSS complements an 
individual’s decision-making style.  In a global age the development of a DSS for an 
international company must take account of the varying national managerial and 
decision-making styles (Martinsons and Davison, 2007).   
 
How then should DSS be developed?  Paradice (2007) suggests that since complex 
decisions are intertwined with emotion and organisational culture, research should 
begin to focus on how emotion, passion and commitment impact upon problem 
formulation.  Even your mood impacts upon how a DSS is viewed and utilised 
(Djamasbi, 2007).  The results of further research in these areas will undoubtedly 
influence the design of future support systems.  Hall and Davis (2007) observe that 
personal values are integral to behaviour and thus the search and selection of a course 
of action.  Such values become of critical importance when the decision-maker is 
under time pressure or has uncertain information.  Hall and Davis (2007) propose to 
support the decision-maker through guiding them to view the problem from a variety 
of perspectives (theoretical, social, political, religious, aesthetic and economic).  Such 
an approach, it is argued, facilitates the development of a wide range of courses of 
action and ensures information is not disregarded.   
 
Hosack (2007) considered if it were possible to influence value based decision-
making in the context of a ‘wicked’ problem (that is a problem which has little clarity 
in either its definition, or end state which are defined in terms of good or bad).  
Through the use of feedback within a DSS, Hosack found it was possible to create 
some change in the decision-maker’s behaviour although it was unclear if the most 
strongly held beliefs had been targeted for influence.  The use of DSSs to tackle 
wicked problems was also considered by Mackenzie, Pidd, Rooksby, Sommerville, 
Warren and Westcombe (2006) who observed that the solution to a wicked problem is 
often achieved by a group and is essentially a social process.  Through the use of a 
combination of brain storming, cognitive mapping and dialogue mapping Mackenzie 
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et al (2006) captured the different views, opinions and arguments associated with the 
development of a solution or framing of a problem.  Organisational solutions to 
wicked problems were also considered by Petkov, Petkova, Andrew and Nepal 
(2007).  The representation of a problem from several perspectives was supported 
through the use of a range of MCDA and ‘soft’ thinking methods.  Overall, they 
concluded that the number and type of techniques used should be dependent upon the 
complexity of the overall problem.   
 
The use of a value-based approach could be very useful when developing 
organisational policy or other collaborative decision-making environments (many 
DSSs utilising MCDA techniques have been designed for strategic planning, Eom and 
Min 1999).  When a group is required to arrive at a consensus, Lee, Lee, Kang and 
Baik (2007, page 3129) note that such situations are “highly dependent upon matters 
of perspective, values and opinions, all of which – being subjective in nature – are 
beyond the reach of existing formal decision technology.”  When a group individually 
rank a set of alternatives there may be a mix of subjective rankings (which can 
therefore be expressed as a value function) and judgemental rankings (which are 
assumed to have been assigned on a rational basis).  Each of the many types of 
subjective and judgemental rankings have there own strengths and weaknesses.  Yet, 
the different approaches can lead to misunderstanding in the rankings assigned by 
different members of the group.  To facilitate reaching a consensus, and identifying 
logical reasoning or flaws in the rankings provided, Lee et al (2007) develop an ‘a 
priori1’ reference model which may be used to determine if the rankings being 
provided have been properly reasoned (through highlighting inconsistencies or logical 
flaws in an argument) or are based more on intuition.  The model itself comprises of a 
logical ordering protocol and subsequent integration procedure.  Unlike some models 
for group decision-making which apportion equal weighting (or power) to every 
individual within the group, Lee et al (2007, page 3143) used superimpositional 
ordering which “is based on the idea that the individuals or stakeholders may not have 
the same weight in an ordering operation because of their expertise, experience, 
representing power, ideological or academic agendas, etc.” This approach should, it is 
                                                 
1 An a priori model is that which has been developed purely from thought and reason. 
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noted remove the bias of groupthink.  This bias occurs when a decision is taken 
without fully considering or evaluating the full range of alternative solutions or 
courses of action.  A consensus is reached with minimum debate or argument.  Such a 
situation arises when individual members of a group feel unable to express a view or 
idea which may be perceived to be ‘at odds’ with the commonly held view of the 
problem being considered (for a detailed overview of group think the reader is 
referred to Kramer, 1998). 
 
An alternative approach to reducing groupthink is to assist a group in viewing a 
problem from an opposing view.  This enables the group to assess and evaluate the 
assumptions upon which they have based their decision whilst allowing additional 
alternative courses of action to be identified.  Techniques which facilitate this method 
are known as structured conflict approaches and include the use of a ‘devil’s 
advocate’ and dialectic inquiry.  Jarupathirun and Zahedi (2007) incorporated the 
dialectic process into a DSS to assist decision-makers faced with unstructured 
problems.  The dynamic process not only countered group think but also supported 
the group in ‘thinking out of the box’ and assisted in the teaching of critical thinking.   
 
Group decisions may also be facilitated by the use of Social Choice (SC) theory 
which supports the use of voting systems.  Srdjevic (2007) reports on the use of social 
choice voting in conjunction with appropriate Multi Criteria Decision Analysis 
(MCDA) techniques (such techniques are commonly used for the structuring and 
evaluation of complex problems, often involving uncertainty, for an overview see 
Belton, 1990) to support decision-making.  In conclusion, if the two techniques are 
implemented then “Reduced information may lead to different outcomes for different 
voting methods...However, the compensation for this drawback is there a good 
chance…that the goal will be achieved, and at least the best alternative will be 
recognised and posted to the first position on the list.”   
 
Complex decisions are often compounded by uncertainty or ambiguity.  Zack (2007) 
differentiates between problems made under uncertainty (when information is 
lacking) and ambiguity (when knowledge is missing), concluding that computer based 
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DSSs are most appropriate to support decisions under uncertainty and human-centric 
approaches for ambiguous decisions.   
 
How to successfully incorporate uncertainty into a DSS is dependent to some extent 
upon the intended use of the system.  Poch, Comas, Rodriguez-Roda Sánchez-Marrè 
and Cortés (2004) comment that in addition to uncertainty, some problems have a 
multiplicity of scales e.g. an environmental problem which starts at a local scale may 
interact with both national and global environmental concerns.  As such, what begins 
as a relatively small, defined problem may have to be considered within a much wider 
context.  The overall problem is, in essence, a complex system of systems in which 
uncertainty and varying complexity must be incorporated into a DSS.  A variety of 
techniques can be used to mathematically incorporate uncertainty into a DSS, many of 
which can be used in conjunction with MCDA techniques. 
 
Fuzzy set theory is a mathematical framework which can be used when “knowledge 
and information about a system is incomplete and experience-based rather than 
systematic.” (Savšek, Vezjak and Pavešic, 2007, page 293).  Fuzzy logic, it is argued 
offers a good approximation of human reasoning in a DSS through its ability to 
represent situations which may not be expressed solely through probability: that is 
when the answer verbally would be ‘maybe’.   
 
The use of fuzzy logic in MCDA problems was also considered by Fan, Lii and Tzeng 
(2007).  A common output of many MCDA problems are preference ordered sets 
which are generally amenable to data-mining techniques to provide useful information 
though the use of dominance based rough set approach (DRSA).  Fan et al extend this 
work to consider the use of DRSA in cases of uncertainty where the results 
comparison tables may be incomplete or the values are able to take a fuzzy subset of 
each decision attribute.  The result of the research was a series of logics representative 
of rules derived from preference ordered data tables.    
 
Guo, Yang, Chin and Wang (2007) discussed the use of evidential reasoning (ER) to 
model and analyse both fuzzy (vague) information as well as uncertainty stemming 
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from incomplete or absent information.  Guo et al extended the ER algorithm (which 
uses the combination rule of the Dempster Shafer theory) to incorporate imprecise or 
incomplete weights assigned to attributes.  The weight could have been assigned 
either directly, or through a pair wise comparison technique by either individuals or a 
group.   
 
The focus of this thesis is, however, upon the use of Bayesian Belief Networks 
(BBN), which are part of classical probability theory.  The combination of MCDA 
techniques with BBNs was researched by Fenton and Neil (2001) to combine the 
capability of reasoning under uncertainty whilst considering several attributes of 
reliability or safety.  BBNs have also been used in time critical situations for the 
automation of decision-making (Bayse, Dean, Kirman and Lejter, 1992).  The 
limitations of classical Bayesian decision theory to represent fuzzy variables are 
discussed in Wang, Qian Pagello and Pei (1996).  These latter authors develop a 
system capable of incorporating uncertainty and presenting the possibility that two 
hypotheses may be plausible.   
 
Burns (2006, page 1570) eloquently explains why Bayesian inference is potentially so 
powerful in DSSs, writing “Bayesian inference provides a formal framework for 
assessing the odds of hypotheses in light of evidence.  This makes Bayesian inference 
applicable to a wide range of diagnostic challenges in the field of chance discovery, 
including…counter-terrorism.”  This literature survey will now turn to consider the 
use of DSSs for military applications, specifically military intelligence.   
 
2.2.4 Applications of decision support systems to military intelligence. 
Andriole (1989, pages 4-5) writes that “military decision support systems…are 
frequently operationally or procedurally embedded in weapons systems integral to 
combat effectiveness, perform critical tasks in time constrained situations, must be 
easy to use and must be thoroughly reliable.”  In addition to this use Carter et al 
(1992, page 11) report on the use of “real time DSSs that can support (for example) 
military field decision problems.  Such systems can be used to correlate incoming 
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intelligence and sensor data, perform a rapid evaluation of alternative options, and 
suggest the best route or weapons mix for a specific mission objective.”     
 
However, before any system can be developed, the tasks it is designed to support must 
be fully understood.  A badly designed system can increase the time taken to complete 
a task, increase workload and heighten the chance of catastrophic errors (Pfautz and 
Roth, 2006).  A variety of techniques can be used to gain the required information.  
Holt and Hazen (1988) concluded that structured observations provided an effective 
and informative method of collating information pertaining to an air defence officer’s 
tasks.  The approach taken helped clarify any ambiguity or uncertainty as to what 
tasks individuals undertook and where they could be best supported.  Moynihan and 
Bowen (1987) sought to identify information requirements and identify potential areas 
for decision support systems for commanders working in command and control.  
Initially, Moynihan and Bowen (1987) developed an appropriate data collection 
methodology.  The task sought to understand the decision-making processes used by 
the officers and their information and data needs.  Pfautz and Roth (2006) used a 
cognitive engineering method (an iterative cycle of analysis, development and 
evaluation) to fully understand the characteristics of the intended DSS user and the 
context in which the system would be used.  Subsequently, this information was used 
in the design of a DSS for stability and support military operations.   
 
The ability to fuse and collate information from across the military environment has 
far reaching applications.  However, this research has centred upon applications of 
DSSs for use in situations where an individual or group has an opportunity to review 
the available information.  One obvious use for such an application is in the area of 
command and control (C2) from simulation (Moffat, 2000; Liao, 2000; Moffat and 
Witty, 2002, and Suzic, 2003) through to tactical decision aids (Vraneš, Lucin, 
Stanojevic, Stenvanovic, and Subašic, 1992).  Toft (1997) writes that “a tactical 
decision is only optimal if it’s conditional on a optimal strategy identified on the 
operational level” and as such, a DSS should be able to assess multi- level decision 
over varying timelines.  Savšek et al (2007) developed a tactical decision aid based 
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upon fuzzy logic, capable of showing the various states of units (for example the level 
of fuel, ammunition, number of soldiers) as a battle developed.   
 
Information obtained from across the battlefield is part of the reality of ‘net centric 
warfare’ in which distributed systems are connected.  The information from such 
systems should be able to provide those with access to the network a common 
understanding – or situational awareness - of the battle space.  That said, the sheer 
complexity in creating a system capable of providing the information each different 
decision-maker needs at an appropriate time is immense.  Arnbourg, Brynielsson 
Artman and Wallen (2000) note that such a system must have ‘information 
awareness’ and measure the information in the system on its precision (correctness of 
data), quality (fitness for purpose) and utility (expected benefit for use).  How the 
impact of data quality and information load can be reduced is discussed in Cowie and 
Burstien (2007); Williams, Dennis, Stam and Aronson (2007), and 
Shankaranarayanan and Cui (2006).   
 
One of the main functions of information collation and analysis is for the provision of 
situational awareness and the provision of timely warning of a potential attack.  A 
lack of situational awareness limits mission performance, even in training situations 
(Worm, Jenvald and Morin, 1998). 
 
BBNs have clear applicability for use in situational awareness due to their ability to 
update the belief in a hypothesis given some new evidence.  This revised value could 
then be used in the projection of future events (Pew and Mavor, 2000).  The detection 
of an intruder into a network was considered by Yuill, Wu, Settle, Gong, Forno, 
Huang and Asbery (2000).  Their detection technique identified the areas of a network 
most likely to be under threat from information the attacker revealed about 
themselves.  Scott (2004) used a Bayesian model-based approach for the development 
of a network intrusion detection system.  Das (2000) utilised a BBN to represent the 
uncertainties in the development of situation assessment in order to update knowledge 
and decide upon a course of action.  The identification of potential enemy courses of 
action is the responsibility of intelligence officers.  Kem (2005) proposes a 
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methodology for identifying and developing enemy courses of action which can be 
maintained once operations commence.  The methodology builds up from an 
understanding of the enemy’s capabilities and understanding of the purpose of their 
actions, to the identification of the centre of gravity and key decisive points likely to 
be attacked to achieve the ir objective.  Falzon, Zhang and Davies (2000) used 
concepts such as the centre of gravity and decisive points for the development of a 
course of action underpinned from a policy analysis perspective.   
 
Intelligence can also be used in the battlefield to provide situational awareness.  The 
overall level of awareness is, of course, dependent upon the data and information 
collated by the various surveillance and reconnaissance platforms (such as unmanned 
air vehicles and satellites).  Liao, Sun and Wang (2003) set out architecture to 
integrate the available knowledge and information in a decision support system 
capable of warning about potential or immediate threats.  The use of DSS for event 
prediction was also considered by Jesse and Kalita (1997) through the development of 
a knowledge based suite of tools to rapidly and accurately carry out general 
intelligence analysis procedures.   
 
More recently, Pfautz and Roth (2006) developed a visualisation tool fo r military 
intelligence analysts working on stability and support operations.  Such operations 
have additional intelligence requirements to those of a more ‘traditional’ military 
campaign, including an understanding of the local, socio-economic and political 
landscape.  There is a need in many such operations to “identify emergent patterns 
suggestive of likely future behaviour…to anticipate (and try to dissipate) the next 
‘flashpoint’ or ‘hot spot’” (Pfatuz and Roth, 2006 page 392)  The finalised tool 
comprised a suite of techniques including BBN which supported both the capturing of 
vague information as well recording how any inferred values were derived.   
 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) offers an alternative approach for a visualisation tool 
of potential use to intelligence analysts.  Comprising of methodologies taken from 
psychology, anthropology and mathematics (including but not limited to graph theory, 
cluster analysis, algebra and statistics) a “social network consists of a finite set of 
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factors and the relation or relations defined upon them” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, 
page 20).   
 
SNA works on the tenet that the way an individual behaves is dependent upon their 
wider social interactions.  Therefore, by identifying the social network within which 
an individual moves it is possible to define flows of information not only between 
individuals but also groups, computers and organisations.  It can be seen that such an 
approach has applicability to investigation into organised crime and terrorist groups.  
SNA has also been linked with Bayesian approaches to enhance the use of missing or 
uncertain data within the social network (Koskinen, Snijders, 2007 and Butts, 2003). 
 
In a similar vein to SNA, shortest path algorithms can be used to identify the 
relationships between groups and thus highlight new lines of enquiry for intelligence 
analysts (Xu and Chen, 2004).  The use of the internet to identify links between 
associates has also been investigated (Skillicorn and Vats, 2007) through the use of 
contextual search queries.  The results of the search may be clustered into units, 
described by several key words.  Overall, the clusters may be representative of the 
importance of various terms, or provide additional supporting evidence for trends 
already identified.  
 
The building of networks showing causal relationships in complex situations has also 
been investigated through a combination of a Bayesian inference and influence 
diagrams (Rosen and Smith, 1996 and Rosen, Smith, Smith, and Maldony, 1998).  
The system, named CAST (Causal Strengths) is designed to support individuals who 
want to create causal models but feel unable to develop the conditional probability 
distributions necessitated by a full Bayesian Network.  Alternatively, the developed 
influence diagram comprises of nodes and their associated cause-effect links.  The 
ability of the cause to either promote or hinder the effect is portrayed by the value 
associated with each cause-effect link.  Interestingly, although designed to represent 
cause-effect relationships, CAST elicits the baseline probability of an event occurring 
as though it were independent of the influences included within the diagram.  
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2.2.5 Evaluation of a decision support system. 
Once a DSS has been developed or acquired it must be installed, tested and deployed.  
At this point it is possible to make an evaluation of the DSS – but how should success 
or failure be measured?  Sprague and Carlson (1982, cited in Sojda, 2007 page 271) 
comments that “organizations building their first decision support system [should] 
recognize that it essentially is a research activity and that evaluation should center on 
a general “value analysis”.”  There is, of course, often the need to justify the 
expenditure on a new system.  Frequently, this is achieved through a cost benefit 
analysis.  Such a measure, however, does not indicate if the system is actually 
supporting decisions.  There is always the possibility that the introduction of a system 
has decreased the quality of decisions being made.  Indeed Wagner (1981, cited in 
Finlay, 1989 page 150) reports a study finding that around 80% of DSS users could 
not quantify the benefits of their DSS.   
 
In response to this, Finlay (1989 page 150) lists the potential benefits of using a DSS 
as being:  “Increase in the number of alternatives examined; better understanding of 
the business; fast response to unexpected situations; ability to carry out ad hoc 
analysis; new insights and learning; improved communication; control; cost savings; 
better decisions; more effective teamwork; time savings; making better use of data 
resources.”  In addition to these objectives a DSS impacts upon many aspects of the 
working environment from an individual’s job to the structure of organisations.  For 
example, the data made available from a new DSS may indeed facilitate some of the 
required analyses.  This, however, could make an individual’s job seem monotonous 
(Turbain et al 2007)  Such an outcome is at odds with Czech and Dizek (1988) who 
perceive the successful application of a DSS to be that it stimulates the analysts 
involvement in a problem.  Many of the benefits listed here will be hard to assess 
numerically and as such will most likely be assessed through anecdotal responses 
from the user.    
 
Phillips-Wren, Mora, Forgionne and Gupta (2007, page 1) develop a framework for 
the assessment of intelligent DSSs by linking “the decision value of an intelligent 
DSS to both the outcome from, and process of, decision making and down to  specific 
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components of the intelligence DSS.”  Sojda (2007) comments that DSSs should 
undergo both a validation and verification processes.  Preferably, the DSS should 
undergo empirical testing “which in some form is critical, and can range from 
experiments run against a pre-selected gold standard to more simple testing of system 
components.  It is imperative to understand from an experimental and logical 
perspective, to what extent inferences can be made as a result of the validation.  In the 
end, the question to answer is: Was the system successful at addressing its intended 
purpose?  Often, searching for the right database for empirical evaluation can be as 
important as adequate decision support system development itself.” (Sojda, 2007, 
page 275). 
 
The next and final section of this literature review will focus on the intelligence cycle 
and highlight where DSS tools may be of most use. 
 
2.3 Military intelligence. 
 
2.3.1 Why collect intelligence? 
The Department of Defense in the USA defines intelligence as “information and 
knowledge obtained through observation, investigation, analysis or understanding” 
(Chizek, Elsea, Best, Bolkcon, 2003, page 2).  The definition makes an important 
point: intelligence is not collected: information and data are received from a variety of 
sources.  Only after analysis or interpretation does such disparate information become 
intelligence.  The costs associated with all aspects of intelligence, from the collation 
of raw data to the dissemination of the final intelligence report are phenomenal, so 
what impact does intelligence have to warrant this expenditure? 
 
Gudgin (1989, page 71) writes that “…the prime function of a Military Intelligence 
Organization, at whatever level, is to give advice concerning the armies of the enemy 
or potential enemy; this was laid down in 1904, for the British Army at least, in the 
report of the Esher committee into the working of the Mobilization and Intelligence 
Department during the Boer War, and has remained as a clear-sighted definition of the 
military intelligence ever since.”  Keegan (2003, page 370) remarks that the ideal of 
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military intelligence as being when one side is “privileged to know the other’s 
intentions, capabilities and plan of action in place and time – how, where, what and 
when – while its opponent neither knew as much in return nor, that his own plans 
were uncovered.”   
 
However, Keegan (2003) observes that the outcomes of very few conflicts since the 
end of the Second World War can be shown to have been influenced by the 
availability of intelligence.  In contrast there are many historical examples, from the 
Roman conquests, through to the Napoleonic Wars and within the World Wars of 
intelligence providing the key to winning a battle.  Furthermore, Keegan notes that 
even battles considered to have been turned upon intelligence made available to 
commanders (such as the Battle of Midway) often have additional, underlying 
supporting factors (prior to the Battle of Midway, a USA submarine accidentally 
strayed into the path of Japanese carriers forcing the redeployment of a dive bombing 
squadron).  That said, historically during and prior to the World Wars, intelligence 
was mainly used to provide a short term tactical gain.  
 
Of course, this is still true.  Yet, in today’s relatively peaceful world the majority of 
intelligence is focused on continuous processes aimed at providing security and 
prosperity (Keegan, 2003, and Gill and Phythian, 2006).  Eisenhower (MacCloskey, 
1967 page 7, cited in Treverton, page 73) defined his intelligence requirements thus: 
“In war nothing is more important to a commander than the facts concerning strength, 
dispositions, and intention of his opponent, and the proper interpretation of those 
facts.  In peacetime, however, the necessary facts are of a different nature.  They deal 
with the conditions, resources, requirements and attitudes prevailing in the world.  
They are essential to the development of policy to further our long-term national 
security and best interests.”   
 
Another fundamental change from the historical battles such as those of Napoleon is 
the lack of a clearly defined threat.  Until the end of the Soviet Union, adversaries 
tended to be in the form of another nation whose doctrine, ideology and capabilities 
were relatively well known.  In contrast to this Treverton (2003) observes that threats 
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now stem from changing demographics, economic concerns, the availability of 
asymmetric warfare (from both rogue states and non-state actors such as fanatical 
religious groups and terrorist groups), and organised crime (including drug trafficking 
and nuclear material).  These threats no longer focus solely upon military targets but 
at National Infrastructures and all members of society.  Intelligence is no longer used 
by Governments just to prevent a military surprise, indeed the UK has MI5 which is 
an intelligence organisation focusing solely upon domestic security.   
 
How then does intelligence support security?  Gudgin (1989, page 75) writes that 
“…the best insurance against war occurring is to be prepared for it; and one of the 
most essential preparations is to know as much as possible about one’s potential 
enemy.  Intelligence can provide this information, can define the risks ahead and can 
estimate the cost of providing warnings against each of them…”  Intelligence should, 
according to Treverton (2003) be able to keep abreast of military capabilities, politics 
and economies of major powers and in addition to this provide understanding of a 
given situation.  In summary the preparedness of a military for a conflict is dependent 
upon its intelligence estimates, without it a Nation is at the mercy of better informed 
adversaries (Odom, 2004). 
 
Yet the future is uncertain. Gazit (1989, page 61) comments that “…commanders of 
today…find it hard to accept a situation in which nobody can foretell the future for 
them.  Many of them hope, or delude themselves, that the intelligence system serving 
them can fulfil this purpose….intelligence must limit itself to two areas: 
 
· Specifically stating what may be expected, based on hard information about 
the other side’s resolutions; 
· Presenting the possibilities based on knowledge of the other side’s general 
intentions and the optimal technical feasibilities at its disposal.” 
 
Handel (1989, page 196) elegantly writes that “the sole reason…the intelligence 
community exists [is] for the purpose of reducing uncertainty on political and military 
issues.  Only very rarely can ambiguity and uncertainty be eradicated….In the world 
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of intelligence, even technical data concerning performance or number of weapons, let 
alone less quantifiable issues such as intentions, military doctrine, and morale, cannot 
be objectively assessed – which means that clear agreement on their ‘meaning’ cannot 
be reached.”   
 
Overall the final output of intelligence “is a better understanding in the heads of 
people who must act or decide” (Treverton, 2003, page 107), and thus supporting 
optimal actions. 
2.3.2 Intelligence sources. 
There are a variety of sources upon which an intelligence estimate can be based.  The 
source which provides the majority of information is known as ‘open source’ or 
information which is available in the public domain.  A wealth of information can be 
gleaned from reviews of technical journal such as those produced by Jane’s 
Information Group, media coverage of politicians and simply surfing the internet.  
Although open sources information is readily available and its collection easy, 
deciding what information should be believed and what should be rejected is far more 
complicated. 
 
The remaining main sources of information used in intelligence estimates are all 
covert and encompass: human observation (HUMINT), electronic and communication 
signals (SIGINT), and photography and imagery (IMINIT).   
 
Of these, the oldest form of intelligence is HUMINT which has been used throughout 
history.  There are many forms of human intelligence including defectors from 
adversary nations, recruited agents, those coerced into providing information through 
blackmail and information obtained through the interrogation of prisoners of war.  All 
such sources are capable of knowingly, or unwittingly, providing false or biased 
information.   
 
Keegan (2003, page 28) writes that “the history of ‘how, what, where, when’ in 
military intelligence is…largely one of signal intelligence.” Signal intelligence, once 
the domain of intercepting written orders, today focuses on electronic signals and the 
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technology required to intercept often encrypted, messages.  Techniques used in this 
domain range from the tapping of telephones, to the ‘bugging’ of rooms through to 
complex military listening stations.  The sheer volume of information sent 
electronically (over e-mail, telephone, radio and secure military communication 
systems) is vast and can create an information glut.  Information collected in this 
manner is of course, also open to misinterpretation, for example when intercepting a 
signal the listener may not know who is talking – is the conversation between two 
people who have access to the truth or are they simply speculating?   
 
The use of imagery for intelligence purposes started in earnest with the advent of 
flight.  Advances in technology have led to the use of satellites and intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets such as unmanned air vehicles (UAVs).  
ISR assets are increasingly used in military domains due to their flexibility.  Satellites 
may only cover an area of interest for a matter of minutes every few hours, and due to 
their known orbits it is possible to hide assets from their sight.  In contrast, the mobile 
nature of ISR assets enables them to provide mission specific information about an 
enemy to the decision-maker relatively quickly (Chizek et al, 2003).  Of course, the 
goal of real- time intelligence is the ability to communicate quickly and securely.  Gill 
and Phythian (2006) note, however, that one of the main limitations of IMINT is its 
limited ability to reveal the intent of an adversary. 
 
Often, to provide a rounded intelligence estimate will require the fusion of several 
forms of intelligence – for example an image of movement supported by either 
SIGINT or HUMINT.   
 
2.3.3 The intelligence cycle. 
The production of an intelligence estimate is not, according to Gill and Phythian 
(2006) an exact science but an imprecise art, dealing only in probabilities, many of 
which are subjectively assessed.  Handel (1989, page 188) writes that intelligence has 
“some quantifiable dimensions and requires decisions and forecasts to be made under 
conditions of pressure and uncertainty where failure is immediately reflected in 
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negative results…failure can lead to severe criticism, even punishment, while success 
is taken for granted.”  
 
The process used by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to produce intelligence 
estimates is a 5 stage cycle, shown in Figure 2.2 (copied from Gill and Phythian, 2006 
page 3).  However, this definition, according to Gill and Phythian (2006, page 3) 
“cannot fully capture the dynamic impact of intelligence’s impact on the external 
environment.  A better way of viewing the intelligence process in order to capture this 
dynamic fully is to adopt the concept of a system that includes feedback.”  The system 
they propose is shown in Figure 2.3 (copied from Gill and Phythian, 2006 page 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2:  The CIA intelligence cycle. 
 
1. Planning and Direction
5. Dissemination
4. Analysis3. Processing 
2. Collection
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Figure 2.3: The intelligence process. 
 
The planning and direction of intelligence is inextricably linked to National Policies.  
However, Treverton (2003, page 106) observes “policy officials seldom have the time 
or patience to articulate their information requirements precisely.  Nor do most of then 
know enough to task intelligence operators effectively should they find the time to try.  
“More on Iran” or “better stuff on Saddam Hussein’s intentions””.   This is the level at 
which most policy officials express their intelligence needs.  In the military context 
information requirements vary depending upon the operational type and are 
submitted, in the USA military, through priority intelligence reports which drive data 
collection.  If too many are placed, the assets to collect the data are simply not 
available and it can be hard to show a direct link between the intelligence provided 
and subsequent decisions made (Nelson, 2004).   
 
The subsequent phase of the production of an intelligence estimate is the collection of 
information and data with all its inherent biases, uncertainties and vagaries.  MI5 
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(MI5 website 2008) notes that “If intelligence is worth recording we ensure that this is 
done accurately, clearly marking its origin and authenticity, and ensuring that it can be 
retrieved swiftly. If we assess that a particular threat needs to be investigated, then 
resources are deployed to obtain further intelligence.”  All of the requested or required 
information is rarely available all at the same time.  Inevitably, information is 
fragmentary and provided over a period of time in small, discrete pieces some of 
which contradict each other.  The aim is to fuse together all this available information 
to provide a consolidated view of the situation in a timely and clear format.  This is 
achieved through the analysis and interpretation of the collated information.   
 
Within the UK, the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) define the assessment phase of 
the intelligence process as “judging the authenticity and reliability of new information 
and its relevance to existing intelligence. Assessments focus on probable and possible 
outcomes, to provide the best available advice for developing a response or resolution. 
They are continually adjusted in light of new intelligence or events.” (Defence 
Intelligence, Ministry of Defence website 2008).   
 
There are two main types of analysis: tactical which focuses on short term gains and 
strategic which considers longer term aims.  Ideally an intelligence agency will 
provide a balanced assessment of each area however, this is rarely achieved.  Often, 
the imperative need of the near term requirement is answered, sometimes at the 
detriment to the longer term strategic view.  Gill and Phythian (2006) describe three 
main types of strategic intelligence reports: 
 
· Basic-descriptive reports which provide an overall assessment of other 
governments, militaries, or markets.  The report is usually based upon open 
source material with some covert information to add value. 
· Current reportorial which includes the latest available information (a 
commonly cited example of such a report is the USA daily Presidential 
briefing). 
· Speculative – evaluative which attempts to estimate or assess possible futures.   
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Of course, the collation of data and its interpretation into intelligence does not in 
anyway guarantee that good decisions will follow.  It is the prerogative of the 
recipient to consciously disregard the intelligence presented to them.  However, Gaitz 
(1989) notes that for good decisions to occur, the intelligence estimate must be 
produced on time and subsequently be read and understood by its intended recipient.  
To facilitate the acceptance of an intelligence estimate, due care and consideration 
must be given to the language and presentational format of the estimate – the 
customer must want to read the report and trust those who produced it (Gill and 
Phythian, 2006).  In this vein, Schum (2005) discusses the use of narrative accounts 
for the presentation of the results of the intelligence process, including common errors 
in the building of narratives.  
 
2.3.4 Why does intelligence fail? 
Intelligence failure is an emotive phrase.  Given the uncertainties inherent in making 
intelligence estimates, it is almost inevitable that at some point, the process will not 
correctly predict an event and a surprise will occur.   
 
The military theorist Clausewitz held intelligence in disdain.  His suspicions of 
intelligence stemmed from the fact that “many intelligence reports in war are 
contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain…in short, most intelligence 
is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies” (Clausewitz, 1976, 
page 136).  Khan (1986) in reviewing Clausewitz’s opinion of intelligence comments 
that Clausewitz’s considered poor intelligence to contribute to the friction of war, and 
intelligence failures to reduce both physical fighting strength (by capabilities not 
being in the appropriate place) and the psychological capabilities of commanders 
(through for example over-estimation of enemy strength or the belief that information 
reinforces preconceived ideas). 
 
Within the UK, intelligence failures are rarely openly discussed and infrequently 
attributable to a single point in the intelligence cycle.  Intelligence failures can occur 
simply by not collecting the appropriate data such that indicators and warnings are not 
seen.  In part though, the blame for such a failure rests with the policy makers and 
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commanders directing the intelligence gathering collection.  There are also those 
failures which stem from inadequate analysis and processing of information and data. 
 
The intelligence process is open to many cognitive biases including the assumption 
that the adversary is rational, or has the same values as the analyst.  What is perceived 
as being an acceptable course of action is affected by the culture of the country under 
consideration.  In addition to this, if an adversary feels that there is no option, even 
though a territorial war cannot be won, the possibility of a political or moral victory 
will be sufficient to start hostilities.   
 
Another cognitive bias which affects intelligence failure is a strongly held 
preconceived idea, particularly if this mental model has been shown to be correct.  
Consider the lead up to the Yom Kippur war of 1973, even though indicators and 
warnings suggested an attack was imminent, the general Israeli belief was that Egypt 
was simply not capable of launching such an attack.  Each indicator was explained 
away, and the overall picture not identified.  Some of the lack of acceptance of 
Egypt’s ability could be explained by the ‘ethnocentric’ bias (Handel, 1989) – simply 
Israel believed in her own superiority to her surrounding Arab Nations.  Of course, 
when such a mindset is in place, it can be hard to evaluate the situation from a 
different perspective, and even when this occurs the results may be refuted and 
ignored.   
 
In addition to these biases, it is easy to believe that an event will not occur because it 
is a very risky option, or that it is simply impossible to achieve.  Handel (1989, page 
244) comments that “the greater the risk, the less likely it seems to be, and the less 
risky it actually becomes.  Thus the greater the risk, the smaller it becomes.”   
 
Are these failures solely the responsibility of the intelligence agency?  Of course the 
intelligence agency must be responsible for the information it produces.  However, the 
processing of information does not stop at the production of the final report.  It is then 
passed to a decision-maker who must read and process the information before 
deciding how to act.   
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Therefore, the failures of intelligence are not solely attributable to intelligence 
agencies, Betts (1978, cited in Gill and Phythaian, 2006, page 104) reports “In the 
best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been 
made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce 
finished analyses, but most often by the decision-makers who consume the products 
of intelligence services.  Policy premises constrict perceptions, and administrative 
workloads constrain reflection.  Intelligence failure is political and psychological 
more often than organizational.”  This view is supported by Schmitt (1997) in the 
military operating environment.  By reviewing known ‘intelligence failures’ of U.S 
intelligence during the Korean war, Schmitt (1997, page 65) writes that “to blame 
intelligence primarily for our military misfortunes is to fail to understand the 
fundamental capabilities and limitations of intelligence and to fail to understand the 
hierarchical relationship between intelligence and the command and operations 
activities it supports……If intelligence “fails”, as sometimes it must, it rarely does so 
alone.  In the end, intelligence failures are failures of command.” 
 
2.3.5 How can intelligence assessments be supported? 
Handel (1989) defines the three elements necessary for successful intelligence as 
being: data, analysis and a lack of political interference in the system.  The focus of 
this thesis is not upon how to support or improve the collection of data, nor to discuss 
the political aspects of intelligence estimates.  However, this work centres solely on 
the analysis and interpretation of collected data.   
 
Handel (1989) suggests that the difficulties in providing intelligence estimates could 
be reduced through three methods: removal of all human biases and perceptions; by 
taking each reported threat seriously and taking appropriate action; finally by the 
introduction of reforms to improve the objectivity of the intelligence decision-making 
process.  Of most interest to this work is supporting the analysis process through the 
reduction of human biases and perceptions within the analytical process. 
 
One technique  used to do just this is the use of indicators and warnings.  “Essentially, 
the purpose of the method is to help the…analyst pick and choose the significant from 
65 
the massive amounts of ambiguous and possibly conflicting data that would be 
abundantly available in crisis situations.” (Handel 1989, page 247)  This analysis 
“warns of impending attack…[and] depends upon the ability to predict enemy 
activity, based on enemy plans, doctrine and observed exercises and training.” 
(Chizek, 2003, page 28).  Potential indicators may be departure of foreign citizens, 
unusual concentration of forces, or changes in radio communications.  Of course, such 
indicators may not be applicable on their own forces which are concentrated for many 
reasons other than the start of hostilities.  Furthermore, if the indicators are known by 
an adversary they can be manipulated.  Patterns of force mobilisation and 
concentration can become normal, such that an intelligence agency no longer 
considers them an indication of attack.   
 
Even when the indicators and warnings do show attack is imminent, if this view goes 
against a long held belief, the intelligence can be rejected.  When using indicators and 
warnings, the context in which they are seen is absolutely critical to their 
interpretation.   
 
The subjective nature of the intelligence process does lend itself to the application of 
structured processes.  However, decision aids are not widely used within the 
intelligence community.  This is quite surprising given the requirement for 
(sometimes inexperienced) analysts to fuse large volumes of qualitative and 
quantitative data under time pressure into an intelligence estimate.  That said, one 
widely used reference book for the structuring of problems and limiting the effects of 
cognitive biases in intelligence estimates is that of Heuer (1999).   
 
In his 2005 paper, Heuer outlines many of the established procedures used to “help 
analysts question assumptions and adjust their mindsets.  These include: 
 
· Red Cell Analysis –trying to predict the behaviour of others by putting 
yourself in their shoes. 
· Devil’s Advocacy – assigning someone to challenge a single, strongly held 
consensus by building the best possible case for an alternative explanation. 
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· Brainstorming – an unconstrained group process for generating new ideas and 
concepts. 
· What If? Analysis – taking as a given that an unexpected event has occurred 
and then trying to explain how it could have come about, known as thinking 
backwards. 
· Alternative Futures Analysis – applies the collective knowledge and 
imagination of a group of experts to identify driving forces that are likely to 
shape an issue and how these different forces, when given different weights, 
might play out in plausible future scenarios. 
· Analysis of Competing Hypothesis.” 
 
The Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) is a structured process which aids 
analysts in questioning basic assumptions and testing a series of generated 
hypotheses.  The process begins with a brainstorming session to generate a complete 
set of hypotheses, all of which receive equal treatment.  Subsequently a matrix is 
created and populated with evidence both supporting and refuting each identified 
hypothesis.  Finally, the most probable hypothesis is that with the least contradictory 
evidence against it, not that with the most supporting evidence.   
 
In addition to these techniques Tatarka (2002) includes the use of decision support 
tools in the forms of graphical displays or sequential presentation of information and 
the use of training for the production of more accurate intelligence estimates.   
Of course, no process will guarantee that the resulting intelligence assessment is 
correct.  What a structured process or decision support system does provide is an audit 
trail of how the estimate was developed.  What assumptions were used, where the 
uncertainty in the estimate lies and, crucially communicate the magnitude of 
uncertainty in the intelligence estimate to the decision-maker. 
2.3.6 Chapter summary. 
This literature survey started by discussing the main types of decision-making models 
used in modern psychology and the common decision-making biases.  It is evident 
that in situations in which time pressure, complexity and uncertainty are inherent, 
individual’s may often benefit from some form of decision support. 
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As presented in the second part of this survey, decision support can take many forms, 
from simple brain storming sessions through to complex, bespoke pieces of computer 
software.  The specific type of support needed is dependent upon the not only the 
decision itself (its structure, its attributes etc) but also the number of people involved 
in making the decision.   
 
In a military environment there are potentially vast amounts of uncertain or 
incomplete data from a variety of sources.  Once collated, the data must be analysed.  
In certain circumstances some of the decisions based upon the collated data may be 
automated (for example in sensor allocation or weapon firing).  However, many 
cannot.  In such a situation, analysts may benefit from a support tool.  The next 
chapter of this thesis will introduce one of the main techniques used for collating data 
which contains uncertainty and will argue for the use of Bayesian Belief Networks in 
DSSs.   
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CHAPTER 3   BAYESIAN BELIEF NETWORKS. 
 
3.1 Bayes theorem. 
Initially defined by the Reverend Thomas Bayes and presented to the Royal Academy 
in 1796, two years after his death, Bayes’ theorem is simple, elegant and powerful.  
Defined as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )cAP
cBPcBAP
cABP
|
|,|
,| =
  
Equation 3.1:  Bayes' Theorem. 
 
The theorem relates the conditional and prior probabilities of two events.  In the above 
equation, ( )cAP |  and ( )cBP |  are defined as prior probabilities.  They represent the 
probability of an event occurring when only background or contextual knowledge  is 
known, e.g. the probability of your garden having wet grass in the morning.  No 
observation or information on the actual event is known, with the above example you 
will not have seen a weather report for the previous evening, or opened the curtains 
yet.  Within the theorem ( )cAP |  acts as a normalising constant. 
 
The probabilities ( )cBAP ,|  and ( )cABP ,|  are conditional probabilities.  These 
values represent the probability of an event (say having wet grass in the morning) 
given that another event has occurred (knowing that it rained during the night).  
Consequently to assess these conditional probabilities requires some understanding of 
the causal relationships between events (in this simple example that rain makes grass 
wet). 
 
The above explanation shows that Bayes’ theorem separates out the effect of 
information on a probability into two sources: the prior probabilities and the 
probabilities in the light of any available evidence (Pew and Mavor, 2000).  Indeed, 
Bayes’ theorem is a logical method for the calculation of probability and is an 
example of probabilistic inference.  Such techniques are used in a wide variety of 
69 
applications including, and of most interest to this work, the prediction of events.  
However, probabilistic inference techniques are only applicable in situations where 
the events being observed, or the evidence made available can be expressed in a 
probabilistic manner.   
 
Assuming the required probabilities have been obtained, Bayes’ theorem expresses 
the probability that a given hypothesis is true based upon the available information.  
New observations or information will lead to a revision in the probability associated 
with the hypothesis.  However, the variation in probability should be “something that 
changes opinion rather than as a measure of determining the ultimate truth.” (The 
Economist, 2000).  This theorem has obvious strengths in many fields, most notably 
medicine and forensic scientific investigations (for additional information on the 
application of BBN in these and other areas the reader is referred to Golub, 1997). 
 
3.2 Brief history of probabilistic models. 
 
The description of Bayes’ theorem indicated that in order to ascertain the conditional 
probabilities, some knowledge of the causal relationships between the events being 
considered is required.  The first causal model to be developed is attributed to Sewall 
Wright in the 1920s (Pearl, 1997).  Working in the field of genetics, Wright 
graphically depicted the linkages between the markings on guinea pigs through their 
parentage.   
 
Since this first causal model, many others have been developed, including 
probabilistic networks.  Probabilistic networks show the dependence (though not 
necessarily causality) between a set of defined variables and their associated 
probability distributions. Early attempts to incorporate uncertain reasoning,  within 
expert systems which were generally rule based (for example: if event X occurs then 
the response is Y) involved the use of so-called certainty factors and the expert system 
MYCIN (Buchanan and Shortliffe, 1984) provides the best known example.  
However, results from using this approach only coincide with results from probability 
theory under a very limited set of conditions.  This, coupled with the emergence of 
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probabilistic networks as a coherent approach to reasoning under uncertainty, 
eventually led to their decline. 
 
There are three broad categories of mathematical techniques used to represent 
uncertainty: (Greenberg 2007, paraphrased from pages 14-16): 
 
· Basic measurements including: classical measures of probability; possibility 
based on fuzzy sets and the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. 
· Risk Metrics including the concepts of utility, credibility and loss.   
· Modelling and analysis paradigms incorporating amongst others the theories 
of expected value, minimax, regret and mean risk models. 
 
The initial successor to rule-based expert systems combined classical probability 
theory and decision theory.  Known as normative expert systems, these models were 
able to incorporate uncertainty.  This, undoubtedly, enhanced the overall capability of 
the expert systems.  It also, however, led to the creation of very computationally 
heavy models.  Eventually, normative expert systems became unworkable.   
 
It was not until the seminal work of Pearl (1986) that the use of classical probability 
in expert systems became viable.  The development of computationally efficient 
algorithms such as Pearl’s (1982) and Lauritzen and Spiege lhalter (1988) supported 
the development of large-scale, complex probabilistic networks.  Researchers such as 
Eric Horvitz, David Heckerman and Jack Breese particularly advanced the use of 
probabilistic models known as Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN).  Such networks use 
the laws of probability for predictive (e.g. if it has rained then the probability the grass 
is wet is…) and Bayes’ theorem for diagnostic reasoning (e.g. the grass is wet, 
therefore the probability it has rained is…) 
3.3 Definition of a Bayesian Belief Network. 
A Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) is a probabilistic framework represented through a 
directed acylic graph (DAG) and a set of probability distributions.  An acyclic graph 
is one which contains no loops and therefore, it is impossible to trace a path through 
71 
the graph and return to your starting place.  A BBN is comprised of three distinct 
parts:  
 
· Variables (which may be discrete or continuous) which in a BBN are 
represented within nodes. 
· The dependence (though not necessarily causality) between nodes is shown by 
the directed edges or arcs within a BBN. 
· Each node has an associated set of probability distributions which acts as the 
mechanism for the incorporation of uncertainty within the BBN.   
 
A simple pictorial representation of the development of a BBN from these parts is 
shown below in Figure 3.1: 
 
The representation of problems through the use of graphs has clear strengths.  Firstly, 
it enables a clear, concise, intuitive presentation of the variables and causal 
relationships within a problem domain.  Essentially, the topology of a BBN shows the 
qualitative knowledge about the situation being considered.  Experts on the situation 
represented within the BBN are able to easily review the BBN and comment upon the 
inclusion, and exclusion, of relevant variables (nodes) and dependencies (arcs).  For 
example, in the simple network shown in Figure 3.1 a review could suggest alternate 
reasons for the grass being wet and therefore, the inclusion of nodes to represent, for 
example: the presence of dew, burst water pipes, etc.  This can be achieved without 
the need for reviewers to understand the, sometimes complex, underpinning 
mathematical techniques.  Any alterations to the BBN, such as the inclusion or 
removal of additional nodes and arcs is easily achieved within available BBN 
software packages such as HUGIN or NETICA. 
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Figure 3.1 Example construction of a BBN from variables, arcs and probability 
distribution. 
 
It is important to note that the derivation of the conditional probabilities associated 
with each node (each of which may be defined independently) may not be trivial.  
Conditional probabilities may be obtained from a variety of sources including 
experimentation, analysis and subjective opinion.  This allows for the best available 
distributions to be entered at the time the network is developed.  Consequently, 
variables with ill defined probability tables can be included within the network from 
its conception.  For such variables subjective opinion may provide a probability 
distribution when no other exists.  Yet, the use of subjective values can lead to the 
inclusion of cognitive biases such as: anchoring and adjustment, representativeness 
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and overconfidence.  Therefore, it is important to maintain detailed documentation of 
why subjective opinion was used and how the values were elicited.  If at all possible 
subjective values should be put through a validation process.  Of course, if more 
refined probability distributions do become available, they can be easily entered into 
the BBN.  Overall, this approach ensures that uncertainties, as expressed within the 
probabilities, are stated explicitly throughout the analysis process.   
 
As a BBN is acyclic, the  network is a static representation in time of a given 
probability distribution.  Whilst evidence may update the beliefs within the network, 
the observation of events will not alter the actual structure of the network: there is no 
opportunity for feedback.  The ability of evidence to affect variables over time is 
however incorporated into dynamic BBNs.   
 
3.4 Developing a Bayesian Belief Network. 
Research papers rarely seem to discuss the development of the BBN they are 
presenting.  It is hard to find information on how researchers identified the variables 
and dependencies to be included within a given network.  This may be symptomatic 
of the lack of defined procedure for the development of a BBN.  Hence, each 
researcher must identify the variables and dependenc ies of interest to themselves 
before structuring a BBN.   
 
To structure a BBN which is an accurate representation of a complex problem may 
require many revisions.  Once the variables to be included has been agreed, the 
dependencies between the variables can be depicted in three ways (as shown in Figure 
3.2, based on Neil, Fenton and Nielson, 2000).  These representations, known as d-
connections, form the basis of information flow within the network.  Any variables 
within a network which are not d-connected are said to be d-separated. 
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Figure 3.2:  Serial, converging and diverging d-connections.. 
 
Expanding upon each of these connections, Figure 3.3 presents an example serial 
connection. 
 
A B C
Type of job Sickness? Symptom 1
 
Figure 3.3 Example of a serial connection 
 
Mathematically, in a serial connection, node B is conditionally dependent upon A, and 
node C upon B.  In this example, a symptom of a sickness is dependent upon being 
employed in job ‘J’ and the diagnosis of a sickness is dependent upon the observation 
of ‘symptom 1’.  Evidence available at either end of a serial connection (here nodes A 
and C or type of job and symptom 1) will update the belief at the node(s) in-between 
(the belief in sickness?).  Nodes at either end of the connection are normally 
dependent, that is evidence entered at these nodes will revise the belief in the other 
(for example knowing the type of job revises the belief in the individual having a 
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symptom 1).  However, these nodes (A and C, or in the example type of job and 
symptom 1) become conditionally independent if the connecting node (B, or sickness) 
is known for certain and becomes instantiated. (knowing a sickness has been observed 
subsequent ly means that knowing someone is employed in a given job will not revise 
the belief in an individual having symptom 1) 
 
Figure 3.4 presents an example of a converging connection.  
A B C
Type of job Sickness?
Family history 
of disease
 
Figure 3.4 Example of converging connection 
 
In a converging connection node B is dependent upon nodes A and C: that is, being 
diagnosed with a sickness is dependent upon observing type of job and any family 
history of disease.  Consequently, evidence entered at node B will update both nodes 
A and C (diagnosing a sickness updates the belief in observing both of the type of job 
and belief in family history of disease).  Evidence entered at node A will update B but 
will not feed up to node C.  Lines of communication between A and C will only open 
when there is direct evidence on node B (or any of node B’s descendants).  When 
such information becomes available, nodes A and C become conditionally dependent.  
For example, knowing type of job, will update the belief in a sickness but not in the 
family history of disease.  Only the certain diagnosis of a sickness will allow 
information on the type of job to update the belief in any potential family history of 
disease.  
 
A diverging connection maybe (Figure 3.5): 
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A B C
Symptom 1 Sickness? Symptom 2
 
Figure 3.5 Example of a diverging connection. 
 
In the example shown in Figure 3.5 example, both symptoms are dependent upon the 
likelihood of a sickness.  Subsequently, information which updates the belief in a 
sickness, updates the belief in the presence (or absence) of symptoms as appropriate.  
Correspondingly, evidence entered at the end nodes (A and C) will inform the 
network about the state of node B and subsequently revise the belief in the remaining 
child node.  However, when node B (sickness) is known for certain and becomes 
instantiated, nodes A and C (observing symptoms 1 and 2) become conditionally 
independent.  At this point, evidence entered at either end of the connection will not 
update the belief in the remaining end node vice versa.   
 
Figure 3.6 shows the previous connections combined into a single network.  The three 
types of connections discussed can be used to support the development of a network.  
For example, with a given connection, if evidence becomes available, does it update 
the beliefs within the nodes the developer anticipated, or did the evidence lead to 
revision in unexpected nodes?  Such assessments can lead to the restructuring of 
networks.  Of course, it is prudent to submit a BBN to a review procedure.     
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P(S|Emp, FHOD) P(¬S|Emp, FHOD)
P(S|¬Emp, FHOD) P(¬S|¬Emp, FHOD)
P(S|Emp, ¬FHOD) P(¬S|Emp, ¬FHOD)
P(S|¬Emp, ¬FHOD) P(¬S|¬Emp, ¬FHOD)
Symptom 2Symptom 1
Type of 
employment
Family history 
of disease
Sickness?
P(Sy2|S)    P(¬Sy2|S) 
P(Sy2|¬S)  P(¬Sy2|¬S)
P(Sy1|S)    P(¬Sy1|S) 
P(Sy1|¬S)  P(¬Sy1|¬S)
P(FHOD)    P(¬FHOD) 
P(Emp)    P(¬Emp)
 
Figure 3.6 An example of a Bayesian Belief Network. 
 
Upon agreement of the network structure, each variable within the BBN must be 
populated with its associated conditional probability distribution.  Figure 3.6 also 
shows the values required to fully populate the BBN shown.  Within this figure, the 
nodes ‘type of employment ’ and ‘family history of disease’ are root nodes, that is no 
arcs feed directly into them, all the other nodes are child nodes.  For root nodes, the 
probability distribution is simply the prior probability distribution, which for this 
example are the probabilities of: 
 
· Working, or not working in given type of employment, 
· Having, or not having a family history of a disease. 
 
The conditional probability table for a child node includes the probability of the node 
attaining each of the defined states conditioned upon all possible combinations of its 
parent nodes.  Thus, for the node ‘symptom 1’ the conditional probability distribution 
comprises the probabilities of: 
 
· Displaying symptom 1 given a sickness (P(Sy1|S)) 
· Not displaying symptom 1 given a sickness (P(¬Sy1|S) 
· Displaying symptom 1 given no sickness (P(Sy1|¬S)) 
· Not displaying symptom 1 given no sickness (P(¬Sy1|¬S)) 
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Even within this relatively simple example, considering all the relevant factors to 
assess each of the required probabilities is not trivial.  It is easy to see how the 
addition of only a small number of additional nodes can rapidly increase the number 
of probabilities required to fully populate a network and increase the burden of 
calculations across the network.   
 
3.5 Propagation. 
BBNs can quickly and efficiently calculate the required probability distributions and 
subsequently update the network values accordingly in response to many different 
types of queries.  This process is referred to as propagation, and is the main strength 
of a BBN.   
 
BBNs exploit the conditional independence within their structure to reduce both the 
number of: 
 
· Probabilities required to fully specify a BBN, thus reducing the burden of 
elicitation. 
· Computations required to answer many potential queries.   
 
The exploitation of conditional independence means that the joint probability 
distribution is not always needed to answer a query within a BBN.  This enables 
BBNs to be computationally efficient.  However, if required, the joint probability 
distribution may be calculated through the use of the chain rule over the conditional 
probability tables.  For a small BBN, it may be possible to calculate the joint 
probability distribution manually over the whole network and then marginalise to 
answer a specific query.   
 
The problem of propagation in general is one which is non-deterministic polynomial 
time hard (NP hard).  This is a class of problem which is intrinsically harder than 
those which can be solved by a non-deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time.  
The optimal solution to such problems is very computationally heavy (no algorithms 
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for the rapid solutions of an NP hard problem exists) as all possible solutions must be 
fully assessed before selecting that which is indeed optimal.   
 
Early propagation algorithms used a local distributed message passing architecture 
(Pearl, 1982 and Kim and Pearl, 1983 both cited in Pearl, 2000).  These initial ideas 
were expanded and developed by Pearl (1986) himself and by Lauritzen and 
Spiegelhalter (1988).  The latter of these authors developed the now commonly used 
method of junction-tree propagation.  This algorithm, which is applicable to many 
probabilistic networks, decomposes a DAG into a series of sub-sets (based upon the 
d-connections within the network), known as cliques within which information flow is 
relatively contained.  Subsequently, the cyclic links between cliques are eliminated to 
create a junction tree.   
 
Within a junction tree information is passed between the cliques and not throughout 
the whole network.  This enables rapid, efficient propagation of evidence and belief 
updates through the network.  For a comprehensive overview of the calculations used 
within a BBN, the reader is referred to Pearl (1988) and Jensen (2001).  Efficient 
propagation algorithms are readily available in BBN software such as HUGIN and 
NETICA. 
 
An example of information flow within a BBN is shown below in Figures 3.7 and 3.8.  
The updating of beliefs within the network is triggered by evidence entering the 
network (Figure 3.7).  Subsequently, in accordance with the laws of probability 
revision messages are sent out across the network (Figure 3.8). 
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Symptom 2Symptom 1
Type of 
employment
Family history 
of disease
Sickness?
Evidence
 
Figure 3.7:  Evidence enters the BBN. 
 
Symptom 2Symptom 1
Type of 
employment
Family history 
of disease
Sickness?
Evidence
 
Figure 3.8:  Node at which evidence enters updates and subsequently sends out 
belief revision messages. 
 
As the belief messages reach the various nodes, they too update their belief 
distributions.  Propagation terminates when no nodes remain to return a belief 
message.  For a detailed description of propagation within a BBN the reader is 
referred to Pearl (1988). 
 
3.6 Large-scale Bayesian Belief Networks   
BBNs are applicable to a wide range of problems due to their capacity for diagnostic 
(from an observed event, identify the reason for it having occurred) and predictive 
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(from an observation predict what will happen) reasoning.  The representation of 
some problem domains can lead to BBNs (Neil, Fenton and Nielson 2000): 
 
· Which are small enough for the causal directions on the edges to be obvious.  
· Where the actual inferences made can run counter to the edge directions.  
 
When considering many real- life complex problems, the causal directions between 
nodes may not always be obvious.  It should be remembered that some dependencies 
may be domain dependent.  However, although ““cause to effect” and “effect to 
cause” are mathematically equivalent…applying uniform interpretations are critical if 
we are to build large scale networks with meaningful semantics.” (Neil et al, 2000).   
 
Complex problems, with their many interlinked variables may require a large-scale 
BBN.  Potential improvements to the structuring of such networks may be through the 
use of automated techniques.  Research by Klopotek (2005) focused on the 
development of a BBN comprising of up to 100,000 nodes through analysis of 
available text.  Nevertheless, automated techniques still require human intervention in 
order to identify those BBN structures which are no t realistic representations of the 
problem domain.  Whilst it is feasible to develop large-scale BBNs it is important to 
note that the propagation algorithms developed by researchers such as Pearl (1986) 
become inefficient on such networks.   
 
3.6.1 Network fragments. 
An alternative approach to automated techniques is the structured development of 
large-scale BBNs through the use of ‘network fragments’.  Pioneered by Laskey and 
Mahoney (1997), a network fragment is defined as “a set of related variables together 
with the knowledge about the probabilistic relationships among the variables.” 
(Laskey and Mahoney, 1997, page 335)  The development of a large-scale BBN is 
achieved through the combination of smaller network fragments each developed by 
experts within a specific field on a problem domain.  Such an approach complements 
scenarios in which there is a great deal of uncertainty about which variables may be 
important.  As work progresses, variables identified as being important may simply be 
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linked into the network, thus overcoming any initial lack of clarity.  The capability to 
rapidly incorporate new variables is a great strength when undertaking real-time 
analysis.   
 
Recent advances in the use of network fragments by Neil and Fenton (2005) considers 
the building of large-scale networks through the use of idioms.  Differing from earlier 
work, the network fragments “…represent very generic types of uncertain 
reasoning…interested only in the graphical structure and not in any underlying 
probabilities and so for this reason an idiom is not a BN as such, but simply the 
graphical part of one.” (Neil and Fenton, 2005, page 2).  It is postulated that the use if 
idioms could be used to rapidly develop BBNs based upon a specific type of 
reasoning.  
 
The structuring of a large-scale BBN must be carried out with consideration given to 
the elicitation of the required conditional probability tables.  A variety of probability 
derivation techniques may be used, including the Noisy-OR distribution (which 
reduces the probabilities to be elicited), and the Noisy-MAX distribution (Jurgelenaite 
and Lucas, 2005, and Neil and Fenton, 2005).   
 
3.6.2 Object-oriented methodologies. 
Object-oriented approaches have been applied to the development and use of BBNs.  
The basic component of an object oriented approach is an object which at the simplest 
level, with respect to a BBN, would represent a variable (node).  At a higher level of 
abstraction, an object could represent a network fragment which Weidl, Madsen and 
Israelson (2005) refer to as an instance object.  Object oriented approaches provide for 
the inclusion of objects (sometimes hidden) within other objects.  This approach 
enables a hierarchical structure of a problem to be developed (for example: nodes to 
network fragments to the overall BBN).  Dawid, Mortera and Vicard (2005) make the 
point that a modular, hierarchical structure may be easily refined through the inclusion 
of objects, or the refinement of existing ones.  As such, a model can be developed at 
an appropriate level of abstraction for the situation being analysed. Koller and Pfeffer 
(1997) developed an object oriented approach starting from the use of a stochastic 
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functional language.  Their work identified three main advantages to the approach, 
namely the: 
 
· Development of model fragments which could be reused in a semantically 
meaningful way. 
· Simple construction and modification of appropriate BBN fragments. 
· Overall reduction in model complexity.   
 
The structuring of a problem within an object oriented approach is facilitated by the 
existence of pattern catalogues which “have proved very useful to capture flexible and 
reusable object-orientated structures, promoting also a shared vocabulary for 
developers to talk about object-orientated design issues.” (Berdún, Pace, Amandi and 
Campo, 2008).  Such libraries do provide a researcher with some defined procedure 
for the development of a BBN.  Their use, however, is dependent upon the researcher 
identifying the correct pattern for use in the problem of interest.   
 
Initial work to extend the use of BBNs focused on the use of logic-programming like 
rules.  However, the use of network fragments and object-oriented methods have 
found particular applicability within the fields of knowledge management, decision 
support systems and reasoning under uncertainty (Valtorta, Byrnes and Huhns, 2005).  
The flexibility of object-oriented technology was used by Wang and Chien (2003) to 
develop internet based group decision support systems allowing for the collation and 
sharing of ideas and opinions.  Object oriented techniques have also been used to 
support the search for information at a suitable level of detail in time critical decisions 
(Tseng and Gmytrasiewicz, 2006).   
 
Applications of object-oriented techniques within the military environment have been 
as diverse as modelling military organisation and behaviour (Suzic, 2003) to 
supporting the specifications required for future information fusion (Laskey and 
Costa, 2007).  Current research on the use of object oriented Bayesian Networks to 
fuse information has also supported their use in providing situational awareness and 
intelligence analyses (Liao et al, 2003 and Pfatzu and Roth, 2006).   
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3.7 Bayesian Belief Networks in military intelligence analyses. 
 
3.7.1 Background. 
Intelligence analysis is not a precise science.  Zlotnick (1972, page 43) succinctly 
states that “The very best that intelligence can do is to make the most of the evidence 
without making more of the evidence than it deserves.”  The use of probabilistic 
reasoning within intelligence analysis ensures: 
 
· The explicit definition of uncertainties within the analysis from the beginning.  
· The logical and consistent manipulation of uncertainty. 
· Each piece of evidence contributes to the final outcome on its own merits. 
· Multiple hypotheses are considered in a structured, fair manner. 
 
Zlotnick (1967) was one of the first researchers to report upon the use of Bayes’ 
theorem in predictive intelligence analysis simulations.  Overall, Zlotnick (1967) 
considered the main strengths of using a Bayesian approach was its ability to support 
internally consistent analysis and concluded that “Mathematical processing will not 
become an alternative to present methods of intelligence analysis. It will become a 
reliability check on present methods. It will help show the plausibility of conclusions 
which the intelligence analyst would not otherwise recognize as compatible with the 
evidence and his own inner logic. It will tell the analyst: if you interpret the evidence 
in this way, then here is the conclusion you should probably reach.” (Zlotnick, 1967, 
page 12). 
 
The use of Bayes’ theorem as a predictive intelligence technique was also considered 
by Fisk (1972).  Within a realistic setting of a potential attack by the Union of the 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) against China’s nuclear capabilities, Fisk (1972) 
compared intelligence forecasts made through both the traditional and a Bayesian 
approach.  Concluding, Fisk (1972) reported that whilst the Bayesian approach was 
not shown to be significantly more accurate, such an approach generated a clear audit 
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trail of the uncertainties associated with information and, importantly, how and why 
such values had been allocated.   
 
Schweitzer (1976) further extended the use of Bayes’ theorem as a predictive 
methodology through its application to political analysis.  During a relatively long 
term study (spanning three years from 1974 to 1976), Schweitzer applied Bayesian 
techniques in three relevant scenarios in which hostilities may commence (North 
Vietnam, Sino-Soviet relations and the Arab Israeli conflicts).  The experiment 
required participants to give initial prior probabilities for a set of defined hypotheses.  
Subsequently, participants were provided with intelligence feeds based on openly 
available data sources.  Based on the information provided, participants revised their 
belief in the probability distributions for the hypotheses set.  Bayes’ theorem was used 
to manipulate the probabilities given by the participants.  During the course of the 
experiment no hostilities commenced and as such, the research could not assess the 
predictive utility of the methodology.  Nevertheless, Schweitzer (1976) was able to 
report on the general advantages and limitations of the technique.  In addition to those 
already outlined, Schweitzer (1976, paraphrased from page 40) identified the 
following advantages: 
 
· The process provides a repeatable audit trail as to how a given assessment was 
made. 
· Analysts must consider how intelligence affects the set of hypotheses and not 
just the assumed most likely hypothesis.   
· Allows judgements to be made and reported on a numerical basis. 
· The process was shown to be less conservative than informal opinions and 
moved the assigned probabilities away from 50/50 faster and farther then 
overall subjective judgements. 
· Periodic assessments provide a degree of assurance that the problem is being 
monitored.   
The following disadvantages to the use of a Bayesian technique were also identified 
as paraphrased from Schweitzer (1976, page 41):  
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· The question being considered must be formulated in mutually exclusive 
categories. 
· The question itself must be amenable to definition as a series of hypothetical 
outcomes. 
· A flow of data relevant to the question must be available for probability 
revisions to be made.  Scarcity of data makes the overall technique less 
reliable. 
· The question must not relate to an event which is largely chance or random.   
 
For a further detail on these points, the reader is referred to Schweitzer (1976).  
 
It is of interest to note that the work by Zlotnick, Fisk and Schweitzer was not 
computer based.  Today, there is an increasing use of information technology, which 
is frequently networked, to turn large volumes of disparate data into pertinent 
information.   
 
3.7.2 Predictive intelligence analysis.   
The use of Bayesian methodologies within intelligence analysis continues to be an 
area of active research.  In 2002 Paté-Cornell presented a BBN designed to support 
the analysis and fusion of disparate intelligence information.  Within the research, two 
distinct issues relating to the fusion of information was noted.  Firstly, that relevant, 
accurate information must be communicated in a timely manner to those who require 
it.  Secondly and, as Paté-Cornell (2002, page 445) writes “perhaps more difficult, 
merging the content of the signal, some “sharp” and some “fuzzy” some dependent 
and some independent into useful information.”   
 
The use of Bayesian updating to fuse information to provide a quantitative 
intelligence assessment was further considered by McLaughlin and Paté-Cornell 
(2005).  The results of the work (which was set within the search for WMD within 
Iraq) demonstrated that Bayesian analysis could be an effective tool for the support of 
intelligence analysis.  Overall, the advantages identified by McLaughlin and Paté-
Cornell (2005) support those outlined by Schweitzer (1976).   
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3.7.3 Identifying deception. 
An important part of the potential knowledge to be gained about a situation is if the 
opposition is undertaking a programme of deception.  Deceptions play on people’s 
preconceptions and inability to systematically consider all the explanations for the 
evidence they observe.  Within the intelligence community, deceptions which go 
undetected can lead to catastrophes.  In response to this, Stech and Elsasser (2007) 
developed a semi-automated tool to support tactical decision-making through 
detecting deception and thus aiding intelligence analysis based on an extended version 
of Heuer’s Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) (Heuer, 1999).  Their work 
varies from many of its contemporaries in its consideration of specifically searching 
for signs of deception and counter deception.  The result of the work is a tool which 
“yields the states that must be hidden, observations that have no probative value to the 
observer, and the states that one might simulate to deceive an adversary.” (Stech and 
Elsasser, 2007). 
 
3.7.4 Analysis of Competing Hypotheses and BBN. 
ACH is a commonly used technique to ensure all hypotheses are considered equally.  
Part of the ACH process is the development of a matrix detailing the identified 
hypotheses and the identified supporting evidence.  This matrix can be represented 
within a Bayesian Belief Network (for details of such an approach the reader is 
referred to Valtorta, Dang, Goradia, Huang and Huhns, 2005) enabling the logical 
reasoning under uncertainty to be assessed and dependencies among hypotheses to be 
revealed.  However, before the BBN can be used, the prior probabilities must be 
evaluated and entered to allow for the calculation of accurate posterior probabilities.  
It is important to remember that individuals are prone to confirmation bias, and 
hypotheses are often generated based on the available evidence.  Therefore, additional 
techniques may be required, alongside the use of the ACH to ensure that as many 
plausible hypotheses as possible are developed.   
With specific reference to intelligence analysis, an additional interesting extension to 
Heuer’s ACH has been in combination with the use of subjective logic (Pope, Jøsang, 
and McAnally, 2006).  The combination of the two techniques “allows analysts to 
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include weak diagnostic information that could be used to expose possible deceptions 
and provide more balanced conclusions as to expected outcomes.” (Pope at al, 2006).  
A possible extens ion to such work would be the combination of ACH and BBN to 
indicate to analysts that their mental model of a situation being considered maybe 
incorrect and additional information should be sought.   
 
3.8 Chapter summary. 
This third chapter of the thesis has presented the methodological basis, development 
and application in military intelligence of Bayesian Belief Networks.  Their robust 
mathematical basis, ease of building and ability to accept data of varying certainty 
makes them an ideal tool for use in military intelligence applications.   
 
The following chapter presents an initial investigation into the development of a DSS 
based upon BBNs. 
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CHAPTER 4 :  INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE APPLICABILITY OF BBNs 
AS DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS. 
 
4.1 Introduction. 
Chapter Three introduced Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) and discussed their 
application within military intelligence analysis.  There is a growing interest in the 
development of decision support systems designed to help individuals who have to 
collate, analyse and draw conclusions from large volumes of disparate data.  Such 
systems are not intended to replace the human analyst, merely to enhance their 
capabilities by providing a clear audit trail and a second opinion.  If both the analyst 
and decision support system arrive at the same conclusion there is extra credence in 
the assessment made.  However, any inconsistencies between the two results should 
lead to the analyst re-evaluating their work.  This will ensure the analyst understands 
why there is a difference within the results which subsequently reduces the chance of 
an oversight or error within the analysis on their part.   
 
The research presented within this Chapter adds to the body of knowledge on the 
potential use of BBNs for the quantitative analysis of military intelligence.  It is 
important to note that the BBN network developed here was not intended to provide 
detailed analysis of the raw data streams provided from surveillance equipment.  
Alternatively, the developed BBN is designed to support a commanding officer or 
intelligence analyst through their decision-making cycle.  It is anticipated that the use 
of the BBN will ensure appropriate consideration of all available information and 
assist the individual in drawing their own informed conclusions about the situation 
being faced. 
 
For the purposes of this research, the use of BBNs for intelligence analyses is 
presented within a fictitious military scenario.  The developed scenario considers a 
land-based section attack against an enemy outpost which may be reinforced.  The 
focus of the research reported within this Chapter was the impact information had, as 
it became available, on the participant s’ perceptions of the situation.  Specifically, it 
was of interest to determine if individuals could logically and consistently combine 
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various probabilities in order to determine their own direct subjective probability of 
an hypothesis being true.  Numerous psychological studies have shown that this is an 
area where humans often perform weakly due to numerous subconscious biases (for 
further descriptions of common decision-making biases and heuristics see Chapter 
Two).   
 
Therefore, the research presented here sought to investigate: 
 
· The impact of additional information upon individual perceptions of a 
situation. 
· The ability of individuals to logically and consistently combine the available 
evidence. 
· The ability of individuals to assess the discriminative value of information 
sources. 
 
4.2 Scenario and Bayesian Belief Networks. 
The scenario developed as part of this research is representative of a land based 
attack.  In the scenario, the United Kingdom (UK) had been deployed and tasked with 
protecting a country with which it has good relations and is of strategic importance to 
the UK.  The mission was to advance and defeat all enemy outposts which were 
within territorial borders and over section2 strength, to secure the area of interest and 
the lines of communication.   
 
Within the scenario, (fully detailed in Annex A) participants were told that a 
reconnaissance group reported two enemy outposts, believed to be of section strength 
in the area of interest.  There was, however, some ambiguity.  Following further 
reconnaissance reports, it became highly probable that one of the two outposts had 
been reinforced.  Participants were instructed to imagine that they were heading 
towards one of the located outposts.  Each of the two outposts had an equally likely 
                                                 
2 A ‘section’ consists of two fire teams totaling 8 men (in the USA referred to as 
Squads)  
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chance of being reinforced.  This gave a fifty percent probability that the participant 
was advancing towards the reinforced outpost.  
 
Ambiguity within the scenario enabled participants to reach their own conclusions 
relating to: the potential threat posed by the outpost as well as the level of technical 
support and the tactics available to themselves.  Since the focus of the experiment was 
the subjective assessments, any inconsistencies between assumptions made by 
individual participants did not impact upon the results obtained in any subsequent 
analysis.  Comparisons were only made between each participant’s direct subjective 
values and the corresponding Bayesian values.  Had the participants been logical and 
consistent in their assessment of the probabilities there would be little difference 
between the values.  Any difference between the values provided a measure of their 
own inconsistencies.   
 
A BBN was constructed for use with the land based attack scenario. Detailed in 
Figure 4.1 the main node of interest was the hypothesis node ‘ Reinforced’.  The 
states of this node relate as to whether or not the outpost (to which the participant was 
advancing) was in fact reinforced.   
 
Within the scenario, three types of military assets could be reported as having been 
sighted at the outpost, namely: 
 
· Anti-tank weapons (ATK).3 
· Armour.4 
· Mortars.5 
 
The reporting of any of these assets is dependent upon whether or not the outpost had 
been reinforced.  This can be seen in Figure 4.1 where the hypothesis node is the 
                                                 
3 Within the UK Army the main anti-tank weapon is Javelin. 
4 Armour covers a wide range of capabilities including tanks, armoured vehicles such 
as the Warrior and reconnaissance armoured vehicles such as the Scimitar. 
5 Mortars are used to provide fire support in exact locations as requested by the 
commanding officer. 
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parent not to the nodes representing the presence of each asset.  The numbers shown 
in Figure 4.1 are for illustrative purposes only. 
 
 
Figure 4.1:  A Bayesian Belief Network of the relationships between the enemy 
outpost being reinforced and the intelligence reports available 6. 
 
Within a military situation, a commander or analyst rarely has access to the ‘ground 
truth’.  Therefore, it was imperative that the BBN include a representation of: 
 
· Reconnaissance capability (Recce Cap).  
· Enemy electronic warfare capability (En EW capability) as this will impact 
upon the utility of sensors.   
 
It is this ‘middle layer’ of nodes relating to the reporting of assets present at a 
reinforced outpost that were of most interest to this part of the research.   
 
As part of the experiment, participants were told the level of reconnaissance capability 
(high or low), to be expected from their own side which reflected good or poor 
                                                 
6 ATK is an abbreviation  of Anti Tank Weapons.  Rep is an abbreviation of Report.  
Recce is an abbreviation of reconnaissance.  Cap is an abbreviation of Capability. 
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visibility conditions.  They were also told of the enemy’s electronic warfare 
capability.  Various pieces of intelligence were then provided to the participants in the 
form of reconnaissance group or electronic sensor reports. 
 
To elicit the conditional probabilities required to populate the developed BBN, an 
experiment was developed which comprised two questionnaires (detailed in Annex A) 
both of which elicited a series of numerical values.  The first questionnaire focused on 
the conditional probability distributions required to populate the BBN.  The second 
questionnaire posed a series of questions, the answers to which could be logically 
derived from the values provided in the conditional probability distributions.  
However, the participants were not made aware of this fact.  The questions posed 
required the participant to undertake mainly diagnostic reasoning (e.g. considering the 
scenario, what in your judgement is the probability that the sensor reports mortars 
being present at the enemy outpost?).  As part of the experiment, participants were 
also asked for their experience of working with intelligence reports which may have 
developed their skills in combining multiple data sources.   
 
To provide a proof of principle execution of the scenario, BBN and developed 
questionnaires, several pilot studies were undertaken.  All participants were serving 
military officers undertaking study at Cranfield University, Defence College of 
Management and Technology.  The pilot studies provided an opportunity to refine the 
presentation and explanation of the experiment to the participants and provided 
several interesting results.   
 
It was concluded that the experiment should only be completed by serving U.K. Army 
officers.  Furthermore, to ensure that all the officers could understand the scenario and 
had an equal level of training from which to develop a response participants had to 
hold the rank of Major or above.  Firstly, to have reached the rank of Major the 
participants will have worked within the army for a substantial length of time.  This 
provided a level of experience upon which the participants may call to provide 
answers posed within the questionnaires.  However, it was also important that the 
participants had a common level of training.  Whilst this is initially provided by 
94 
officer training at the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, following this officers 
undertake a period of initial officer training in their own area (e.g. logistics) and then 
subsequently specialise (e.g. in catering) before taking captaincy exams.  Following 
training at Sandhurst, the first common training for all officers occurs at the level of 
Major.  Therefore, to ensure a consistency in the level of expertise, gained both 
through experience in serving in the military and formal training, all participants were 
required to hold the rank of Major.   
 
The pilot studies also revealed the importance of running the experiment, whenever 
possible ‘face to face’.  This approach allowed for any points of ambiguity to be 
clarified as the experiment progressed 
 
Building upon the results of the pilot study, an experiment was conducted with 13 
participants, all holding the rank of Major or above.  All participants were serving 
Army Officers undertaking post-graduate study at Cranfield University, at the 
Defence College of Management and Technology.  Whenever possible, experiments 
were conducted ‘face to face’ with participants.  However, this approach was not 
always possible.  In such cases, the experiments were sent out via e-mail and 
participants were encouraged to ask for clarification.  It was noted that the difference 
in data collection techniques may impact upon the overall results obtained.   
 
The conditional probability distributions were used to populate the developed BBN 
for each participant.  The combined the available probability distributions to calculate 
the Bayesian (normative) probability of the outpost being reinforced.  The BBN was 
interrogated by entering evidence (such as low reconnaissance capability, sensors 
report mortars at outpost) into the network.  The values of interest calculated by the 
BBN was compared against the equivalent direct responses provided by the 
participants (given in the second questionnaire detailed within Annex A).  The 
deviation between the Bayesian and corresponding direct probability was calculated 
and provided a measure of the participants own individual inconsistencies.  These 
deviations were analysed to determine if any trends or biases were apparent. 
 
95 
4.3 Results and discussion. 
 
4.3.1 Investigations into the probability of an outpost being reinforced. 
The main focus of this investigation was the effect of additional information on each 
participant’s perception of the outpost being reinforced.  Intelligence reports acted as 
the mechanism to provide additional information on the reported sightings of assets at 
an outpost.  Within the scenario, the assets potentially sighted were: armour, anti-tank 
weapons (ATK) and mortars.   
 
Representative results for an individual participant are shown in Figure 4.2.  This 
figure clearly shows a continual increase in the probability of the outpost being 
reinforced for both the Bayesian and direct subjective probability.  The result shows 
fairly close direct subjective and Bayesian probabilities when only one piece of 
information is available.  However, as additional information becomes available, the 
participant begins to over-adjust the probability of the outpost being reinforced.  This 
is shown by the increasing difference between the direct subjective and Bayesian 
probabilities.  The over-adjustment is suggestive of the participant being unable to 
correctly take account of the interdependencies between the various assets sighted at 
the outpost.   
 
For the results shown, the Bayesian values, derived from the supporting BBN, support 
the belief of the participant: the outpost is probably reinforced.  However, a decision 
support system based upon this BBN could note caution as to the magnitude of the 
likelihood of this compared to that perceived by the participant.  This could assist the 
participant’s decision on how to commence any attack against the outpost as well as 
affecting attitude to the status of the second reported outpost.   
 
 
 
 
. 
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Figure 4.2:  Effect of additional reconnaissance reports on the Bayesian and direct 
probabilities of the outpost being reinforced. 
 
Following the result shown in Figure 4.2 it was of interest to determine if these results 
were replicated across the group of results obtained.  This was achieved by calculating 
each participant’s deviation (difference between the direct subjective and Bayesian 
probability) as each intelligence report became available.  Subsequently, the mean 
deviation for the group of participants was calculated as each intelligence report was 
obtained.  This result, along with the maximum and minimum deviation within the 
group as each intelligence report became available, is shown in Figure 4.3.  It can be 
seen that the re is a continual increase in the deviation between the direct and Bayesian 
probability as additional assets are sighted at the outpost supports the findings shown 
in Figure 4.2.  Interestingly, there was little difference in the highest calculated 
deviation at each intelligence report (range from 34 to 39), however, the minimum 
calculated deviation ranged from -57 to -2.   
 
The results shown in both Figures 4.2 and 4.3 could be indicative of the representative 
heuristic.  This bias is most likely to have been caused by the participant’s mental 
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model of the situation being different from that shown in the BBN, for example other 
hitherto unvoiced factors affect their perception of the required probabilities.   
 
It is considered possible that the participant’s perception of the size of the enemy 
force located at the outpost was affecting their estimates of the likelihood of the 
outpost being reinforced.  An outpost that is manned at section strength would be 
unlikely to be supported by all three assets of armour, ATK and mortars.  Hence, if all 
three assets are located at the outpost it is possible that there would be more than a 
section of men (and possibly other assets) located there which have not yet been seen 
by the reconnaissance group.   
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Figure 4.3:  Effect of additional reconnaissance reports on the mean deviation of 
the probability of the enemy outpost being reinforced. 
 
Due to the small number of experimental results it was not possible to assume that the 
Central Limit Theorem would apply.  It was also not possible to assume normally 
distributed data, hence a non-parametric statistical test was used.  The Wilcoxon 
signed rank test (Panik, 2005) was selected for use and applied to the calculated 
deviations.  The Bonferroni correction (Berk and Carey, 1999) was applied to attain 
an overall significance level of 5%.   
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Based on the initial sample size of thirteen participants, three questions produced 
deviations between direct and Bayesian probabilities which were found to be of 
statistical significance.  The deviations of interest related to the  probabilities when the 
reconnaissance capability was low and that: 
 
· ATK was present given that the reconnaissance group report ATK present, 
Reconnaissance capability low. 
· ATK was present given that the reconnaissance group reports no ATK, Sensors 
report no ATK. 
· The outpost was reinforced given that the reconnaissance group reports ATK 
mortars and armour. 
 
The collated results were also analysed for evidence of the inve rse fallacy.  This 
heuristic occurs when individuals confuse the probability of event A occurring given 
event B already has (written as ( )BAP |  and for example may be the probability that 
the grass is wet given that it has rained) and its inverse, the probability of event B 
occurring given event A already has (written as ( )ABP |  and continuing the example 
may be the probability that it has rained and therefore the grass is wet).  
Consequently, individuals inadvertently give the wrong probability. 
 
As previously explained, the conditional probability distributions were used to 
populate the developed BBN for each participant.  The BBN was interrogated by 
entering evidence through a series of available intelligence reports into the network.  
The normative values calculated by the BBN were compared against the equivalent 
direct responses provided by the participant based upon the information available.  
The conditional probability tables also allowed for the calculation of the inverse 
fallacy probability for each of the interrogations entered in the BBN and for which a 
direct response had also been provided.   
 
A comparison of the probabilities obtained from the interrogation of the BBN against 
the equivalent direct responses elicited from the participants found one direct match 
between the results.  This match, in which the participant is said to have provided a 
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normative, or Bayesian response, is unlikely to have been caused by the participant 
being perfectly rational.  The more probable explanation is that the probability 
calculated by the BBN was caused either by rounding errors, or have been inevitable 
due to the conditional probability tables elicited from the participant.  Indeed, had the 
participant been perfectly rational, more direct matches would have been anticipated.   
 
4.3.2 Further investigations into the probability an outpost is reinforced. 
It was considered important to investigate further the conjecture that when 
participants were asked "what is the probability that the outpost has been reinforced?" 
the response being given was actually a response to the question "by how much has 
the outpost been reinforced?” Based on the scenario, it was necessary to determine 
what force strength the participants perceived to be located at the outpost if all three 
assets were reported as being present.  Furthermore, based on this perceived force size 
what, if any, other assets would the participants expect to be present at the outpost 
which may have not yet been identified.  It is entirely feasible that the participants had 
a preconceived idea of the strength of the outpost and the additional information 
simply served to reinforce their initial opinion. 
 
To fully investigate this conjecture a slight alteration was made to the subjective 
conditional probability questionnaire.  An additional question was included which was  
designed to elicit the participant’s perception of the force present at the enemy 
outpost.  No changes were made to the BBN developed in support of the experiment.  
The experiment was subsequently re-run with an additional ten participants.   
 
The results obtained disclosed that nine of the ten participants considered that an 
outpost of section strength (as included in the experimental scenario) would have 
some form of anti- tank weapon.  Therefore, the sighting of anti-tank weapons should 
not impact upon the probability of the outpost being reinforced.  Further to this, all the 
participants believed that there was at least a 50% probability of the outpost having 
being reinforced by the enemy, prior to it have being located by a reconnaissance 
group.  Hence, a reinforced outpost will have signs of additional support.  In total 
seven participants believed that the outpost would be manned by more than a section 
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of men.  Overall, the perceived additional support anticipated as being present at the 
outpost ranged from men and assets taken from a mortar platoon to a full company of 
soldiers.   
 
In line with the earlier analysis, the BBN developed in support of the experiment was 
populated and interrogated for each individual participant.  Again, for each participant 
the deviation (the difference between the direct subjective and Bayesian probability) 
as each intelligence report became available was ascertained.  Subsequently, the mean 
deviation for the group of participants was calculated as each intelligence report 
became available.  This result is shown in Figure 4.4.  As seen in the earlier study, the 
sighting of a single asset was associated with only a small deviation between the 
direct subjective and Bayesian probability.  However, as additional assets were 
sighted at the outpost, the deviations between the two probabilities increased.   
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Figure 4.4:  Effect of additional reconnaissance reports on the mean deviation of 
the probability of the enemy outpost being reinforced. 
 
As previously mentioned, nine of the participants expected ATK to be present at the 
outpost.  Therefore, the sighting of both armour and ATK contained within the second 
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intelligence report should not have led participants to substantially revise the 
probability of the outpost being reinforced from the value assigned when only armour 
had been sighted.  However, as the intelligence reports included the sighting of 
additional assets at the outpost, participants seemed unable to correctly manipulate the 
dependencies between the assets.  As such, as additional information became 
available, participants began to over-estimate the probability of the sighted outpost 
being reinforced.   
 
Overall, the analysis of the results obtained from the revised experiment showed that 
the participants’ perception of the enemy force present at the outpost had no 
discernible effect on the measured difference between the Bayesian and direct 
probabilities obtained.  An alternative reason for the observed deviations may be due 
to the structure of the network.  It is considered that the most likely explanation of the 
deviation is the inability of the participants to correctly manipulate the 
interdependencies between the available intelligence sources.  This resulted in the 
participants over-estimating the probability that the outpost was reinforced.  This 
could subsequently impact upon the decisions taken on how to mount an attack 
against the outpost.   
 
4.3.2.1 Preferred intelligence report. 
Following on from the above results, investigations were carried out into the 
participants’ preferences for additional information during the revised experiment.  
Participants were questioned as to whether they would prefer a reconnaissance or 
sensor report to decide if:  
 
· Armour was present at the outpost. 
· The outpost was reinforced.   
 
Eight of the ten participants questioned, preferred the reconnaissance group report to 
assist the decision of whether armour was present at the outpost.   
Figure 4.5 shows the probability of armour being present at the enemy outpost based 
on a positive sensor report.  Analysis of the most valuable report was undertaken 
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using the ‘odds ratio’ which is the ratio of probability of A divided by the probability 
of not A.  In this case, the odds ratio is the ratio of the probabilities of armour 
present/armour not present.  This ratio based on the probabilities of the sensor report 
of armour being present at the outpost is 83.1/16.9=4.29.  The corresponding ratio of 
the probabilities of armour pesent/not present based on a reconnaissance report is 9.83 
as shown in Figure 4.6.  Consequently, the reconnaissance report is more valuable.  
 
All the participants networks were interrogated to determine which report was the 
most valuable.  The results of the analysis are shown in Table 4.1 with the most 
influential report being highlighted in bold.  Of the  eight participants who stated a 
preference for the reconnaissance report to determine the probability of armour being 
present at the outpost, seven were found to have this as most influential report in their 
BBN.   
 
Figure 4.5:  Probability armour is present at the enemy outpost based on low 
reconnaissance capability, presence of enemy electronic counter measures and a 
sensor report of armour. 
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Figure 4.6:  Probability armour is present at the enemy outpost based on low 
reconnaissance capability, presence of enemy electronic counter measures and a 
reconnaissance report of armour. 
 
 Ratio of armour present/not present based 
upon reports from: 
Participant Sensors Reconnaissance Group 
1 36.04 5.99 
2 14.85 5.58 
3 1.86 4.65 
4 0.43 3.29 
5 1.84 5.17 
6 1.99 3.72 
7 3.31 3.31 
8 0.67 1.56 
9 4.92 9.83 
10 1.78 17.09 
Table 4.1:  Ratio of probabilities of armour present/armour not present. 
 
Sensor rep Mortars
Present
Absent
32.2
67.8
Reinforced
Yes
No
63.9
36.1
Armour present  
Present
Absent
90.8
9.24
Recce rep Mortars
Mortars
NoMortars
22.7
77.3Recce rep armour
Armour
NoArmour
 100
   0
Friendly Recce capability
High
Low
   0
 100
Recce rep ATK
ATK
NoATK
34.8
65.2
ATK present
Present
Absent
82.8
17.2
Sensor rep armour
Armour
NoArmour
55.4
44.6
Sensor rep ATK 
ATKPresent
NoATK
51.4
48.6
Enemy EW capability
DAS
ECM
   0
 100
Mortars present 
Present
Absent
55.5
44.5
104 
In Table 4.1, a ratio of 1 implies that the report from the sensor did not affect the 
probability of armour being present at the outpost.  A ratio of less than 1 indicates that 
the probability of armour being present at the outpost is highest.  Conversely, a ratio 
of less than 1 reveals the higher probability to be that armour is not present at the 
outpost.  Participants 1 and 2 show very high ratios for the sensor report ratio of the 
probabilities of armour present /armour not present.  These ratios were caused by the 
conditional probability distributions elicited from the participants and used to 
populate their own BBN.  The distributions provided by participant 1, when combined 
in the BBN calculated that for: low reconnaissance capability, with enemy EW having 
ECM capabilities and the sensor report indicated armour, the  probability of armour 
being present at the outpost was a 97.3% and a 2.7% probability of armour not being 
present.  Interestingly, participant 7 shows no difference in the ratio for the 
probabilities of armour present / armour not present for the sensor or reconna issance 
report.  This means that each report had an equal impact upon the probability of 
armour being present based upon their elicited conditional probability distributions (a 
positive report on armour from either the sensors or reconnaissance group gave a 
probability that armour being present as 76.8% and of not being present as 23.2%) 
 
Participants were also questioned as to whether they would prefer a reconnaissance or 
sensor report to decide if the outpost was reinforced.  Seven of the ten participants 
preferred a reconnaissance group report.  Table 4.2 shows the ratio for the 
probabilities of an asset being present/not present for both the sensor and 
reconnaissance group reports.  For each participant, the most valuable report for each 
asset is shown in bold.  For example, considering participant 1, the most influential 
report of the sighting of ATK and armour comes from sensor reports with a 
reconnaissance group report having most influence on the belief as to whether or not 
the outpost was reinforced with mortars.   
 
In contrast, the results for participant 2 show the sensor report being the most valuable  
with respect to deciding if ATK were present and a reconnaissance group report being 
most influential for the presence of armour.  Interestingly, participant 2 shows no 
difference in the value between a reconnaissance or sensor reports on the presence of 
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mortars.  Participant 7 show no difference in the value between the intelligence 
reports for all three assets.  As discussed in the results presented in Table 4.1, this is 
due to the conditional probability tables provided by the participant giving equal 
importance to the two sources.  As such, a positive report from each source makes an 
equal impact upon the probability of armour being present or not present at the 
outpost.  Interestingly, for the reports on armour  the reconnaissance report was the 
most valuable in 9 of the BBNs for determining if the outpost was reinforced. 
 
 Report on ATK Report on Armour Report on mortars 
Participant Sensor Recce Sensor Recce Sensor Recce 
1 1.06 1.05 1.22 1.84 2.14 2.57 
2 1.36 1.22 1.47 1.30 1.10 1.10 
3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.26 1.00 1.00 
4 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.65 1.00 1.09 
5 1.02 1.05 1.25 1.79 1.00 1.00 
6 0.95 1.22 1.02 1.20 1.04 1.12 
7 1.14 1.14 1.56 1.56 1.25 1.25 
8 1.0 1.16 1.00 1.70 1.00 1.00 
9 1.22 1.19 1.60 1.77 1.72 2.23 
10 1.83 1.68 0.78 1.69 0.69 0.90 
Table 4.2:  Ratio of probabilities of outpost reinforced/outpost not reinforced. 
 
A ratio of probabilities equal to 1 implies that the report did not effect the probability 
of the outpost being reinforced (which thus remained at 50%)  A ratio of probabilities 
which is less than 1 indicates that the reporting of an asset in such a report (for 
example participant 6 with the sensor report on ATK) reduces the probability of the 
outpost being reinforced to below that of the outpost not being reinforced.   
 
As for the initial experiment, due to the small number of experimental results it was 
not possible to assume that the Central Limit Theorem would apply.  It was also not 
possible to assume normally distributed data, hence a non-parametric statistical test 
was used.  The Wilcoxon signed rank (Panik, 2005) test on the observed deviations 
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was calculated.  The Bonferroni correction (Berk and Carey, 1999) was applied to 
attain an overall significance level of 5%.  Two questions led to deviations which 
were found to be statistically significant: 
 
· If the Recce group report ATK weapons and armour but does not report 
mortars, what is the probability that the outpost has been reinforced? 
· If the Recce group report ATK weapons, mortars and armour, what is the 
probability that the outpost has been reinforced? 
 
4.3.3 Selection of the most appropriate intelligence report. 
A further experiment was conducted to investigate the selection of a preferred 
intelligence report.  Two additional changes were made to the modified experiment 
used to investigate the preferred intelligence report, namely: 
 
· At no detriment to the experimental results and in order to shorten the time 
required to complete the experiment, a reduced set of conditional probability 
tables were elicited. 
· To facilitate analysis an additional two questions were included: 
o If you could have either the sensor report or the reconnaissance report, 
which would you choose to help you decide whether armour was 
present at the outpost? 
o If you could have any single sensor or reconnaissance report, which 
would you choose to help you decide whether the outpost had been 
reinforced?  
 
The six possible answers to the second question listed above were the reconnaissance 
or sensor report on: armour, ATK weapons or mortars.  Of the seven participants, who 
completed the experiment, six indicated that they would prefer the reconnaissance 
group report to help them decide if armour was present at the outpost.  However, the 
results actually showed that for six of the participants it was in fact the sensor report 
which was the most valuable.   
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It is unclear as to why there is a difference between the preferred report started by the 
participant through direct questioning and that indicated by the BBN based on their 
elicited conditional probabilities.  It is possible that the participants did not have 
experience of working with reports collated from electronic sensors.  Hence, the 
participants may prefer to rely on highly skilled reconnaissance teams, with whom 
they may have served for a substantial length of time.  
 
4.4 Conclusions and chapter summary. 
This research has sought to investigate the following objectives: 
 
· The impact of additional information upon individual’s perceptions of a 
situation.  
· An individual’s ability to logically and consistently combine the available 
evidence. 
· The ability of individuals to assess the discriminative value of information 
sources. 
 
The developed decision support system was not intended to tell an individual which 
decision to take: the output of the system is not the ‘right or wrong’ decision.  The 
decision support system introduces objectivity and an audit trail of how a decision 
was taken.  It is anticipated that this will strengthen the decision-making process by 
ensuring a fair assessment of all the available information and thereby reducing the 
inherent risk within the decision-making process. 
 
To support the research into the above objectives a fictitious scenario representative 
of a land based attack and supporting BBN were developed.  The basis of the scenario 
was an attack against an enemy outpost which, although perceived to be manned at 
section strength, had a fifty percent probability of having been reinforced.  The focus 
of the research was the impact of additional information, as it became available during 
the situation, had on an individual’s belief that the outpost had been reinforced.  A 
Bayesian Belief Network was used to provide a normative model of the situation and 
provide the Bayesian probability of the outpost being reinforced. 
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Analysis of the results highlighted a sharp increase in the mean deviation between the 
direct and Bayesian probabilities when two or more assets were sighted at the outpost.  
This is likely to have been caused by participants incorrectly manipulating the 
dependencies between the assets sighted at the outpost.  The deviations may also have 
been caused by differences between the structure of the BBN and the participants 
mental model of the situation.  Therefore, additional research must carefully consider 
the development and structure of any BBNs.   In conclusion, the availability of 
additional information did alter the participants’ view of the situation.  However, they 
were unable to logically and consistently combine the available information to make 
accurate assessments of the situation being faced.  What remains unclear is the impact 
the decision support system would have had on subsequent decisions relating to 
courses of action on the attack of the outpost.  The results show that the participants 
had strong mental assumptions relating to the outpost and the importance of 
information received from human intelligence sources.  It is possible that the results 
presented from the network would not have changed the opinion of the participants. 
 
The participants in the experiment tended to prefer the reconnaissance report to the 
sensor report when offered a choice.  However, the BBNs developed from the 
participants’ conditional probability tables frequently showed the sensor report to be 
the most valuable.  It is unclear why this trend was observed but may have been 
caused by participants’ careers leading them to have had more contact with 
reconnaissance reports than sensor reports.   
 
The results obtained indicated that participants were not able to give sufficient 
credence to information received by electronic methods.  It was unclear why this trend 
was observed.  However, there is merit in the development of a system which could 
logically and consistently combine both human and signal intelligence to aid analysts’ 
understanding of a situation and ensure accurate consideration of all available 
intelligence.  As such, it can be concluded that there is merit in the design of a BBN 
decision support system which could support intelligence analysis by: 
 
· Ensuring reports from all sources are fairly considered and evaluated. 
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· Indicate, based on the available information the most plausible hypotheses. 
 
This latter point would, in theory enable a decision-maker to identify when their view 
of the situation may require re-consideration or when additional information would be 
required.  These point s will be investigated further in Chapter Five.   
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CHAPTER 5 :  CASE STUDY:  APPLICATION OF BBNs AS DECISION 
SUPPORT TOOLS TO THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT OF 1973. 
 
5.1 Introduction. 
Chapter Four of this thesis investigated areas where a BBN used as a DSS could be of 
most use.  The results of the investigation concluded that: 
 
· Experimental participants were unable to logically and consistently combine 
multiple data sources. 
· There was evidence to suggest participants were not able to give proper 
attention to data from electronic sources. 
· There was merit in the development of a decision support system able to 
indicate the most plausible hypothesis and how this may change over time 
with the available information and derived subjective conditional probability 
distributions. 
 
To further investigate and address these strands of research, this chapter presents a 
BBN as a decision support system within the context of the main events leading up to 
the start of the Arab Israeli conflict of 1973.  Through the use of hypothetical 
probability estimates the case study shows where and how such a tool could have 
been of use to the Israeli intelligence forces by addressing the above points of interest. 
 
The timeline used for the analysis is comprised from entirely open source data and, of 
course, has been constructed with the luxury of hindsight.  Therefore, the work 
presented here is in no way meant to provide a comparison of the decisions taken 
during the actual events discussed here.  Those intelligence analysts and military 
personnel present at the time of the events would have had access to additional, 
classified information.  Furthermore, any decisions taken at that time would have been 
made under the pressures and political constraints of the time.  However, substantial 
effort has been given to ensuring that the timeline, BBN and conditional probabilities 
used for this research are as realistic as possible.  Overall, the purpose of the research 
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is to illustrate the potential benefits and strengths, as well as any weaknesses in the 
use of BBNs for intelligence analyses.    
 
5.2 Development of the timeline and Bayesian Belief Networks of the main 
events leading up to the start of the 1973 Arab Israeli conflict. 
Prior to the start of the 1973 conflict, commonly known as the Yom Kippur war, 
Israel was renowned for its exceptional intelligence service and capabilities.  How 
then, was the nation taken by a surprise attack?  Hughes-Wilson (2004, page 257) 
notes that following the conflict of 1967 that Israel “underestimated her enemy”.   
 
Indeed hindsight had shown that there was no failure to gather intelligence which 
suggested an impending attack.  Troop movements, the location of bridging 
equipment and the call up of reserves amongst other signals were all noted.  The 
information was there.  It was “Israel’s overconfidence that had prevented accurate 
intelligence assessments.” (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991. page 178).  The 
combination of overconfidence and underestimating the enemy “led directly to the 
[second] Israeli mistake: a curious inability to draw the right conclusions from a given 
set of facts.  Thus the simultaneous build-ups in Syria and Egypt never appear to have 
been linked.  The likelihood of an attack was just plain ignored.  There seemed to be 
an absolute assumption that the Arabs could not attack until Israel’s own political 
criteria for any Arab attack had been met.” (Hughes-Wilson, 2004, page 258). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is not to give a detailed account of the history leading up 
to, nor the facts of, the Yom Kippur war.  An overwhelming body of literature exists 
on these topics.  However, the interested reader is referenced in particular to Hughes-
Wilson (2004), Bickerton and Klausner (1991) for excellent comprehensive accounts 
of the war from the both the military and political perspectives.  In addition to these 
Wagner (1974) provides a fascinating analysis of the decisions taken by the Israeli 
Government in 1973. 
 
Based on an open source literature review, the research presented here considers, two 
collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive hypotheses.  Together, these 
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hypotheses represent the intent of the Egyptian and Syrian coalition at various points 
from 1967 to 1973.  The hypotheses considered were: 
 
Hypothesis A Hostile:  The Egyptian and Syrian coalition will undertake a hostile 
attack against Israel to achieve their aims. 
 
Hypothesis B Peaceful:  The Egyptian and Syrian coalition will not undertake a 
hostile attack against Israel to achieve their aims. 
 
Table 5.1 presents the main military and political events leading to the start of 
hostilities in the Arab Israeli conflict of 1973.  Whilst many sources are available, the 
information included below is a summary of the information given in Buckwalter 
(2002).  
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Date Action 
Background 
During the Six Day War Egypt suffered territorial losses.  Following 
this there was a period of ‘no war – no peace’ which greatly affected 
Egypt’s economy through the loss of revenue from the closure of the 
Suez Canal.  President Sadat of Egypt felt he had to take action.  
President Sadat of Egypt and President Assad of Syria agreed a 
simultaneous attack on two fronts against Israel with the aim of 
removing Israelis from the captured lands (Operation Badr). 
Egypt secured additional arms in exchange for an extension of the 
Soviet Egyptian Naval Agreement. 
Dec-71 to 
May-73 
Egypt creates numerous minor and three major military scares in Israel 
by: Mobilising sections of their reserves; Moving bridging material to 
the Suez canal; Preparing crossing places and Concentrating tanks, 
artillery and troops. 
Apr-73 Syria and Egypt receive 1st installment of air defence missiles.  
May-73 Egyptian mobilisation creates major scare in Israel.  
Mid-73 
Doubts are spread about the efficacy of the air defence missile force. 
Media rumors of Arab disunity and friction with the Russians are not 
discouraged.  Threats on the use of an oil embargo continue.   
Damming report on feasibility of canal crossing leaked to Israeli 
intelligence and building of an oil pipeline near intended war zone 
publicised. 
Jul-73 Syria and Egypt receive 2nd installment of air defence missiles. 
13-Sept-73 Syrian fighters attack Israeli reconnaissance flight.  
Sept-73 Syria increases strength opposite the Golan heights. 
24-Sept-73 
CIA passes intelligence to Israel noting discrepancies between Egypt’s 
build up to exercise and build ups to previous exercises.  
25-Sept-73 
King Hussein of Jordan flies to Israel saying that the Syrian 
deployments were a precursor to war.    
27-Sept-73 Egypt mobilises large number of reserves.  
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Date Action 
30-Sept-73 
Egypt mobilises another large number of reserves and announces the 
demobilisation of the 27th Sept reserves.   
Israeli intelligence receives reliable human intelligence that the 
Egyptian exercise will end in an actual crossing of the Suez Canal. 
1-Oct-73 Egyptian planned exercise (Tahrir 41) commences. 
2-Oct-73 
Israel receives intelligence on Syrian movements of bridging 
equipment, fighter aircraft and surface to air missile batteries. 
Egypt mobilises bridging equipment and crossing spots.  
3-Oct-73 Egypt tell Soviet Union of the planned attack against Israel. 
4-Oct-73 
Israeli Air reconnaissance over Sinai reveals an unprecedented build up 
of Egyptian forces.  Also noticed is a Soviet airlift heading for the 
region. 
5-Oct-73 
Human intelligence source sends Israeli intelligence code word for 
imminent war. 
Israeli intelligence receives reports that Soviet naval vessels are 
departing. 
5-Oct-73 
Israeli cabinet meet to discuss what evacuation of the Russian civilians 
means.   
6-Oct-73 
Israeli human and signal intelligence sources leave no doubt that Arab 
hostilities were imminent.  1400: Start of hostilities.  Israel is surprised. 
Table 5.1:  Timeline of main representative events providing a potential indication 
of attack against Israel from 1967-1973. 
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Figure 5.1:  Initial BBN developed to support quantitative analysis of events 
potentially indicating an attack against Israel in 19737. 
 
Based upon information in the developed a timeline, a BBN was developed to support 
the research, as shown in Figure 5.1.  Since the focus of this work was the use of 
BBNs for intelligence analysis it was of most interest to develop the network from the 
point of view of an Israeli intelligence officer, as it was the Israelis who were 
surprised at the start of the 1973 hostilities.   
 
Had this network actually been developed between 1967 and 1973 it would have been 
done so against the territorial gains Israel had made during the Six Day War of 1967.  
Following this success, the Israeli intelligence and government developed very firm 
views on what conditions had to be met before Egypt could re-commence hostilities.  
Specifically these were: The purchase of aircraft capable of providing deep attack as 
well as air defence capabilities and the belief that Syria would not commence 
hostilities without being in a coalition with Egypt.   
                                                 
7App is a shortened version of apparent.  AD is a shortened version of Air Defence.  
Ops is a shortened version of operations.  SIGINT refers to signal intelligence. 
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The BBN in Figure 5.1 incorporates these beliefs and other potential military cues as 
to the intent of the Egyptian government.  For example, the overall capability of a 
fighting force is affected by their ability to operate at night and in bad weather.  A 
force which is only fully effective on a clear day will have a limited set of courses of 
action available to them.   
 
There are however, other general factors which impact upon a nation’s ability to 
commence hostilities, not least of which is the fact that war is expensive.  Often going 
to war requires a government to increase military spending as a percentage of the 
gross domestic product.  Whilst go ing to war may support the defence industry, it can 
create hardships and poverty within the warring nations through impacting upon areas 
such as the stock market, trade routes and tourism.  It is important to remember that 
between 1967 and 1973 the Egyptian economy was weakened through a loss of 
revenue following the closure of the Suez Canal.  In addition to this, conflict within 
the Middle East carries the possibility of affecting the global supply of oil through 
cuts in production or an embargo the effects of which would be seen worldwide. 
 
Going to war also carries political risk.  At the lowest level this could be the inability 
to achieve national cross party support for the government commencing hostilities.  
However, this risk can escalate and could result in outcomes including: possible 
sanctions against a nation, the alienation of countries previously considered friendly 
and potential retaliation attacks.  All of these issues could lead to destabilisation of the 
local region. 
 
5.3 Refinement of the Bayesian Belief Network developed in support of the 
main events leading up to the start of the 1973 Arab Israeli conflict. 
The BBN shown in Figure 5.1 is relatively complex due to the number of events and 
relationships it represents.  However, before it could be used for any analyses, all the 
required conditional probability distributions had to be obtained.  For the purposes of 
this research, the probabilities were elicited from a military historian working at the 
Defence College of Management and Technology over a series of four meetings.  
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The first meeting provided an opportunity to present, discuss and refine the BBN and 
supporting timeline.  The discussions centred on the structure of the network and as 
such no conditional probabilities were elicited.  During the meeting it was agreed to 
simplify the BBN shown in Figure 5.1 through, in essence the removal of all nodes 
explicitly representing the political, economic and environmental factors.   
 
The nodes removed were done so for several reasons.  Firstly, the re were certain 
nodes which could not be adequately expressed in probabilistic terms namely:  
attainable war aims, an Arab coalition (noted as opposition in coalition in the 
network) split in Arab/Soviet relations, and the reporting of a split in Arab/Soviet 
relations.  Secondly, the review process highlighted several nodes which it was 
considered unlikely that an Israeli intelligence officer would have known about.  
These nodes mainly related to the environmental conditions that the Egyptian and 
Syrian coalition desired to commence hostilities including: sufficient slack in canal 
tide, gaps in USA satellite coverage, Arab force capability, ability to sustain 
operations at night, and the ability to sustain operations in bad weather.  Thirdly, those 
nodes relating to the political risk and ability to sustain war were removed.  It was not 
considered possible to represent the myriad interlinking factors which affect theses 
nodes within the BBN.  Furthermore, even if the BBN were to incorporate such a 
representation, it is considered unlikely that intelligence officers could obtain the 
required probability distributions.  Finally, the node relating to the reporting of 
exercises within the media was removed.  An exercise requires the mobilisation of 
forces, equipment and the concentration of forces and, as such, an exercise can 
actually represent the start of hostilities.  
 
In addition to the removal of the above nodes, those nodes relating to the availability 
of intelligence were amended.  The nodes relating to human and signals intelligence 
(HUMINT and SIGINT) were changed from whether the intelligence was available to 
whether it was credible.  As such, the summation of the available intelligence now 
gave the overall credibility of the intelligence.   
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None of the above changes to the developing BBN were considered detrimental to the 
aim of there search.  The resulting BBN is shown in Figure 5.2 in which all values are 
purely illustrative.   
 
 
Figure 5.2:  Revised BBN developed to support quantitative analysis of events 
potentially indicating an attack against Israel in 1973. 8 
 
At the second meeting, the BBN was populated with fictitious numbers in order for 
the military historian to observe how the introduction of evidence altered the network 
values.  This enabled a review of the relationships presented within the network.  The 
military historian was asked to verify that the values within the network moved in an 
‘intuitive’ way.   
 
The following, third, meeting focused on the most appropriate method for the military 
historian to express numerical values, e.g. as percentages, frequencies, fractions or 
using a pointer on a sliding scale.  This third meeting also provided an additional 
opportunity for the military historian to review the model.  The outcome of the third 
                                                 
8 App is a shortened version of apparent.  AD is a shortened version of Air Defence.  
HUMINT refers to Human Intelligence.  SIGINT refers to Signals Intelligence.   
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meeting was an agreement to elicit the required conditional probability distributions 
as percentages.  Subsequently, all the required probabilities were elicited at the fourth 
and final meeting.  This was the longest of all the meeting and lasted several hours.  In 
addition to the conditional probability distributions, the military historian was asked 
to directly state a range of probabilities based upon a variety of available information 
sources, namely the probability of hostile intent given that there was clear intelligence 
and an apparent: 
 
· Extensive build up of an air defence capability. 
· Partial mobilisation of reserves. 
· Concentration of forces. 
· Departure of foreign citizens. 
· Extensive air defence capability and partial mobilisation of reserves. 
· Extensive air defence capability, partial mobilisation of reserves and 
concentration of forces. 
· Extensive air defence capability, partial mobilisation of reserves, 
concentration of forces and the departure of foreign citizens. 
 
Using the elicited conditional probability distributions, the BBN was populated.  
Subsequently, the network was interrogated by the sequential instantiation of the 
appropriate nodes relating to the simplified timeline of events shown in Table 5.2.  
The main focus of the work was to observe the impact of additional, cumulative 
information on the likelihood that Arab intent was hostile.  The BBN calculated the 
Bayesian probability of hostile intent through combining the various data and 
evidence available based on the military historian’s subjective probabilities.   
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Date Action 
Apr-73 Syria and Egypt receive 1st installment of air defence missiles. 
May-73 Egyptian mobilisation creates major military scare in Israel. 
Jul-73 Syria and Egypt receive 2nd installment of air defence missiles. 
2-Oct-73 
Israel receives intelligence on Syrian movements of bridging 
equipment, fighter aircraft and air defence batteries. 
Egypt mobilises bridging equipment and crossing spots. 
4-Oct-73 
Israeli Air reconnaissance over Sinai reveals an unprecedented 
build up of Egyptian forces.  Also noticed on this date is a Soviet 
airlift heading for the region 
Table 5.2:  Simplified timeline of main representative events providing a potential 
indication of attack against Israel from 1967-1973. 
 
A series of questions were composed and subsequently put to the historian, the 
answers to which could be logically deduced through interrogation of the BBN.  The 
historian, however, was unaware of this.  Therefore, when the questions were directly 
posed to the historian the results given were intuitive.  The deviations between the 
Bayesian values and directly elicited subjective probabilities for the various questions 
posed were calculated.  The differences were a measure of the historian’s own 
individual inconsistency.  As such, the deviations were analysed to determine if any 
trends or biases were present within the results.   
 
 
5.4 Results and discussion. 
 
5.4.1 Proof of principle of derived BBN. 
Firstly, the key events in Table 5.2 were sequentially and cumulatively entered into 
the BBN.  No assumptions were made relating to the state of the nodes referring to 
human and signal intelligence, or subsequently the quality of the intelligence picture.  
Table 5.3 summarises the results. 
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Events observed 
Probability Arab 
intent was hostile 
(as %) 
Initial belief that hostilities would occur 30 
Apparent limited build up of an air defence capability 32 
Apparent limited build up of an air defence capability and 
mobilisation of reserves 
44.6 
Apparent mobilisation of reserves and an extensive build 
up of an air defence capability 
47 
Apparent mobilisation of reserves, an extensive build up of 
an air defence capability and a concentration of forces 
51.5 
Apparent mobilisation of reserves, an extensive build up of 
an air defence capability concentration of forces and the 
departure of foreign citizens  
61.0 
Table 5.3:  Probability of Arab intent being hostile based on evidence available in 
timeline. 
 
The results in Table 5.3 show that as the number of apparent events observed 
accumulated, the probability that Arab intent was hostile increased.  It is important to 
remember that the Bayesian values shown above are dependent upon the elicited prior 
probability distributions.  Consequently, the values shown are subjective and made in 
full consideration of all the available information with the luxury of hindsight.  
Therefore, these values should not be used in any comparison against decisions taken 
during the actual events being considered.  Nevertheless, the results do show that 
BBNs have applicability in the use of assessing the likelihood of various hypotheses 
based on the continual updating of information.   
 
5.4.2 Investigations into trends and biases. 
As part of the experiment, the military historian provided direct estimates for a series 
of propositions which are shown in Table 5.4.  All the propositions assumed that clear 
intelligence was available and started by assuming only a single piece of intelligence 
was available.  Subsequently, two, three and finally four pieces of intelligence became 
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simultaneously available.  Each proposition was entered into the BBN and the 
differences between the direct subjective estimates and the Bayesian values were 
assessed.   
 
The results generally show a noticeable difference between the Bayesian and direct 
estimates for a given proposition.  In the main, the results in Table 5.4 show an 
increase in the calculated deviation as additional simultaneous pieces of information 
became available.  These findings are shown graphically in Figure 5.3. 
 
The result shown in Figure 5.3 presents a continual increase in the probability of the 
coalition intent being hostile for both the Bayesian and directly elicited probabilities.  
When only two pieces of information were available, there is fairly close agreement 
between the two sets of values.  As additional information becomes available, the 
historian begins to over adjust the probability of hostile intent.  In Figure 5.3 this is 
shown by the increasing difference between the direct subjective and Bayesian 
probabilities.  The over adjustment in suggestive of the historian being unable to 
correctly take account of the interdependencies between the intelligence reports 
provided. 
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 Probability value  
Probability that Arab intent was hostile given: Direct Bayesian 
Direct-
Bayesian 
Clear intelligence and an extensive build up of 
an air defence capability 
50 36.6 13.4 
Clear intelligence and a partial mobilisation of 
reserves 
45 44.4 0.6 
Clear intelligence and an apparent 
concentration of forces 
70 34.1 35.9 
Clear intelligence and an apparent departure 
of foreign citizens  
35 39.6 -4.6 
Clear intelligence, an extensive air defence 
capability and an apparent partial mobilisation 
of reserves 
60 51.9 8.1 
Clear intelligence, an extensive air defence 
capability, an apparent partial mobilisation of 
reserves and an apparent concentration of 
forces 
80 56.6 23.4 
Clear intelligence, an extensive air defence 
capability, an apparent partial mobilisation of 
reserves an apparent concentration of forces 
and the apparent departure  of foreign citizens  
90 66.6 23.4 
Table 5.4:  Comparison of Bayesian and Direct values for the main propositions of 
interest. 
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Figure 5.3:  Effect of additional information on the Bayesian and directly elicited 
probabilities of coalition intent being hostile. 
 
5.4.3 Relative importance of potential information sources. 
The final area of interest was that of assessing the relative importance of each 
potential information source.  The results presented in Chapter Four showed that the 
majority of participants were unable to correctly assess the information report which 
has most impact upon the likelihood of a set of hypotheses.  The experiment reported 
on in Chapter 4 focused specifically on the selection of reconnaissance or sensor 
reports.  In the experiment presented here the emphasis was no t upon how the 
information was collected but upon what the information related to.  That is, which of 
the potentially available pieces of information (Mobilisation of troops; Concentration 
of forces; Development of an air defence capability; Departure of Soviet citizens) 
provided the most information relating to the possible intent of the Egyptian Syrian 
coalition?   
 
As part of the experiment the military historian was requested to rank, in order of 
influence, the potential information sources available fo r assessing the intent of the 
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Arab coalition.  Table 5.5 presents the direct rankings provided by the military 
historian are shown alongside those obtained from the interrogation of the BBN.   
 
 Results obtained from: 
Influence 
ranking 
Direct questioning Network interrogation 
1 
Development of an air defence 
capability 
Mobilisation of reserves 
2 Mobilisation of reserves Departure of foreign citizens 
3 Apparent concentration of forces 
Development of an air defence 
capability 
4 Departure of foreign citizens Apparent concentration of forces 
Table 5.5:  Ranking of importance for available information. 
 
It can be seen that there is some inconsistency between the rankings provided verbally 
by the military historian and those derived from the network populated with the 
distributions provided by the same person.  It is plausible that when providing the 
direct probabilities for various diagnostic propositions, the military historian was 
subconsciously giving preference to intelligence from the various sources in a way not 
consciously expressed through the elicitation of the conditional probability 
distributions.  
 
5.5 Conclusions . 
This analysis has presented a BBN as a DSS to support intelligence analysis in the 
historical context of the main events leading up to the start of the Yom Kippur War.  
Whilst proof of concept has been shown, the results depend upon the prior 
probabilities elicited and used to populate the network.  Therefore, these values must 
be carefully obtained and assessed.  The work has not sought to challenge those 
decision made during the real time occurrence of the events considered which would 
have been made in a different environment with additional resources. 
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The results further indicate that as multiple information sources become available 
individuals are unable to correctly manipulate the interdependencies between the 
sources.  In addition to this, inconsistencies were revealed between the relative 
importance of each potential information source as defined by an individual and the 
BBN.   
 
Overall, the results suggest that intelligence analysts may benefit from a system 
capable of combining different streams of information to calculate Bayesian values 
for a given hypotheses set.  The derivation of the network would provide a clear audit 
trail for the hypotheses and intelligence nodes included and rejected.  The techniques 
used to obtain the conditional probability distributions used to populate the BBN are 
transparent and create a clear audit of the distributions used.   
 
In addition to this, should the network provide unexpected results, the analyst would 
be forced to reconsider the values and assumptions behind it.  This could help prevent 
subconscious preferences being given to particular intelligence sources.  Of more 
concern would be how to ensure a thorough review of the BBN should it provide the 
expected answer.   
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CHAPTER 6 :  SUBJECT LIKELIHOOD ELICITATION:  A COMPARISON 
OF DIRECT RANKING, LIKELIHOOD RATIOS AND CONDITIONAL 
PROBABILITIES FOR USE IN DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS. 
 
6.1 Introduction. 
The experiments presented within Chapters Four and Five investigated the 
applicability of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) for the quantitative analysis of 
intelligence reports.  So far it has been concluded that to be of greatest benefit any 
system developed to support such a process must: 
 
· Logically and consistently combine multiple intelligence reports obtained 
from both human and signals intelligence sources. 
· Assist in determining the relative importance and influence of each 
information source in discriminating between a set of known hypotheses. 
· Have a structure which is open to scrutiny and provides a clear audit trail of 
the assumptions, hypotheses and data used. 
· Logically and coherently update the belief for each hypothesis considered as 
new evidence or data enters a network.   
 
The development of a BBN which achieves all of these goals and makes use of 
subjective probability distributions requires an appropriate elicitation technique.  
Inevitably, all such techniques have strengths and weaknesses.  Therefore, it is 
important to fully understand which elicitation technique should be selected in any 
given situation.  Advancing the body of knowledge in this area, this chapter describes 
the development of a pilot study and subsequent experiment to compare: direct 
ranking of the variables’ perceived importance for discriminating between given 
hypotheses, likelihood ratios and conditional probabilities.  The focus of this 
experiment was the extent to which the different elicitation techniques lead to 
equivalent or different judgements.   
 
A BBN was created in support of the experiment to act as a normative model.  An 
individual network was created for each participant based on their own conditional 
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probabilities.  Comparisons were made between the results of the normative model 
and the participant’s direct subjective estimates based upon their intuitive reasoning.   
 
6.2 Development of experiment. 
 
6.2.1 Design of the BBN. 
Building upon previous work, the experiment to compare elicitation techniques 
utilised the scenario based on the main events observed in the lead up to the Arab 
Israeli conflict of 1973 (as detailed in Chapter Five ).  The timeline developed in 
support of the scenario was used without alteration, and for ease of reference is 
repeated in Table 6.1.  The accompanying BBN, also developed in Chapter 5, is also 
repeated for clarity in Figure 6.1. 
 
Event 
number 
Date Action 
1 Apr-73 Syria and Egypt receive 1st instalment of air defence missiles. 
2 May-73 Egyptian mobilisation creates major military scare in Israel. 
3 Jul-73 Syria and Egypt receive 2nd instalment of air defence missiles. 
4 
2-Oct-73 
Israel receives intelligence on Syrian movements of bridging 
equipment, fighter aircraft and air defence batteries. 
Egypt mobilises bridging equipment and crossing spots. 
5 
4-Oct-73 
Israeli Air reconnaissance over Sinai reveals an unprecedented 
build up of Egyptian forces.  Also noticed on this date is a Soviet 
airlift heading for the region. 
Table 6.1: Simplified timeline of main representative events providing a potential 
indication of attack against Israel from 1967-1973. 
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Figure 6.1:  BBN developed to support quantitative analysis of events potentially 
indicating an attack against Israel in 1973.9 
 
As noted in Chapter 5, the time required to elicit the required probability distributions 
to fully populate the network through consultation with a military historian was 
substantial and  occurred over a series of meetings.  Importantly, the military historian 
only provided probability distributions and was not required to directly rank the 
variables within the network, nor provide estimates of likelihood ratios.  The 
participants for this experiment were students at the Defence College of Management 
and Technology.  As such, the experiment was generally completed either at the end 
of a lecture or during a break in teaching.  Therefore, the experiment was designed to 
take no more than a maximum of 30 minutes to complete.  Considering this, the 
network shown in Figure 6.1 was considered to contain too many nodes and 
conditional probability distributions to be of practical use in a 30 minute experiment 
which contained three different elicitation techniques.  The experiment would simply 
take too long to complete.   
 
                                                 
9 App is short for apparent.  AD is short Air Defence.  HUMINT refers to Human 
Intelligence.  SIGINT refers to Signals Intelligence.   
130 
As the focus of the experiment was not if the network could perfectly predict the 
probability of hostile intent, but on how the differing elicitation techniques considered 
may lead to equivalent or differing judgements, it was considered prudent to simplify 
the BBN.  This was achieved through the removal of various nodes and thus reduced 
the overall elicitation burden placed on participants.   
 
Firstly, the nodes ‘HUMINT’, ‘SIGINT’ and ‘Quality of Intelligence Picture’ were 
removed.   The removal of these nodes actually established a degree of flexibility 
within the network.  Either, these values could be explicitly stated as part of the 
experiment, or participants could be allowed to make their own inferences as to the 
overall quality of the intelligence picture (this option utilised the premise that each 
participant would consistently use their assumed level on the quality of intelligence 
picture throughout the answers they provided).  In either case, the overall quality of 
the intelligence picture was assumed to remain constant throughout the experiment.  
As such, the removal of these nodes did not impact upon the analysis undertaken to 
assess the impact of the different elicitation techniques on the judgements made by the 
participants. 
 
Secondly, the four nodes relating to the ‘apparent’ observation of events (e.g. apparent 
mobilisation of reserves) were also removed.  The removal of these nodes was 
undertaken through consideration of the aim of the experiment.  At its core, the 
scenario focused upon an interpretation on a series of events.  The network in Figure 
6.1 requires the participants to separate out the probabilities of the events actually 
occurring, and subsequently the probability that the event would be observed and 
reported.  Although this level of abstraction provides greater detail to the network, it 
did not directly support the aim of this final experiment which was to compare the 
judgements made by participants through differing elicitation techniques.  To provide 
sufficient data for analysis, the participants simply had to provide their assessment of 
the situation based upon the available information.  Therefore, removing the 
distinction between ground truth and observed events simplified the BBN without 
compromising the results obtained.   
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The removal of all nodes relating to the quality of intelligence and the apparent 
observation of events ensured that the BBN was sufficiently small for all three 
elicitation techniques to be used within a 30 minutes experiment.   
 
Whilst reviewing the BBN, some consideration was also given to changing the 
hypotheses used within the BBN to: 
 
Hypothesis A:  The Egyptian and Syrian coalition is capable of hostile attacks against 
Israel but is seeking to hide this fact. 
 
Hypothesis B:  The Egyptian and Syrian coalition is continuing a programme to 
become capable of undertaking a hostile attack against Israel. 
 
Hypothesis C:  The Egyptian and Syrian coalition is not interested in undertaking a 
hostile attack against Israel. 
 
These hypotheses were used in a brief pilot study, completed by six post graduate 
students at the Defence College of Management and Technology (four of whom were 
serving military officers).  The results of the study identified that individuals were not 
able to clearly discriminate between a coalition which has hostile intent but is seeking 
to hide this fact (and hence there would be at best limited indications of the real 
intent) and a coalition which has hostile intent but has not yet the capability to achieve 
their aim.  Therefore, a more plausible set of hypotheses was considered to be:   
 
· The Egyptian and Syrian coalition intent was hostile. 
· The Egyptian and Syrian coalition intent was peaceful. 
 
The finalised BBN incorporating all of the above amendments is shown in Figure 6.2 
(note values are for illustration only). 
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Figure 6.2:  Finalised BBN developed for the elicitation experiment. 
 
6.2.2 Design of the experimental questionnaire . 
The experiment consisted of a single questionnaire comprising three distinct parts, 
each one relating to a specific elicitation technique (as detailed in Annex B).  Section 
one focused on the direct ranking of variables.  The results given in this section 
revealed participants’ perceived importance for each variable (potential information 
source within the BBN) with respect to the hypotheses considered.  The experiment 
itself had four potential information sources which relate to events seen within the 
scenario timeline (Table 6.1): 
 
· Mobilisation of reserves. 
· Enemy force concentration. 
· Soviet citizens leaving Egypt. 
· Air defence capability. 
 
To rank the potential information sources, firstly participants decided which 
information sources were the most and least important in uncovering the opposition’s 
intent.  Next, participants ranked the remaining two information sources between the 
most and least important.  Weights were assigned to the four rankings using a linear 
scale.  The least and most important sources were allocated weights of zero and one 
hundred respectively.  Subsequently, participants placed marks on the linear scale 
representing the relative position of the remaining two ranked sources.  The linear 
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scale consequently contained four marks: zero, one hundred and the two marks made 
by the participant.  It was clearly explained to the participant that the gaps between 
the marks on the scale represented the relative difference in importance of each 
potential information source.  Participants were encouraged to vary the position of the 
middle ranks until the gaps between all four variables were perceived to be correct.  
Only then were the middle rankings assigned numerical weights. 
 
The second section of the experiment concentrated on eliciting likelihood ratios.  
Likelihood ratios are an individual’s assessment of the ratio: probability of an event 
occurring given that the hypothesis is true versus the probability of the event 
occurring given that the hypothesis is not true.  A ratio must be assigned for every 
event and hypothesis being considered.   
 
Likelihood ratios represent the relative likelihood of each event occurring and the 
importance, or impact, that information about the event’s occurrence has on the set of 
hypotheses.  The events being considered, which for the purposes of this research are 
in a defined timeline (Table 6.1), may or may not support a hypothesis.  Furthermore, 
the events being considered are not independent.  Therefore, the likelihood ratios must 
incorporate the fact that the observed event may be dependent upon events previously 
seen and accounted for.  Such an approach should prevent the double counting of 
information.  However, this approach also leads to one of the main weaknesses of the 
technique.  For a timeline incorporating many events, an assessment of a likelihood 
ratio for a given event and hypothesis must be made based on all the information 
available from every previous event.  For a long chain of events, it can be seen that 
this would become an increasingly complex process, possibly beyond the capabilities 
of a single individual.  This view is not shared by McLaughlin and Paté-Cornell 
(2005).  When considering the use of likelihood ratios to elicit probabilities against 
the commonly used technique of conditional probabilities, McLaughlin and Paté-
Cornell (2005, page 4) state that “…for an expert to estimate the conditional 
probability of an event given a hypothesis and (italics in original quote) all previously 
available information is generally not more complex that thinking about p(E|A) 
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(defined in the paper as the likelihood function) alone.  In fact, intuitively, it may be 
the most natural way to process the information.”  
 
Within the context of this experiment participants were asked for the likelihood ratio 
for each event within the timeline given all previous events.  For example, the 
likelihood ratio for event two: Egypt orders a partial mobilisation of forces, is given in 
the knowledge of a reported instalment of air defence missiles.  A likelihood ratio of 1 
implies that an event is equally likely to occur whether the Arab coalition’s intention 
is imminently hostile or not, given all previous events observed.  A ratio greater than 
1 suggests that an event is more likely to occur when hostilities are imminent.  
Conversely, a ratio less than 1 represents a belief that the event being considered is 
more likely to occur when hostilities are not imminent.   
 
The third and final section of the experiment centred on straightforward conditional 
probability distributions.  Often probability distributions for Bayesian Belief 
Networks (BBN) are constructed from collated data.  However, within the 
applications of BBNs considered here, it is inevitable that the data required to 
construct all of the required probability distributions will not be available.  This 
necessitates the use of subjective probability distributions.  Whilst subjective 
probabilities incorporate the contextual knowledge of the expert from whom they are 
elicited, the values given are prone to include well-known cognitive biases (as 
presented in Chapter Two). 
 
In total, two sets of subjective probabilities were elicited: the conditional probability 
distributions required to populate the supporting BBN; and a series of direct estimates 
requiring diagnostic reasoning based on the events shown in Table 6.1.  The 
conditional probability distributions were used to populate a BBN for each 
participant.  The BBN combined the available evidence to calculate the Bayesian 
(normative) probability of Arab coalition (Egyptian and Syrian) intent.  Any deviation 
between the Bayesian and direct subjective probability provided a measure of the 
participant’s own individual inconsistencies.  The deviations were analysed to 
determine if any trends or biases were present within the results.   
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6.3 Experiment into subjective value elicitation: A comparison of direct 
rankings, likelihood values, and conditional probabilities for use in decision 
support systems.   
 
6.3.1 Experimental methodology. 
An experiment was conducted at the Defence College of Management and 
Technology.  38 serving UK army officers undertaking a period of post graduate 
study complete the experimental questionnaire (as detailed in Annex B).  
Questionnaires are commonly used elicitation technique when investigating cause and 
effect relationships, or eliciting procedures.  Once fully designed, the standard format 
of the questionnaire facilitates the analyses of (potentially) large volumes of data.  
The questionnaires were not administered whilst the participants were undertaking 
their normal duties and as such the use of questionnaires cannot be considered as 
being a natural technique in the formal sense.  However, the questionnaires contained 
three different methods for the expression of their expertise (direct rankings, 
likelihood ratios and conditional probability distributions). As such, the questionnaire 
should have provided an opportunity for the participant to express their opinion in a 
manner with which they were familiar, and was therefore natural to them.   
 
None of the officers were familiar with intelligence work.  Building upon the findings 
of the earlier experiments all 38 participants were met face to face.  All participants 
undertook the experiment at the same time.  The experiment was presented and each 
elicited technique was briefly explained.  Subsequently, the participants completed the 
questionnaire by themselves without discussion with those around them.  However, 
participants were encouraged to seek clarity on any points of ambiguity with the 
experiment facilitators.  Many questions were raised and answered on an individual 
basis.  All responses were completed within 30 minutes.  Although the participants 
were encouraged to seek clarification, in total 31 of the 38 sets of results were 
amenable to analysis.  The remaining 7 sets of results were not amenable to analysis 
due to either being returned incomplete, or incorrectly answered (for example 
conditional probability distributions which in total exceeded 100%).   
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6.3.2 Direct ranking and weighting of potent ially available information sources. 
 
6.3.2.1 Analysis of rankings. 
The calculated (normative) Bayesian rankings (based upon the mutual information 
between each source of evidence and the hypothesis node) were compared with the 
given direct rankings.  The results are shown in Table 6.2.  Identical Bayesian and 
direct results are highlighted through the use of shading.   
 
Of the 31 direct responses analysed, the majority of participants considered 
information relating to the: 
 
· Mobilisation of reserves to be the most influential piece of evidence (16 of 31 
responses). 
· Concentration of forces to be the second most influential piece of evidence (14 
of 31 responses). 
 
Initial comparisons of the direct rankings against the BBN rankings showed similar 
aggregates.  In total 12 individuals directly ranked the mobilisation of forces as the 
most important piece of information and the concentration of forces as the second.  
Correspondingly, an interrogation of all the BBNs found eight networks which also 
ranked the mobilisation of forces as the first and concentration of forces as the second 
most influential pieces of evidence.  However, the direct and BBN results generally 
corresponded to different people.  Furthermore, strikingly only two participants 
(participants 14 and 17 in Table 6.2) gave the same four rankings when questioned 
directly and through interrogation of their BBN.  
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Participant 
Results 
from 
Development 
of Air 
defence 
capability 
Mobilisation 
of reserves 
Concentration 
of forces 
Departure 
of foreign 
citizens  
Direct 4 2 1 3 
1 
Bayesian 4 1 2 3 
Direct 3 2 1 4 2 
Bayesian 2 1 4 3 
Direct 4 1 2 3 3 
Bayesian 4 3 1 2 
Direct 1 2 3 4 4 
Bayesian 1 3 2 4 
Direct 3 1 2 4 5 
Bayesian 4 3 2 1 
Direct 4 1 2 3 6 
Bayesian 4 3 1 2 
Direct 4 1 2 3 7 
Bayesian 2 1 4 3 
Direct 1 2 3 4 8 
Bayesian 2 1 3 4 
Direct 3 4 2 1 9 
Bayesian 1 2 4 3 
Direct 3 2 1 4 10 
Bayesian 3 1 2 4 
Direct 4 1 2 3 11 
Bayesian 3 1 2 4 
Direct 3 1 2 4 12 
Bayesian 2 1 3 4 
Direct 4 1 3 2 13 
Bayesian 1 3 4 2 
Direct 4 1 3 2 14 
Bayesian 4 1 3 2 
Direct 3 1 2 4 15 
Bayesian 3 2 4 1 
Direct 4 1 3 2 16 
Bayesian 4 1 2 3 
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Participant 
Results 
from 
Development 
of Air 
defence 
capability 
Mobilisation 
of reserves 
Concentration 
of forces 
Departure 
of foreign 
citizens  
Direct 4 2 1 3 
17 
Bayesian 4 2 1 3 
Direct 4 3 1 2 18 
Bayesian 4 3 2 1 
Direct 1 2 3 4 19 
Bayesian 2 1 3 4 
Direct 4 2 1 3 20 
Bayesian 4 3 1 2 
Direct 3 1 2 4 21 
Bayesian 2 3 1 4 
Direct 3 2 1 4 22 
Bayesian 4 2 1 3 
Direct 2 4 3 1 23 
Bayesian 1 3 2 4 
Direct 4 1 2 3 24 
Bayesian 1 4 2 3 
Direct 1 3 2 4 25 
Bayesian 3 1 2 4 
Direct 4 1 2 3 26 
Bayesian 2 1 3 4 
Direct 3 1 2 4 27 
Bayesian 1 2 4 3 
Direct 3 2 1 4 28 
Bayesian 4 1 2 3 
Direct 4 2 1 3 29 
Bayesian 4 1 2 3 
Direct 2 1 3 4 30 
Bayesian 4 1 2 3 
Direct 4 1 2 3 31 
Bayesian 2 1 4 3 
Table 6.2:  Example Results of direct ranking and BBN rankings of potentially 
available information sources. 
 
139 
Table 6.3 shows the joint probability distribution of the direct and Bayesian rankings, 
with the conditional probability distributions presented in Table 6.4.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 Joint probability distribution (as percentages) of the Bayesian and direct 
rankings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.4:  Conditional probability distribution (as percentages) between direct and 
Bayesian rankings. 
 
It is interesting to note that the closest agreement between the Bayesian and direct 
rankings occurred for placing the least influential piece of information.   
 
To assess the overall correlation (or agreement) between the direct and Bayesian 
rankings, the non-parametric measure of Kendall’s tau statistic (Equation 6.1) was 
used.   
 Direct rankings 
Bayesian 
rankings: 
1 2 3 4 
1 9.68 9.68 2.42 3.23 
2 7.26 5.65 8.87 3.23 
3 5.65 4.03 9.68 5.65 
4 2.42 5.65 4.03 12.90 
 Direct rankings 
Bayesian 
rankings: 
1 2 3 4 
1 38.71 38.71 9.68 12.90 
2 29.03 22.58 35.48 12.90 
3 22.58 16.13 38.71 22.58 
4 9.68 22.58 16.13 51.61 
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Equation 6.1:  Kendall's Tau. 
 
Within equation 6.1, n is the number of items being compared and P is the sum, over 
all ranked items, of items ranked after a given item by both rankings.  An example 
calculation of Kendall’s tau statistic using example participant results is shown in 
Table 6.5. 
 
 
Concentration 
of forces 
Mobilisation 
of reserves 
Departure of 
foreign citizens  
Development of 
Air defence 
capability 
Direct 1 2 3 4 
Bayesian 2 1 3 4 
Cumulative 
value of P 
2 4 5 5 
Table 6.5:  Example calculation of Kendall’s tau statistic. 
 
Table 6.5 presents the potential information sources in direct rank order (columns 
moving left to right) alongside the corresponding Bayesian ranks.  Utilising the order 
given by the direct rankings, P is calculated cumulatively based upon the Bayesian 
rankings.  Thus, the first direct ranked potential information source is ‘concentration 
of forces’ which has a corresponding Bayesian rank of 2.  Consequently, of the three 
columns to the right of ‘concentration of forces’ two will have higher ranks (i.e. 
‘departure of foreign citizens’ ranked 3rd and ‘development of an air defence 
capability’ ranked 4th).  Therefore, the value of P is initially set at two.  Subsequently, 
the second direct ranked potential information source ‘mobilisation of reserves’ is 
assessed.  With a corresponding Bayesian ranking of 1, the remaining two columns to 
the right both have higher Bayesian rankings.  The value of P is therefore increased to 
4.  Next, the column with the 3rd direct ranking (departure of foreign citizens) is 
reviewed.  This potential information source also has a Bayesian ranking of 3.  At this 
point there is only one remaining column to the right of the table which has a 
Bayesian rank of 4.  Hence, the value of P increases to 5.  The remaining and final 
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column of the table does not change the value of P as there are no columns to the right 
with which to base an assessment.  Therefore, the final calculated value of P is 5.   
 
The value of n in the above example is 4 (the number of potential information sources 
to be ranked).  Entering the values of n and P into the equation for Kendall’s tau 
gives: 
 
( )
667.01
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Kendall’s tau statistic was calculated for every participant, the results of which are 
shown in Figure 6.3.  The overall median value of the statistic was 0.33.  It can be 
seen that in total 13 of the 31 results had a value greater than +0.6 which is indicative 
of a good agreement between the direct and Bayesian rankings.  Of these, however, 
only two had a tau statistic greater than 0.9 which represents strong agreement 
between the rankings.  That some participants exhibit good agreement between the 
rankings is not surprising given what is being compared.  What is surprising is that 
there are not more of them and that the agreement is not much stronger.   
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Figure 6.3:  Variation in Kendall's tau statistic. 
142 
6.3.2.2 Analysis of weightings. 
This analysis was undertaken through the calculation of the sum of squared rank 
deviations.  The calculation was based upon the participant’s stated direct weightings 
and the BBN’s normative weighting of the potential information sources (based on the 
mutual information between each source and the hypothesis node). 
 
From the field of information theory, mutual information and entropy measure 
different aspects of uncertainty.  Entropy, as defined by Shannon (1949), is a measure 
of the uncertainty associated with a given variable.  The entropy H of a probability 
distribution of X is expressed as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )å
=
-=
n
i
ii xPxPXH
1
2log
   
Equation 6.2:  Entropy. 
 
Where X is a discrete random variable taking values { }nxxx ..., ,21 .   
 
When interpreting entropy, the higher the entropy value, the more uncertainty there is.  
If a value is known for certain then the entropy is zero.  If all possible outcomes are 
equally likely then the probability distribution becomes uniform and the entropy has 
its maximum value which may simply be calculated as ( )nlog .  When looking at a 
BBN the calculation of expected entropy change in the hypothesis node is known as 
the value of mutual information.  In essence, mutual information details how much 
information one event or piece of evidence provides about another.  Within the 
context of this experiment, mutual information calculates the expected reduction in 
the uncertainty of a hypothesis resulting from evidence from a potential information 
source and can therefore be used to used to rank the ‘worth’ of each intelligence 
report in removing the uncertainty associated with Arab intent. 
 
The mutual information between a node X and an intelligence source Y, is represented 
as ( )YXI ;  and is the average reduction in entropy in node X based upon a given 
instantiation in the intelligence source, that is: ( ) ( ) ( ).|; YXHXHYXI -=   Where 
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Equation 6.3:  Mutual information. 
 
Based upon a participant’s response, an example calculation of the value of mutual 
information follows.  For this example we will consider the value of H(Arab Intent | 
enemy force deployment).  The node of enemy force deployment has two states: 
concentrated and not concentrated.  Figure 6.4 shows the experimental BBN for a 
participant before any information has been entered into the network.   
 
 
Figure 6.4:  Example participant BBN. 
 
Subsequently, Figure 6.5 presents the same BBN with the the node enemy for 
concentration instantiated as concentrated.   
 
 
Figure 6.5:  Example participant BBN with enemy force deployment node 
instantiated as concentrated. 
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From this figure the value of H(Arab Intent | enemy force deployment = 
concentrated): 
 
= ( ) ( )[ ]24.0log24.076.0log76.0 22 +-  
[ ] 79.049.030.0 =---=  
 
Figure 6.6 again shows the same network, but this time with the node enemy force 
concentration instantiated as not concentrated.  Thus the value of H(Arab Intent | 
enemy force deployment = not concentrated) is: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]933.0log933.00667.0log0667.0 22 +-=  
[ ] 35.009.026.0 =---=  
 
 
Figure 6.6:  Example participant BBN with enemy force deployment node 
instantiated as not concentrated. 
 
The probability of forces being concentrated is 62.5% and the probability of force not 
being concentrated is 37.5%, thus: 
 
H(Arab Intent | enemy force deployment) ( ) ( ) 625.035.0375.079.0625.0 =´+´=  
 
The entropy value associated with the hypothesis node (based on the equal priors for 
each state of 50%) is 1.  Therefore, overall the value of mutual information is: 
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I(Arab Intent; Enemy force concentration) 375.0625.01 =-=  
 
Using this value of mutual information, the reduction in entropy at the Arab Intent 
node is 37%.  That is, knowing the true state of the node enemy force concentration 
reduces the uncertainty in Arab intent by an average of 37%.  By repeating similar 
calculations for the other three intelligence sources the following values of mutual 
information were obtained: 
 
· Mobilisation of reserves: 46.86% 
· Enemy force concentration: 37.5% 
· Soviet citizens leaving Egypt: 33.23% 
· Air defence capability: 18.05% 
 
The sources with the highest and lowest values of mutual information were assigned 
weights of one hundred and zero respectively.  The weights, iW , of the other sources 
were determined such that:   
 
MinMIMaxMI
MinMIMI
W ii -
-
=
  
Equation 6.4:  Weighting of mutual information. 
 
For the participant used in the explanation of mutual information, the scaled weights 
and subsequent calculation of the sum of squared standard deviation is shown in Table 
6.6.  This value was used to assess the correlation between the direct and Bayesian 
weightings.  As each participant only ranked four variables many standard rank 
correlation techniques, such as Spearman’s coefficient were not truly applicable.  
 
An example calculation of the weights and sum of squared rank deviation, for the 
participant used in the previous examples, is shown in Table 6.6.  The cumulative 
results for all participants is shown in Figure 6.7.   
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Node 
V
alue of m
utual 
inform
ation 
Scaled m
utual 
inform
ation 
D
irect probability 
M
utual info. ranking 
D
irect ranking 
R
ank deviation 
Sum
 of squared rank 
deviation 
Development of an air 
defence capability 
46.86 100.00 0.00 1 4 3 
Mobilisation of reserves 37.06 65.98 50.00 2 3 1 
Concentration of forces 33.23 52.69 100.00 3 1 -2 
Removal of foreign 
citizens  
18.05 0.00 65.00 4 2 -2 
18 
Table 6.6:  Example sum of squared rank deviations (based upon direct and 
Bayesian weightings) for potential information sources. 
 
Results of sum of squares rank deviation obtained from direct weightings and reduction in mutual 
information.
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Figure 6.7:  Sum of Squared results (mutual information and direct weightings) of 
potentially available information sources providing an indication of Hypothesis A. 
 
Overall, Figure 6.7 presents a wide varia tion in the calculated results.  It can be seen 
that calculated deviations range from zero to 18.  This higher deviation is indicative of 
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substantial disagreement between the direct and Bayesian weightings.  Indeed, only 
two participants had zero deviation.  The use of direct rankings and weightings is 
frequently proposed as a quick method for the development of a BBN (such as 
Fenton, Neil and Gallan, 2007 and Neil and Fenton, 2005).  However, this research 
indicates such an approach may lead to substantial, yet unintentional discrepancies 
within the network.    
 
 
6.3.2.3 Likelihood ratios of potentially available information sources. 
The second part of the analysis focused on the given likelihood ratios provided by 
participants for each event within the timeline.   
 
Figure 6.8 presents the variation in probability (based on likelihood ratios) for 
hypothesis A (Egyptian and Syrian coalition intent is hostile).  The predominant trend 
in Figure 6.8 is for an increase in the probability of hostile intent as each subsequent 
event is observed.  Nonetheless, there is a small group of results for which the 
accumulation of observed events actually leads to a decrease in the probability of 
hostile intent.  The presence of this group within the data raises questions about the 
reliability of likelihood ratios as an elicitation technique.   
Variation in likelihood ratio for the hypothesis Egyptian and Syrian coalition intent is hostile as 
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Figure 6.8:  Variation in likelihood ratios for Hypothesis A. 
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It is, of course, entirely possible that some participants genuinely believed tha t the 
accumulation of events observed within the timeline reduced the probability of hostile 
intent.  After all, nations develop air defence capabilities during times of peace and 
reserves may be mobilised for planned military exercises.  That said, it is perhaps 
more plausible that these participants were unclear about the required ratio relating 
the two distinct hypotheses.  It was important to try and assess if either of these 
situations had occurred.  As such, for each participant who consistently provided 
likelihood ratios of less than one (and therefore a decreasing probability of hostile 
intent), at each event within the timeline a comparison was made between the stated 
likelihood value and the participant’s equivalent direct subjective probability and 
normative value provided by the ir own BBN.   
 
For every participant whose likelihood ratios indicated a decreasing probability of 
hostile intent, their equivalent direct subjective estimates and values obtained from 
their BBN showed an increase in the probability of hostile intent.  As such, it was 
decided that these participant showed a level of rationality as in each of the elicitation 
techniques used, the probabilities elicited consistently moved in a given direction 
(albeit in two of the cases the probability of hostile intent increased and in the third it 
decreased).  Furthermore, in two of the elicitation techniques, the probability of 
hostile intent increased as the events in the timeline were observed.  These findings 
supported the view that partic ipants were unclear about how to derive the required 
likelihood ratio.  As such, for each participant who had consistently given likelihood 
ratios of less than one, the reciprocal value was calculated (thus giving an increasing 
probability of hostile intent as events were observed, inline with the results from the 
additional elicitation techniques).  The result of the analysis, with this correction 
applied is shown in Figure 6.9. 
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Variation in Likelihood ratio for hypothesis Egyptian aand Syrian coalition intent is hostile (with 
correction applied) as events are observed.
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Figure 6.9:  Variation in likelihood ratios for Hypothesis A with correction applied 
to continual likelihood ratios of less than one. 
 
The prevailing trend depicted within Figure 6.9 appears more intuitively correct.  As 
events are observed, there is a corresponding increase in the belief that the Egyptian 
and Syrian coalition intent is hostile.  It is important to remember that this work has 
been carried out with the luxury of hindsight which permits an intuitive assessment of 
the expected results.  Should this technique be used in a previously unseen 
circumstance, the developer of a support system would have to be sure that the correct 
ratios, and not the inverse values, had been given.  This could be achieved, for 
example, through the use of leading questions (note alternative methods could be 
used) to ascertain how the participants anticipate the probabilities will move.  A 
comparison of this and the given values would reveal any immediate discrepancies.   
 
As previously noted, some research has considered likelihood ratios as being the most 
natural way in which to process information (McLaughlin and Paté-Cornell, 2005).  
The experiment presented here centred on a relatively short timeline comprising only 
five main events.  Accordingly, participants may have been able to assess all the 
available information when determining the likelihood ratios.  Yet, even in this 
relatively simple situation, 29% (9 out of 31) of participants appear to have provided 
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the inverse ratios to those stated in the experimental questionnaire.  It is of interest to 
note that during the conduct of the experiment, it was the elicitation of likelihood 
ratios which took the most time and raised the most questions.  A great deal of effort 
was spent explaining the meaning of the ratios and the principle behind their 
derivation.  Several participants felt unable to provide values and as such were unable 
to complete the questionnaire.  Many of the participants expressed concern over their 
ability to provide the requested ratios at all, let alone with any level of confidence.  
The general impression during this part of the experiment was not one of ease, nor 
that thinking in such a way was indeed natural.  Therefore, the use of this technique in 
the development of any decision support system would require a detailed elicitation 
questionnaire to ensure that the required likelihood ratios, and not the inverse values, 
had been provided.   
 
 
6.3.2.4 Conditional probability distributions.   
The final section of the analysis centred on the elicitation of conditional probability 
distributions.  Each participant’s stated distributions were entered directly into their 
own BBN (as shown in Figure 6.2).  Once populated, the events comprising the 
timeline (detailed in Table 6.1) were sequentially entered into the BBN as evidence.  
Correspondingly, the beliefs in the hypotheses were updated in the light of this 
evidence.  The results calculated by the BBN are shown in Figure 6.10 and 6.11.  
 
The main trend observed in Figure 6.10 is for increasing probability of hostile intent 
as events in the timeline were sequentially observed.  The corresponding decrease in 
the probability of peaceful intent is shown in Figure 6.11.  These trends support those 
seen in the results of the likelihood ratios.  The average Bayesian probability as each 
event was observed is shown in Figure 6.12.  Interestingly, the reporting of reserve 
troops being mobilised (in addition to the development of an extensive air defence 
capability) did not alter the average probability in the coalition’s intent.  Only when 
forces are concentrated does the average belief in hostile intent substantially alter.   
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Variation in Bayesian probability that Egyptian and Syrian coalition intent is hostile as main events 
are observed.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Extensive AD Extensive AD and Mob Res Extensive AD, Mob Res and Conc
Forces
Extensive AD, Mob Res, Conc
Forces and Dep Foreign Citizens
Events observed
B
ay
es
ia
n
 P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 
Figure 6.10:  Variation in Bayesian probability for Hypothesis A. 
 
 
Variation in Bayesian probability for the hypothesis Egyptian and Syrian coalition intent is peaceful 
as main events are observed.
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Figure 6.11:  Variation in Bayesian probability for Hypothesis B. 
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Variation in average Bayesian probability for hypotheses considered as main events are observed.
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Figure 6.12:  Variation in average Bayesian probability for hypotheses A and B. 
 
As part of the experiment, participants were asked series of questions requiring direct 
probabilistic estimates using intuitive diagnostic reasoning.  All the direct estimates 
were based around the events included within the scenario outline (as detailed in 
Table 6.1).  For example, the participants were asked to consider ‘what is the 
probability that the Arab coalition intent is hostile given that Egypt has’: 
 
· Extensively built up its air defence capability. 
· Extensively built up its air defence capability and ordered a partial 
mobilisation of reserves. 
· Extensively built up its air defence capability, ordered a partial mobilisation of 
reserves and concentrated its forces.   
 
The direct estimates were compared against the corresponding Bayesian values 
calculated by the participant’s corresponding BBN.  Figure 6.13 shows the variation 
between the direct and Bayesian values for the hypothesis of hostile intent.  The 
deviations ranged from -83.3% to +53.2%.  Some instances of an exact match 
between the direct and Bayesian value were seen.  However, it is unlikely that these 
were due to the participants being perfectly logical.  It is likely to have been caused 
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either by the structure of the network, or have been inevitable due to the conditional 
probability distributions used to populate the BBN.  It can be seen that as there is an 
accumulation of events observed, the trend is for the results to move from a negative 
to positive deviation.   
 
Effect of additional information sources on deviation between Direct and Bayesian values for 
hypothesis that Egyptian and Syrian coalition intent is hostile as main events are observed.
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Figure 6.13:  Variation in deviations (Direct –Bayesian) for Hypothesis A. 
Effect of additional information sources on the average deviation between Direct and Bayesian 
values for hypothesis that Egyptian and Syrian colaition intent is hostile as main events are 
observed.
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Figure 6.14:  Variation in average deviation (Direct –Bayesian) for Hypothesis A. 
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The average deviation at each observed event is shown on Figure 6.14, alongside the 
overall spread of deviations (maximum and minimum).  It can be seen that as an 
accumulation of events are observed, there is a trend for the overall spread of results 
to decrease.  The mean deviation can been seen to follow the trend for moving from a 
negative to positive deviation. 
 
Based upon the values seen in Figure 6.13 and 6.14, the Wilcoxon signed rank test 
was applied to each participant’s deviation between their direct and corresponding 
Bayesian value.  Using a null hypothesis that the deviations have a median value of 
zero, two deviations were found to be statistically significant namely when an:  
 
· Extensive build up of air defence was been reported. 
· Extensive build up of air defence, a mobilisation of reserves, a concentration 
of forces and the departure of Soviet Citizens were reported. 
 
Negative deviations result from a larger Bayesian value than direct.  That being so 
when only one or two events were observed most participants tended to underestimate 
the probability of hostile intent.  However, as additional events were observed and 
reported, the deviation kept moving in the same direction. Over the course of the 
timeline to some extent, it is almost inevitable that the deviation between the Bayesian 
and direct values will decrease due to constraints placed upon the probabilities.   
Figure 6.15 shows the changes in deviations between the first observed event 
(extensive air defence) and the last event (extensive air defence, mobilisation of 
reserves, concentration of forces, and departure of foreign citizens).   
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Deviations (Direct - Bayesian) of the hypothesis Egyptian and Syrian coalition intent is hostile for the 
first and last main events observed.
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Figure 6.15:  Variation in deviations (Direct –Bayesian) for Hypothesis A for the 
first and last main events observed. 
 
What is particularly interesting about this plot is that for 23 of the 31 participants, the 
first deviation is less (i.e. more negative) than the final deviation.  As seen in the 
average deviations (Figure 6.14), for most of the participants the first deviation is less 
(i.e. more negative) than the final deviation.  This warranted additional investigation.  
It was not possible to assume that the Central Limit Theorem would apply to the data 
set.  Neither could it be assumed that the data were normally distributed.  Using a null 
hypothesis that the difference between the two deviations has a median value of zero, 
the Wilcoxon signed rank test was applied to 31 results with a correction of continuity 
equal to -0.5.  The resulting value was 68.2-=z which showed statistical significance 
at just over the 0.01 level for a two tailed non-directional test.     
 
Finally, it was of interest to compare participants’ Bayesian range of probabilities 
(defined as the difference between the maximum and minimum probabilities) with 
their direct range of probabilities.  Using a null hypothesis of a median difference in 
range of zero, the Wilcoxon signed rank test was applied to the 31 sets of results.  
There was insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis as the returned value of p 
was 0.085 which is higher than the 5% significance level.  That said, the computed 
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confidence interval (-1.0, 14.6) has a confidence level of 95.1%.  As such, the null 
hypothesis may still be considered questionable.  A larger test group may be needed to 
demonstrate significance.   
 
Interestingly during the conduct of the experiment, the elicitation of conditional 
probabilities raised the least concerns from participants even though it constituted the 
longest section of the questionnaire.  The most likely reason for this is that 
participants are used to expressing values in terms of percentages (or frequencies) as 
opposed to ratios or rankings.  So although this section was the longest it was possibly 
seen as the most straightforward to complete and therefore raised the least questions.  
Whilst the questionnaire must be refined and developed for the situation of interest, 
once completed the elicitation procedure provides a clear audit trail.  The 
development of the BBN is relatively simple and intuitive to review.  In addition to 
this, the structure of a BBN may be easily manipulated, allowing expansion or 
contraction of the modelled domain. 
 
However, any changes may require additional conditional probabilities to be elicited.  
Furthermore, should the network provide unexpected results, the analyst would be 
forced to reconsider the values and assumptions behind it.  This could help prevent 
subconscious preferences being given to particular intelligence sources. 
 
Consideration of the results obtained from the conditional probabilities show that 
participants were not always able to coherently assess the information available to 
them.  When only one or two events were observed (and thus reported) participants 
generally underestimated the probability of hostile intent with their direct estimates.  
However, as additional events were reported participants were unable to correctly 
manipulate the interdependencies between the events.  Consequently, participants 
began to overestimate the probability of hostile intent.  In a military situation such 
under and overestimation of the likelihood of hostilities commencing could have 
undesirable consequences.    
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6.3.2.5 Comparison of likelihood ratios and direct estimates requiring 
diagnostic reasoning. 
 
In theory, if participants were perfectly coherent then the same results would have 
been elicited throughout the experiment.  Howeve r, as deviations in the results have 
been seen it was important to determine if these deviations were random or 
systematic.  Therefore, building upon the comparison of likelihood and direct 
probabilistic estimates based upon intuitive diagnostic reasoning against a normative 
model, it was of interest to compare the likelihood and direct values against one 
another.  The calculated deviations are shown in Figure 6.16.  The average deviation 
and overall spread of deviations calculated at each event in the timeline are shown in 
Figure 6.17.   
Effect of additional information sources on deviation between direct and likelihood values for 
hypothesis that Egyptian and Syrian coalition intent is hostile as main events are observed.
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Figure 6.16:  Variation in deviations (Direct –Likelihood) for Hypothesis A. 
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Effect of additional information sources on average deviation bewteen Direct and Likelihood values 
for hypothesis that Egyptian and Syrian coalition intent is hostile as main events are observed.
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Figure 6.17:  Average variation in deviations (Direct –Likelihood) for Hypothesis 
A. 
 
Both Figures 6.16 and 6.17 show that as additional information becomes available at 
each event, the deviation between the direct and likelihood ratio value increases.  This 
can easily be seen by the variation in the mean deviation in Figure 6.16.  It is 
interesting to note that the average deviation lies closest to the lower end of the spread 
of results across the events observed within the timeline.  However, the overall trend 
seen in Figures 6.16 and 6.17 supports the results seen in the comparison of the direct 
and normative values. 
 
6.4 Experiment into subjective value elicitation with intelligence personnel: A 
comparison of direct rankings, likelihood values, and conditional 
probabilities for use in decision support systems.   
 
6.4.1 Introduction. 
The participants in the main experiment were not experienced in intelligence analysis.  
Therefore, it was considered important to repeat the experiment with a group of 
participants who have current knowledge in this area.  In total five serving military 
officers completed the experiment via e-mail.  Participants were encouraged to seek 
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clarification on any ambiguous points.  No questions were raised.  An additional sixth 
participant completed the experiment who had extensive knowledge of intelligence 
analysis but was no longer a serving military officer.  This final participant completed 
the experiment through a face to face interview.  Once completed, this participant was 
shown the populated BBN and was given an opportunity to revise their conditional 
probability distributions.  It is accepted that this could create a difference in the results 
obtained. 
 
6.4.2 Ranking and weightings of potentially available information sources. 
As in the main experiment, the two most influential intelligence reports were the 
mobilisation of reserves and enemy force concentration.  However, in contrast to the 
main study, the majority (four) responses placed enemy force concentration as the 
most influential, not the mobilisation of reserves.   
 
This final experiment also showed surprisingly little agreement between the direct and 
BBN normative rankings based upon mutual information.  Indeed, interrogation of all 
the BBNs found only one network which ranked the concentration of forces as the 
most influential intelligence report.  The results of the interrogation revealed that four 
(the majority) of BBNs ranked the mobilisation of results as the most influential 
potential intelligence source.  This is supported by Kendall’s tau statistic which 
showed no indication of a strong agreement between the rankings (the highest value 
calculated was 0.33). 
 
Further to this, the direct and normative weightings associated with the potential 
information sources were analysed using the sum of squares rank deviations.  The 
results varied from 2 to 16.  Overall, the use of directly ranking nodes as a technique 
for the rapid development of a BBN could introduce substantial discrepancies within 
the results derived from the network. 
 
6.4.3 Likelihood ratios of potentially available information sources. 
These results showed substantial differences from the trends seen in the main 
experiment.  The overall trend for each participant is an increase in the probability of 
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hostile intent as events are observed.  There are no examples of a continual, or overall, 
decrease in the probability of hostile intent as events were observed and reported.  
This result is illustrated in Figure 6.18 which shows the average probability based 
upon the likelihood ratio as each event in the timeline unfolds.   
 
Variation in average likelihood ratio for hypothesis Egyptian and Sryian coalition intent is hostile as 
main events are observed.
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Figure 6.18:  Average variation in likelihood values for the Hypothesis A. 
 
It was previously postulated that likelihood ratios consistently below one were caused 
by the participants being unclear about the required ratio relating the two distinct 
hypotheses.  The fact that all participants in this experiment seemed to have 
understood the ratios required may be due to their relevant experience in handling 
intelligence information.  In comparison to the previous experiment, participants did 
not express the same levels of concern or raise as many questions whilst completing 
this section of the experiment.  As such, it is possible that likelihood ratios may be an 
acceptable elicitation technique for use with individuals who are used to manipulating 
intelligence data or work with ratios and mathematics as part of their daily role.   
 
161 
6.4.4 Conditional probability distributions. 
The variation in Bayesian probability of hostile intent is shown in Figure 6.19, which 
has two engaging features.  Firstly, the observation of the second event in the timeline 
splits the results into two groups.  Three of the participants perceived the observation 
of partially mobilising reserves following the development of an air defence capability 
decreases the probability of hostile intent.  Yet, for the remaining participants this 
observation increases the probability of hostile intent.  For five of the participants all 
the remaining events observed increase the probability of hostile intent.  The 
remaining participant decreased the probability of hostile intent upon the observation 
of forces concentrating, but increased the probability following the report of foreign 
citizens departing. 
 
Variation in Bayesian probability that Egyptian and Syrian coalition intent is hostile as main events 
are observed.
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Figure 6.19:  Variation in Bayesian probability for Hypothesis A. 
 
The second observation of note in Figure 6.19 is that each participant has a higher 
probability of hostile intent when all four events have been seen than at the start of the 
timeline.  The average variation for both hypotheses is given in Figure 6.20.  As seen 
in the previous larger scale experiment, the observation of reserves being partially 
mobilised did not substantially alter the average probability of intent.  Only when, in 
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addition to this, were forces seen to concentrate was the probability of intent seen to 
alter.  
Variation in average Bayesian probability for hypotheses considered.
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Figure 6.20:  Variation in average Bayesian probability for Hypotheses A and B. 
 
Subsequently, the participants’ direct probabilistic estimates based on diagnostic 
reasoning of events within the timeline were compared against normative values 
calculated from their own BBN.  Figure 6.21 presents the deviations between these 
two values for each event within the timeline.  The trend supports that seen in the 
previous experiment (Figure 6.13) that is for a move in deviations from negative to 
positive as events unfolded.  This  was potentially explained by participants 
underestimating the probability of hostile intent when only one or two events has been 
observed, yet overestimating the probability when three or more events had been 
observed.  This trend was not repeated in the results of this experiment.  What can be 
seen is the movement of each participant’s deviation towards zero as the events are 
observed.  As previously explained, this result is almost inevitable due to the 
constraints placed upon the numbers available.   
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Effect of additional information sources on deviation between Direct and Bayesian values for 
hypothesis that Egyptian and Syrian coalition intent is hostile as main events are observed.
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Figure 6.21:  Variation in deviations (Direct – Bayesian) for Hypothesis A. 
 
Effect of additional information sources on average deviations between Direct and Bayesian values 
for hypothesis that Egyptian adn Syrian coalition intent is hostile as main events are observed.
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Figure 6.22: Mean variation in deviations (Direct – Bayesian) for Hypothesis A. 
 
Figure 6.22 presents the average deviation between the directly estimates based on 
diagnostic reasoning and the corresponding normative Bayesian values.  For 
comparison, the overall spread of results is also shown in Figure 6.22.  The average 
deviations shown in Figure 6.22 are smaller than the corresponding average 
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deviations seen in the main experiment (Figure 6.14) and overall are closer to the 
lower part of the spread of results.  This raises the possibility that participants who 
regularly manipulate intelligence data may be more consistent than those who do not. 
 
6.4.5 Comparison of likelihood ratios and intuitive diagnostic probabilities.   
Finally, a comparison was made between the likelihood and direct estimates 
probabilities based upon diagnostic reasoning.  The deviations between these values 
for the hypothesis of hostile intent are shown in Figure 6.23, with the average 
deviation and spread of results shown in Figure 6.24.  It is clear that the shape of 
Figure 6.23 is similar to that of 6.21, with the deviations moving towards zero as 
events are observed.  The average deviations between the direct conditional 
probabilities and likelihood ratios gave the smallest deviations seen during the 
research (all below 5%).   
 
Effect of additional information sources on deviation between direct and likelihood values for 
hypothesis that Egyptian and Syrian coalition intent is hostile as main events are observed.
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Figure 6.23:  Variation in deviations (Direct – Likelihood) for Hypothesis A. 
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Effect of additional information on deviation between Direct and Likelihood Ratios for hypothesis 
that Egyptian and Syrian coalition intent is hostile as main events are observed.
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Figure 6.24:  Average variation in deviation (Direct - Likelihood) for Hypothesis A. 
 
It was of interest to further analyse the deviations between the likelihood values and 
direct probabilistic estimates from diagnostic reasoning.  Based upon the absolute 
average deviation between these values the results from both 6 participants in the final 
study and the 31 participants in the larger study were used in a two tailed Mann-
Whitney non-parametric test.  The returned p-value was 0.1435 which is greater than 
the critical test value of 0.05 indicating no significant differences at the 5% level.  
This result does not prove the null hypothesis of no difference between the deviations 
seen in the results of the participants whom had experience of working with military 
intelligence and those who did not.  However, the null hypothesis is plausible.  To 
demonstrate a statistically significant difference between the two groups would, it is 
suggested, require a larger sample of results from officers with intelligence 
experience.   
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6.5 Conclusions and chapter summary 
 
6.5.1 General conclusions  
This thesis argues that BBNs provide a suitable basis for the development of a system 
capable of quantitative analysis of intelligence reports.  One of the main issues 
associated with the development of a BBN is the construction of the probability 
distributions used to populate the network.  Often, the required distributions may only 
be derived subjectively.  Therefore, to further the body of knowledge available in this 
area, an experiment has been conducted to compare three elicitation techniques: direct 
ranking of the variables’ perceived importance for discriminating between given 
hypotheses, likelihood values and conditional probabilities.  The focus of this 
experiment was the extent to which the different elicitation techniques lead to 
equivalent or different judgements.   
 
Based upon the main events observed leading to the start of the Arab Israeli conflict 
of 1973, a timeline and supporting BBN were developed.  The BBN provided a 
normative model against which the subjective values were compared and analysed for 
indications of biases and numerical trends. 
 
Two experiments were conducted.  The first generated 31 sets of results from serving 
military officers studying at the Defence College of Management and Technology.  
Subsequently, a second experiment was completed by 6 participants, all of whom had 
extensive knowledge of military intelligence.  Five of these participants were 
currently serving officers. 
 
6.5.2 Rankings 
Comparisons were made between the direct rankings and the BBN rankings (based 
upon mutual information between each source and the hypothesis node).  Both 
experiments placed the mobilisation of reserves and the concentration of forces as the 
two most influential nodes.  The larger experiment considered the mobilisation of 
forces as the most influential.  Conversely, the experiment comprising of those with 
intelligence experience placed the concentration of forces as being the most influential 
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information in this situation.  In both experiments there was little agreement between 
the participants direct and associated BBN rankings.  The lack of correlation between 
the rankings was further shown through the calculated values of Kendall’s tau 
statistic.  Overall, only two participants had a tau statistic value greater than 0.9 which 
is representative of strong agreement.   
 
6.5.3 Weightings. 
The analysis was undertaken through the calculation of the sum of squared rank 
deviations, based upon direct and BBN weightings.  The BBN weightings were based 
upon mutual information between each source and hypothesis node.  A wide variation 
in the calculated results was seen from zero to 18.  High deviations are representative 
of substantial disagreement between the direct and Bayesian weightings.  The use of 
direct ranking and weightings is proposed as a quick method for the development of a 
BBN.  However, this research indicates such an approach may lead to substantial, yet 
unintentional discrepancies within the network. 
 
6.5.4 Likelihood ratios. 
The overall trend was for an increase in the probability of hostile intent as events 
within the timeline were observed.  However, within the larger experiment there were 
a small group of participants for which the accumulation of observed events actually 
lead to a decrease in the probability of hostile intent.  For these participants, a 
comparison of the likelihood and direct conditional probabilities highlighted a major 
discrepancy.  For each result in which the likelihood values indicated a decrease in 
hostile intent as events were observed, the corresponding direct conditional 
probabilities showed and increase in the probability of hostile intent.  Therefore, it is 
concluded that a group of participants provided the inverse likelihood ratio to that 
requested within the experiment.  Interestingly, no examples of the inverse ratio were 
found in the experiment conducted by those who have experience of military 
intelligence.   
 
It is concluded that the use of likelihood ratios are really only applicable to those who 
have experience of working with intelligence data, or with ratios as part of their work.  
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For those not familiar with the derivation of such ratios, the elicitation procedure 
caused concern over their ability to provide the required value with any level of 
certainty.  If likelihood ratios were used to provide the subjective values within a 
BBN, the elicitation procedure would require additional information to ensure the 
ratios had been given in the required format.  For example, the procedure could 
include leading questions to ascertain which how the participants anticipate the 
probabilities will move.  A comparison of this and the given values would reveal any 
immediate discrepancies.   
 
6.5.5 Conditional probability distributions . 
Each participant’s conditional probability distributions were entered directly into their 
own BBN. Once populated, the events comprising the timeline were sequentially 
entered into the BBN as evidence.  This served to update the probability of each 
hypothesis.  The main trend observed was for an increasing probability of hostile 
intent as the events were observed.  It is of interest to note that the observation of the 
second event (the partial mobilisation of reserves following a limited air defence 
capability) did not substantially alter the probability of hostile intent.  Only when, in 
addition to these events, was a concentration of forces observed did the probability of 
hostile intent noticeably increase.  
 
Participants also provided a series of direct probabilistic estimates using diagnostic 
reasoning.  All direct estimates were based upon events within the scenario timeline.  
The results shows a move from negative deviation (caused by the Bayesian value 
being the largest) to positive (caused by the direct probability being the highest).  That 
being so when only one or two events were observed most participants tended to 
underestimate the probability of hostile intent.  Participants appear unable to correctly 
manipulate the dependencies between the observed event s within the intelligence 
reports.  For example, the concentration of forces and mobilisation of reserves may be 
indicative of an attack or equally be part of a planned military training exercise.  The 
departure of foreign citizens could be due to a national holiday, expulsion or be based 
on insider information.  Yet the combination of these factor creates a context in which 
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there are dependencies between this information.  The context is key to understanding 
the dependencies between the intelligence reports received.   
 
Over the course of the timeline the deviations tended towards zero.  To some extent, it 
is almost inevitable that the deviation between the Bayesian and direct values will 
decrease due to constraints placed upon the probabilities.  The elicitation of 
conditional probability distributions raised the least questions of any section of the 
experiment.  This is most likely due to participants being used to expressing 
probabilities as percentages or frequencies. 
 
In summary, the results of the analysis show that: 
 
· As evidence accumulates participants are unable to correctly manipulate the 
dependencies between information in intelligence reports within the context 
being considered. 
· The results suggest participants indirectly expressed varying preferences as to 
the importance of information depending upon the elicitation technique used. 
· There is some evidence to suggest correlation between direct and normative 
rankings, however correlation is not as high as might be expected. 
· Participants who were not regularly exposed to intelligence information, nor 
regularly used ratios were not able to easily, nor effectively express 
probabilities through the use of likelihood ratios. 
· Participants who are regularly exposed to intelligence data provided more 
consistent values across the elicitation techniques used than those who did not 
have the exposure to intelligence data. 
· Conditional probability tables provide a consistent methodology for the 
elicitation of subjective preferences. 
· Bayesian Belief Networks offer a flexible, robust methodology for the 
development of a normative model upon which a decision support system for 
the quantitative analysis of intelligence data may be built.   
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS. 
 
Intelligence failures are rarely caused by a lack of information.  Often, the failure is 
caused by an inability to piece information together; to correlate the many small 
pieces of data into a larger picture.  Essentially, the collation, analysis and 
communication of intelligence is an integral part of risk management: what enemy 
weakness can be exploited, what contingency plans should be deve loped?  There is an 
almost ever- increasing complexity to military intelligence analysis.  In today’s rapidly 
changing environment there is a need to predict asymmetric attacks from disparate 
groups of people whose overall access to technology and military training is 
uncertain.  Such predictions will be based upon information which may be 
fragmentary, incomplete, imprecise and provided from diverse sources over a 
sustained timeline.   
 
Reports into the major ‘intelligence failures’ of the past decade have all suggested 
improvements within the field of intelligence analysis.  The 9-11 Commission report 
(2004) made a series of wide-ranging recommendations relating to changes in the 
structure of the intelligence community.  However, the report did not make any 
recommendations relating to the intelligence process, nor the tools or techniques used 
within it.  Conversely the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction made specific recommendations 
relating to the intelligence analysis process.  The WMD report (2005) states that the 
failure to find WMD was due to a combination of factors: insufficient information, 
insufficient number of alternative hypotheses considered, lack of clear communication 
about the uncertainty and confidence in any predictions made.  Within the UK, the 
Butler report suggested a review of intelligence staff with the specific aim of 
determining if they have all the resources required to complete their work.   
 
This thesis has investigated the development of a support tool for analysts working 
with, and reasoning about information which is uncertain, incomplete or imprecise.  It 
has been argued that the basis of such a tool should be a Bayesian Belief Network 
(BBN)   
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A BBN is a probabilistic framework represented through a directed acylic graph and a 
set of probability distributions.  These flexible, robust networks are able to 
incorporate values from a range of sources including empirical values, experimental 
data and subjective values.  Key advantages of BBNs are their ability to show the 
variation in the probability distribution over a series of hypotheses and support both 
diagnostic and predictive reasoning.  BBNs have defined techniques for representing 
uncertainty associated with information within a network.  Furthermore, the processes 
required for formulating a network, deriving the required distributions and finally 
entering new information are all transparent processes open to audit and debate.  The 
procedures necessitate explicit consideration of uncertainty on both the information 
used in and inferences drawn from the analysis.  All of the numerical results obtained 
from the BBN at the end of the analysis are defendable, open to scrutiny and 
amenable to sensitivity analysis.   
 
Inevitably, all techniques have strengths and weaknesses.  With respect to a BBN, the 
main weaknesses are ensuring all plausible hypotheses have been identified and 
captured within the network; and the use of subjective values may require too much 
time from domain experts and incorporate cognitive biases into the network. 
 
This thesis has considered various aspects of the development of a decision support 
tool based upon a BBN through both fictitious and historical case studies.  For each 
case study considered, a supporting scenario and BBN were developed.  Within the 
scenario, a series of intelligence reports were presented over a defined timeline.   
 
Military situations often involve complex decisions.  Decisions may be complex for 
many reasons such as the requirement to consider many interlinking factors.  In 
addition to having to fully evaluate many factors, which in itself is complex, 
additional complexity may arise from information on the factors containing 
uncertainty or being incomplete.  Further complexity may arise from the individuals 
involved in making a decision; from the number of stakeholders required to reach a 
consensus to the emotions and personal values driving each ind ividual stakeholder.  It 
is important to remember that the outcome of military decisions may be perilous.  In 
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such environments, a decision may only be seen as acceptable, reasonable or rational 
when fully considered within the context in which it was taken.  If there is real 
difficulty in predicting the outcome of a decision, it is common to refer to the risk 
associated with the identified courses of action.  Whilst how the risks are viewed is 
dependent upon the framing of the decision, the acceptance of risk is personal to each 
decision-maker.  One of the most common methods for expressing risk is through 
probabilities. 
 
This thesis elicited the required subjective values through the use of specifically 
designed questionnaires.  Experimental participants were, whenever possible, met on 
a face to face basis in order to discuss the scenario and any points of ambiguity 
relating to the required subjective values.  The participants were required to explicitly 
state their subjective values, as opposed to having the required values derived from 
theoretical bets.  To facilitate the experiment both the BBN and questionnaire used 
were kept as simple as possible.  It is an accepted weakness of the experimental 
methodology that no measure of the participants’ uncertainty in the subjective values 
they provided was elicited, nor were any of the participants calibrated.  This weakness 
increased the chance of the participants being overconfident in the values they gave.  
As part of the experiment, participants were encouraged to provide probabilities in the 
format with which they felt most comfortable either as a stated number or a 
frequency.  The presentation of values as frequencies has also been shown to reduce 
errors within the stated answers. 
 
Although no calibration of the participants answers were sought, participants were 
questioned to ascertain if they had any previous experience of working with 
intelligence reports.  Any relevant experience may have developed their skills at 
combining multiple data sources and uncertainty. 
 
Decision support systems have applicability in situations where the sheer volume of 
information or number of contributing factors creates a situation in which an 
individual cannot make an informed decision alone.  This research has centred upon 
military intelligence analysis in which an individual has an opportunity to review the 
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information as it becomes available.  In today’s relatively peaceful world the majority 
of intelligence is focused on continuous processes aimed at providing security and 
prosperity.   
 
Situational awareness is an area in which BBNs have clear applicability due to their 
ability to update the belief in hypotheses given some new evidence.  Any evidence 
may be reported in a variety of sources.  Often, the provision of a rounded estimate 
will require the fusion of several forms of intelligence – for example, an image of 
troop movements supported by additional human or signals intelligence.  The revised 
estimate of an outcome can be used in the prediction of future events.   
 
Of course, the collation of data and its interpretation into intelligence does not in 
anyway guarantee that good decisions will follow.  Intelligence analysis is prone to 
many cognitive biases including the belief that the opposition is rational, over riding 
strongly held preconceived ideas, and the belief that risky options will simply not 
occur.  Information to inform the decision-making process may be presented in the 
form of an intelligence report.  Whilst the timely provision of an intelligent report 
presented in a format which is easily understood by the recipient facilitates the 
reading of the report, it does not ensure that the information is understood or accepted.  
Outputs from a DSS which are at odds with the generally perceived view of a problem 
may be seen as a threat to an individual’s credibility or simply be disregarded.  This is 
an important point.  The use of a DSS stops at the end of the analysis.  A DSS does 
not implement a decision; the ultimate responsibility for taking a decision still rests 
with an individual.  If they do not understand the results of the DSS, do not believe in 
its credibility or reliability then they may exercise their judgement and not use the 
results of the analysis.  This is their prerogative and ultimately a decision will still be 
taken. 
 
Within the field of DSSs for military intelligence, this work has mainly investigated 
human biases within the analysis process.  The developed DSS could be used with 
existing knowledge of indicators and warnings to identify when observed events may 
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be suggestive of behaviour which is at odds with the generally held perception of a 
situation.   
 
The DSS investigated as part of this research was not intended to replace the human 
analyst, merely to enhance their capabilities by providing a clear audit trail and 
second opinion.  If both the analyst and DSS arrive at the same conclusion there is 
extra credence in the assessment made.  However, any inconsistencies between the 
two results should lead to the analyst re-evaluating their work.  This will ensure the 
analyst understands why there is a difference within the results which subsequently 
reduces the chance of an oversight or error within the analysis on their part.   
 
The first part of this research sought to investigate: 
 
· The impact of additional information upon an individual’s perceptions of a 
situation. 
· The ability of individuals to logically and consistently combine the available 
evidence. 
· The ability of individuals to assess the discriminative value of information. 
 
The scenario used for the experiments in supports of these objectives was a fictitious 
land-based section attack against an enemy outpost which may be reinforced.   The 
experiment comprised of two questionnaires.  One elicited subjective probability 
tables in the causal direction of influence.  The other elicited direct subjective 
probabilities for various propositions requiring diagnostic reasoning.  A BBN was 
used to provide a normative model of the situation and provide the Bayesian 
probability of the propositions of interest.   
 
The results found that as additional information became available the participants’ 
view of the situation did alter.  However, it was clear that participants were unable to 
logically and consistently combine the available information within the intelligence 
reports to make accurate assessments of the situation being faced.  The results also 
showed participants stated a preference for HUMINT over SIGINT.  However, for 
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many participants, the normative result indicated that the information received from 
SIGINT sources was in fact the most valuable  in removing uncertainty about the 
situation. 
 
It was unclear why participants were not able to give sufficient credence to 
information received from electronic sources.  This has implications relating to the  
design of a DSS.  Overall, the results of the first set of experiments concluded that 
there was merit in the use of BBNs as a DSS to support intelligence analysis by: 
 
· Having a structure which is open to scrutiny and provides a clear audit trail of 
the assumptions, hypotheses and data used. 
· Logically and consistently combining multiple intelligence reports obtained 
from a variety of sources thus ensuring all reports are fairly considered and 
evaluated.  
· Logically and consistently update the belief for each hypothesis considered as 
new evidence or data enters a network. 
 
This latter point would, in theory enable a decision-maker to identify when, in their 
opinion, additional information should be sought to clarify a situation.   
 
To further investigate the results of the initial investigations a BBN and scenario were 
developed within the context of the main events leading up to the start of the Arab 
Israeli conflict of 1973.  The purpose of the experiment was to illustrate the potential 
benefits and strengths, as well as any weaknesses in the use of BBNs for intelligence 
analysis.  For the purposes of the experiment, the BBN was refined and populated 
over a series of meetings with a military historian at the Defence College of 
Management and Technology.   
 
As the focus of this part of the research was the use of BBNs for intelligence analysis, 
it was of most interest to develop the network from the point of view of an Israeli 
intelligence officer, as it was the Israelis who were surprised at the start of the 
hostilities.  The results obtained supported the result seen in previous experiments that 
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as multiple information sources became available the historian was unable to correctly 
manipulate the interdependencies between the information sources.  In addition to 
this, the analysis revealed inconsistencies between the relative importance of each 
possible information source as directly ranked by the historian and the normative 
rankings provided by the BBN.   
 
In both experiments stated preferences for reports and the considered relative 
importance of information sources varied between the direct and normative results.  
Therefore in addition to the previously stated requirement of a DSS the system must 
also: 
 
· Assist in determining the relative importance and influence of each potentially 
available information source in discriminating between a set of known 
hypotheses. 
 
This thesis argues that BBNs provide a suitable basis for the development of a system 
capable of quantitative analysis of intelligence reports.  One of the main issues 
associated with the development of a BBN are the probability distributions used to 
populate the network.  Often, the required distributions may only be derived 
subjectively.  The development of a BBN making use of subjective probability 
distributions requires an appropriate elicitation technique.  Advancing the body of 
knowledge in this area, two experiments were conducted to compare: direct ranking of 
the variables’ perceived importance for discriminating between given hypotheses, 
likelihood ratios and conditional probabilities.  The focus of the experiments was the 
extent to which the different elicitation techniques lead to equivalent or different 
judgements.   
 
Building upon early work the experiments used the BBN and scenario based on the 
main events leading to the start of the Arab Israeli conflict of 1973.  The first 
experiment generated 31 sets of results from military officers studying at the Defence 
College of Management and Technology.  Subsequently, a second experiment was 
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completed by 6 participants, all of whom had extensive knowledge of military 
intelligence.  Five of these participants were currently serving officers. 
 
Comparisons were firstly made between the direct rankings and the normative BBN 
rankings (based upon mutual information between each source and the hypothesis 
node).  Surprisingly little agreement was found between the direct and normative 
rankings.  In total only two participants had a direct match between all four  direct and 
normative rankings.   Investigations into the correlation between the two sets of 
results found a weaker association than might have been expected.  The use of direct 
ranking and weightings is proposed as a quick method for the development of a BBN.  
However, this research indicates such an approach may lead to substantial, yet 
unintentional discrepancies within the network. 
 
The overall trend in the results of likelihood values was for an increase in the 
probability of hostile intent as events were observed.  However, there were a small 
group of participants (all of whom did not have experience of military intelligence) 
for whom the accumulation of evidence actually led to a decrease in the probability of 
hostile intent.  For these participants, a comparison of the likelihood and direct 
probabilities highlighted a major discrepancy.  For each result in which the likelihood 
values indicated a decrease in hostile intent as events were observed, the 
corresponding direct probabilities showed an increase in the probability of hostile 
intent.  Therefore, it is concluded that this group of participants provided the inverse 
likelihood ratio to that requested within the experiment.   
 
Consequently, it is concluded that the use of likelihood ratios for the derivation of 
probability distributions for use in BBNs should only be used by those who have 
experience of working with intelligence data, or with ratios as part of their work.  For 
those not familiar with the derivation of such ratios, the elicitation of likelihood ratios 
caused uncertainty and created the possibility of the inverse ratio to that requested 
being stated.  If individuals who are not confident with the use of ratios are required to 
state likelihood ratios then this should be conducted with the elicitation of additional 
information to ensure the required ratios have been stated.  For example, the 
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procedure could include leading questions to ascertain how the participants anticipate 
the probabilities will move.  A comparison of this and the given values would reveal 
any immediate discrepancies.   
 
The final section of the analysis centred on the elicited conditional probability 
distributions.  Each participant’s stated distributions were entered directly into their 
own BBN.  Once populated, the events within the timeline were sequentially entered 
into the BBN as evidence.  The general trend was for an increasing probability of 
intent as more events were observed.  Interestingly, the observation of the second 
event (the partial mobilisation of reserves following a limited air defence capability)  
did not substantially alter the probability of hostile intent.  Only when, in addition to 
these events, a concentration of forces was observed did the probability of hostile 
intent noticeably increase.  
 
Analysis of the results showed most participants underestimated the probability of 
hostile intent with their direct judgements when only one or two events had been 
observed.  However, as additional information was received, participants seemingly 
became unable to correctly manipulate the interdependencies between the reported 
events.  This resulted in the participants over estimating the probability of hostile 
intent  with their direct judgements relative to the normative values.  Although just 
failing to show significance at the 5% significance level, there is some suggestion 
from the data that the range of direct judgements might be greater than the range of 
Bayesian normative values and this deserves further investigation.  It is the context in 
which the events are observed which holds the key to their interpretation.   
 
In summary the results show that participants indirectly expressed varying beliefs 
about the importance of information depending upon the elicitation technique used.  
Little evidence was found of a high correlation between direct rank ings of variables’ 
importance and those obtained from the BBNs normative results.  Participants who 
were not regularly exposed to intelligence information, nor regularly used ratios were 
not able to easily, nor effectively express probabilities through the use of likelihood 
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ratios.  Conditional probability distributions provided the least troublesome technique 
and showed the smallest deviations between the direct and normative values assessed.   
It is concluded that BBNs do provide a flexible, robust methodology for the 
development of a normative model upon which a decision support system for the 
quantitative analysis of intelligence reports may be built.   
 
The development of a BBN provides a clear audit trail of the assumptions, variables 
and data used within the creation of an intelligence assessment.  The networks are 
easy to construct, review and refine in readily available software such as NETICA.  
The finalised network is capable of showing the variation in the probability 
distribution over a series of hypotheses and support both diagnostic and predictive 
reasoning.  However, the network can only show those hypotheses which have been 
identified.  To maximise the utility of the BBN, careful consideration must be given to 
the use of an appropriate technique to support hypothesis generation.  Within the field 
of intelligence analysis one of the most commonly used techniques is that of the 
analysis of competing hypotheses.   
 
BBNs have defined processes for the incorporation of uncertainty.  Furthermore, the 
processes for formulating a network, deriving the required distributions and finally 
entering new information requires explicit consideration and communication of 
uncertainty on both the information used in and inferences drawn from the analysis. 
 
Within the field of intelligence analysis it is possible that a BBN will require input 
from numerous experts.  As a result the final network may be composed of smaller 
networks (possibly network fragments), each developed by a specialist.  This is 
supported by the ability of a BBN to incorporate a range of probability distributions.  
Each section of the network could be populated through a different elicitation 
technique.  Those with knowledge of intelligence or ratios may prefer to use 
likelihood ratios.  However, the use of conditional probability distributions was found 
to produce the least differences between normative and direct values. 
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One of the main limitations of this research is the number of participants who have 
experience of handling intelligence data.  Undoubtedly an area for further research 
would be to conduct a large scale experiment into the comparison of elicitation 
techniques.  Such an experiment could consider additional elicitation techniques to 
those investigated within this research and determine if the results support the 
findings reported here.   
 
The results of the analysis have shown statistically significant deviations between the 
military officers directly elicited probabilistic judgements and the corresponding 
normative combinations of their complex judgements.  This conclusion could be used 
to further guide the development of a support tool for intelligence analyses.  
Potentially, the results shown here could assist in the creation of an explanation 
facility within a support tool capable of assisting analysts surprised by the outcome of 
some analysis.  The explanation facility may help clarify why the resulting trend has 
been seen given the accumulation of evidence and suggest which, if any, probability 
distributions the analyst may wish to review.  To this end, had more time been 
available for this research it would have been interesting to further investigate the 
results from the 6 participants with experience of military intelligence.  This would 
have been achieved by gaining feedback from the participants on the BBN developed 
with their conditional probability distributions and gain their views on if the network 
does indeed behave as they envisaged.  The results could further show what support 
an analyst may need to review probability distributions used within a BBN. 
 
An additional area for consideration would be the training requirements for analysts 
who would build and use the networks.  The construction of a BBN within software 
such as NETICA is, to a great extent, intuitive.  It should be made apparent to both 
analysts and the customers of intelligence reports that the figures produced by the 
networks are not absolute.  The strength of a BBN is not in a single numerical value, 
but in its ability to show variations in trends and identify when observed events begin 
to suggest an outcome at odds with the perceived wisdom.  How to build trust in such 
a system and ensure its correct use is a topic for further research.   
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ANNEX A:  Land based scenario.   
An enemy force invaded a country that the UK is friendly with, and is of strategic 
importance to, the UK.  During its advance, the enemy force gained as much land as 
feasibly possible for use in subsequent negotiations for territorial gain.  However, the 
strategic reason for the hostile act is still not fully understood. 
 
In response to the invasion, the UK deployed a battle group to repel the enemy force; 
the operation was not carried out as part of a coalition.  A battle group comprising of 
12 Mechanised Brigade10, 19 Mechanised Brigade11 and 16 Air Assault Brigade was 
deployed12.   
 
The intent of the battle group was to defeat all the remaining enemy outposts within 
the territorial borders of the friendly country.  To achieve this 12 Mechanised Brigade 
and 19 Mechanised Brigade conducted an operation to destroy any remaining enemy 
outposts, to ensure the security of the area and the lines of communication.  Earlier 
operations were of high intensity to ensure the successful defeat of the enemy force.  
It was anticipated that the destruction of remaining enemy outposts would involve 
close quarters fighting. 
 
During the operation, the reconnaissance group reported two enemy outposts, 
believed to be of section strength, in the area of interest.  However, there was some 
ambiguity as following further reports it became highly probably that one of the 
outposts sighted has been reinforced. 
 
The participant's mission was to advance and defeat all enemy outposts, which were 
within territorial borders and over section strength, to secure the area of interest and 
the lines of communication.  The mission had to be completed within 24 hours of its 
start.  The mission was given high priority, as the Battle Group could not advance to 
the meeting point until the area was secured. 
To complete the mission the following assets are available to you: 
 
                                                 
10 Comprises armoured medium and light roled troops.   
11 On 1st January 2005 19 Mechanised Brigade became the 19 Light Brigade. 
12 An air manoeuvre brigade. 
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· Human intelligence from the Battle Group reconnaissance group 
· 2 companies and 2 squadrons forming part of 12 Mechanised Brigade 
· Support from 1 AS90 battery and a mortar platoon 
· Engineering plan is to provide support to the advance.  Once the advance is 
complete, priority will switch to mobile support to the secured route 
· Electronic warfare capabilities are available.  
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Participant response sheet (conditional probabilities). 
 
The weather on the day of the advance is rain in the local area giving poor visibility.  
Friendly forces have LOW RECCE CAPABILITY.   It is also known that the enemy 
has an EW capability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For questions 3-8  the probabilities you give to each row should sum to 100 
 
E.g. 
 
  What is the probability of 
When 
enemy ATK 
is: 
And friendly recce 
capability is 
Friendly recce 
sighting of 
ATK 
NO friendly recce 
sighting of ATK 
Present High 
50 50 
For question 2, please enter the probability of each event occurring.  The rows will not sum 
to 100. 
E.g. 
What is the probability at the en location that: 
ATK is present Armour is present Mortars are present 
50 60 70 
 
DEFINITIONS: 
DAS CAPABILITY:  Defensive aid suite technology available for use. 
ECM CAPABILITY.  ESM/ECM/EPM available for use.  
REINFORCED EN LOCATION.  This relates to an outpost which has  
received reinforcements from the enemy force and has more assets or personnel present  
than those anticipated. 
SENSOR information received by any method other than the human eye 
HIGH RECCE CAPABILITY all Recce capability  originally available are still in service 
and appropriate for current climatic conditions. 
LOW RECCE CAPABILITY Some assets originally available may be out of service or 
not appropriate for current climatic cond itions. 
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1. For this question please give your answer as a percentage.  In your judgement 
what is the probability of enemy outposts being reinforced before they are definitely located 
by the BG recce patrol?  
 
 
2. FOR THIS QUESTION EACH ROW DOES NOT SUM TO 100.  For each enemy 
outpost please enter the probability of each asset being present.  
 
  What is the probability that: 
For an enemy outpost that is ATK is present Armour is 
present 
Mortars are 
present 
NOT Reinforced    
REINFORCED    
 
3. Each row should sum to 100. 
 
 What is the probability of: 
When enemy 
ATK is: 
And friendly recce 
capability is 
Friendly recce sighting of 
ATK 
NO friendly recce 
sighting of ATK 
Present High   
Absent High   
Present Low   
Absent Low   
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4. Each row should sum to100. 
 
 What is the probability of: 
When enemy 
armour is: 
And friendly recce 
capability is 
Friendly recce sighting of 
armour 
NO friendly recce 
sighting of armour 
Present High   
Absent High   
Present Low   
Absent Low   
 
5. Each row should sum to100. 
 
 What is the probability of: 
When enemy 
Mortars are: 
And friendly recce 
capability is 
Friendly recce sighting of 
Mortars  
NO friendly recce 
sighting of Mortars  
Present High   
Absent High   
Present Low   
Absent Low   
 
6. Each row should sum to 100. 
 
 What is the probability of: 
When enemy EW 
capability is: 
And enemy ATK 
is 
Friendly sensors show 
enemy ATK present 
Friendly sensors 
DO NOT show 
enemy ATK 
present 
DAS Present   
DAS Absent   
ECM Present   
ECM Absent   
7. Each row should sum to 100. 
 
217 
 What is the probability of: 
When enemy 
EW capability 
is: 
And enemy 
armour is 
Friendly sensors show 
enemy armour present 
Friendly sensors DO NOT 
show enemy armour 
present 
DAS Present   
DAS Absent   
ECM Present   
ECM Absent   
 
8. Each row should sum to 100. 
 
 What is the probability of: 
When enemy 
EW capability 
is: 
And enemy 
Mortars are  
Friendly sensors show 
enemy Mortars 
present 
Friendly sensors DO NOT 
show enemy Mortars 
present 
DAS Present   
DAS Absent   
ECM Present   
ECM Absent   
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Participant response sheet (consistency and causal reasoning) 
 
The weather on the day of the advance is rain in the local area giving poor visibility.  
Friendly forces have LOW RECCE CAPABILITY.   It is also known that the enemy 
has an EW capability. 
 
For questions 1,2,4,5,6,8,9,10-18, please give in YOUR judgement the single 
probability of the event occurring. 
 
For questions 3 and 7 the sum of the probabilities you give to parts a) and b) 
should sum to 100. 
 
DEFINITIONS 
 
DAS CAPABILITY: Defensive aid suite technology available for use. 
ECM CAPABILITY.  ESM/ECM/EPM available for use. 
REINFORCED ENEMY LOCATION. .  This relates to an outpost which has 
received reinforcements from the enemy force and has more assets or personnel 
present than those anticipated. 
SENSOR information received by any method other than the human eye 
HIGH RECCE CAPABILITY all Recce capability  originally available are still in 
service and appropriate for current climatic conditions. 
LOW RECCE CAPABILITY Some assets originally available may be out of 
service or not appropriate for current climatic conditions. 
 
 
1. Considering the scenario, in your judgement what is the probability that ATK 
is present at the enemy outposts? 
 
 
2. Considering the scenario, in your judgement what is the probability that the 
enemy outposts have been reinforced? 
 
 
 
3. In this question, the response to parts a) and b) SUM to 100. 
219 
If the enemy has ECM capabilities, and considering the scenario, what is the 
probability that the sensor report for the enemy outposts: 
 
a. Indicates ATK is present 
 
 
b. Indicates ATK is NOT present 
 
 
4. Considering the scenario, in your judgement what is the probability that 
armour is present at the enemy outposts? 
 
 
5. Considering the scenario, in your judgement what is the probability that Recce 
Gp reports armour present the enemy outposts? 
 
 
6. Considering the scenario, in your judgement what is the probability that the 
sensors report armour present at the enemy outposts? 
 
 
7. In this question, the response to parts a) and b) SUM to 100. 
If the Recce Gp have low visibility conditions and the Recce Gp report does not 
mention armour, what is the probability that at the enemy locations: 
 
a. Armour is present 
 
 
b. Armour is not present 
 
 
8. Considering the scenario report in your judgement what is the probability that 
Mortars are present at the enemy outposts? 
 
 
9. Considering the scenario, in your judgement what is the probability that the 
Recce Gp reports Mortars being present at the enemy outposts? 
 
 
10. Considering the scenario, in your judgement what is the probability that the 
sensors reports Mortars being present at the enemy outposts? 
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11. If the Recce Gp reported no artillery, and no Mortars, but did report the 
presence on armour, in your judgement what is the probability that the enemy 
outpost under observation has been reinforced? 
 
 
12. If the Recce Gp reported no Mortars but did report the presence of both ATK 
AND armour, in your judgement what is the probability that the enemy 
outpost under observation has been reinforced? 
 
 
13. If the Recce Gp reported the presence of artillery, armour and Mortars, in your 
judgement what is the probability that enemy outpost under observation has 
been reinforced? 
 
14. If the Recce Gp reported ATK was not present at the enemy outpost but the 
sensor report DID indicate the presence of artillery, in your judgement, what is 
the probability of ATK being present at the enemy outpost? 
 
 
15. If the Recce Gp reports ATK is present at an enemy outpost, but the sensor 
report DID NOT indicate the presence of artillery, in your judgement, what is 
the probability of ATK being present at the enemy outpost? 
 
 
16. Both the Recce Gp and the sensors report the presence of ATK at the enemy 
outpost.  In your judgement, what is  the probability of ATK being present at 
enemy outpost? 
 
 
17. Both the Recce Gp and the sensors DO NOT report the presence of ATK at the 
enemy outpost.  In your judgement, what is the probability of ATK being 
present at enemy outpost? 
 
 
18. The Recce Gp report is unavailable, but the sensor report indicates the 
presence of ATK at the enemy outpost.  In your judgement, what is the 
probability of ATK being present at the enemy outpost? 
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ANNEX B:  Response sheet for an experiment into subjective value elicitation:  A 
comparison of direct rankings, likelihood values, and conditional probabilities 
for use in decision support systems.   
 
Scenario background 
This scenario is based on the events leading up to the start of hostilities of the Yom 
Kippur War in 1973.  Within the scenario you will be asked to provide a series of 
answers, some of which will require you to consider the situation from the perspective 
of an Israeli cabinet member.  When providing your answers throughout this 
experiment please bear in mind the historical relationship between the Arab coalition 
(Egypt and Syria) and Israel.  
 
Prior to the commencement of hostilities the Arab coalition specifically created a 
series of ‘false alarms’ within the Israeli military through the concentration and 
movement of their forces.  At this time, the Israeli government was preparing to fight 
a general election and so did not want to be seen mobilising reserves for no reason.  
The false alarms created by the Arab coalition de-sensitised the Israeli military to such 
events – seeing troop movements and concentrations became less unexpected.  As 
such, it became harder for the Israeli military to accept and realise that the events 
occurring before them now actually represented a hostile attack and were not another 
planned exercise or manoeuvre.   
 
Scenario hypotheses 
The experiment will consider two collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive 
hypotheses considered to represent the possible status of the Egyptian and Syrian 
coalition at various times from April to October 1973. 
 
Hypothesis A = The Egyptian and Syrian coalition are capable of a hostile attack 
against Israel within the next few months. (Imminently hostile) 
 
Hypothesis B = The Egyptian and Syrian coalition is NOT planning a hostile 
attack against Israel within the next few months. (Not imminently hostile)  
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Elicitation of rank ordering of nodes. 
 
The aim of this first section of the experiment is to determine in your opinion the 
order of importance of the potential information sources available to the Egyptian-
Syrian coalition: 
  
· Mobilisation of reserves 
· Concentration of forces 
· Soviet citizens leaving Egypt 
· Development of an air defence capability 
 
1. In your opinion which of the 4 potential information source is the most 
important? 
 
2. In your opinion which of the 4 potential information sources is the least 
important? 
 
The chart below show a vertical line starting at zero and ending at 100.  By zero write 
the potential information source you considered to be the least important.  Conversely, 
by 100 write the potential information source you considered to be the most 
important.  Now answer the following two questions: 
 
3. In your opinion which of the 4 potential information sources is the second most 
important? 
 
4. In your opinion which of the 4 potential information sources is the next to least 
important? 
 
If zero is the least important and 100 the most important, place two marks on the chart 
representing the positions of the remaining 2 potential information sources and label 
them.  You need to be comfortable that the gaps between the marks represent in your 
opinion the increase in importance of each potential information source from one to 
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the next.  Finally, place numbers by the marks between 0 and 100 to represent the 
importance of the two marks you have made on the (0,100) scale.   
 
 
 
 
0 
100  
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Elicitation of likelihood values 
 
As previously stated, the two hypotheses being considered are: 
 
Hypothesis A = The Egyptian and Syrian coalition are capable of a hostile attack 
against Israel within the next few months. (Imminently hostile) 
 
Hypothesis B = The Egyptian and Syrian coalition is NOT planning a hostile 
attack against Israel within the next few months. (Not imminently hostile)  
 
Based on the events in Table 1 below, you are asked in this second part of the 
experiment to provide a series of assessments, called likelihood ratios.  These ratios 
relate the relative probabilities of an event being reported when hostilities are either 
imminent or not imminent and when ALL the preceding (i.e. lower-numbered) events 
have been reported. 
 
For example, consider event two:  Intelligence report received that Egypt has ordered 
a partial mobilisation of reserve forces.  You are asked to provide the ratio of the 
probability of this occurring, knowing that there is an intelligence report that a SAM 
missile installment has been received, if hostilities were imminent compared to event 
two occurring if no hostilities were planned.  A ratio of 1 implies you believe that the 
event is equally likely to occur whether the Arab coalition’s intention is imminently 
hostile or not, given all previous events which have taken place.  A ratio greater than 
1 means that you believe the event is more likely to occur when hostilities are 
imminent.  Conversely, a ratio less than 1 represents a belief that the event being 
considered is more likely to occur when hostilities are not imminent.  The value of the 
ratio expressed how many times more likely the event being considered is given all 
previous events when hostilities are imminent compared to when they are not 
imminent.  
 
Now look at Table 1.  You are requested to give your answers as ratios based on the 
method explained above.  Work through the table top to bottom, a row at time,  From 
the second row on, assume that you know all of the previous (lower-numbered) events 
have already occurred. 
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Event 
# 
Description: Likelihood 
ratio 
1 Intelligence report received that Syria and Egypt have 
developed a limited air defence capability through a 1st 
instalment of SAM missiles 
 
2 Intelligence report received that Egypt has ordered a 
partial mobilisation of reserve forces 
 
3 Intelligence report received that Syria and Egypt have 
developed an extensive air defence capability through a 
2nd instalment of SAM missiles 
 
4 Special air reconnaissance over Siani reports a 
concentration of Egyptian forces. 
 
5 Intelligence report received that Soviet citizens in Egypt 
have started leaving. 
 
Table 1:  Collation of likelihood values 
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Elicitation of conditional probabilities 
 
In this third and final part of the experiment you will be asked to provide a series of 
probabilities as percentages.  Please remember when deciding upon your values that 
there are no right or wrong answers, we are simply interested in your opinion of the 
situation.  You are asked not to use values of 0 or 100 since these imply things 
which are either impossible or certain and, given the perspective we ask you to 
adopt in this experiment, none of the events or hypotheses considered here fall 
into either of those categories. 
 
When comple ting the following questions please answer them as though you were an 
Israeli cabinet minister being presented with reports from the Israeli intelligence 
service.  It is important to remember that the reports you be accurate, however they 
may also be mistaken in their interpretation of events or there may be non-hostile 
explanations for them such as military exercises   
 
1. Please note that the sum of your answers to this question must equal 100.  
Considering the background to the conflict, but BEFORE you know any of the 
events shown in Table 1 on the last page occurred what would be your degree 
of belief, expressed as a percentage probability, that the Arab intent was: 
a. Imminently hostile (i.e. planning an attack within the next few months) 
 
b. Not imminently hostile (i.e. not planning an attack within the next few 
months) 
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2. Please note that the sum of your answers in EACH ROW must equal 100.  
Considering the scenario, please enter the following probabilities 
 
The probability of mobilizing reserves When Arab intent is 
No 
mobilisation 
Partial 
mobilisiation 
Full 
mobilisation 
Imminently hostile    
Not imminently hostile    
 
 
3. Please note that the sum of your answers in EACH ROW must equal 100.  
.  Considering the scenario, please enter the following probabilities 
 
The probability of forces being 
concentrated 
When Arab intent is 
Concentrated Not concentrated 
Imminently hostile   
Not imminently hostile   
 
 
4. Please note that the sum of your answers in EACH ROW must equal 100.  
Considering the scenario, please enter the following probabilities 
 
The probability of Soviet citizens leaving When Arab intent is 
Leaving Staying 
Imminently hostile   
Not imminently hostile   
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5. Please note that the sum of your answers in EACH ROW must equal 100.  
Considering the scenario, please enter the following probabilities 
 
The probability of an air defence capability 
being developed  
When Arab intent is 
No such 
capability 
Limited AD 
capability 
Extensive AD 
capability 
Imminently hostile    
Not imminently hostile    
 
For questions 6 to 9 you need to bear in mind the difference between an event actually 
occurring and an apparent event being reported by an imperfect source such as an 
intelligence agency.  These questions require you to judge how likely you would 
consider an intelligence agency to correctly detect and report an event of the type 
indicated given that it has occurred. 
 
You also need to judge the chance of them mistakenly reporting something that is not 
true, e.g. mistaking a full mobilisiation of reserves for a partial mobilisiation of 
reserves or even no mobilisation at all.  Logically, the higher the reliability of the 
intelligence agency the more often its reports should correspond with the event that 
has actually occurred.  However, even a very reliable agency is not perfect and can 
make mistakes.  Of course, the propensity to make such mistakes might be different 
for different types of events – that is something for you to judge. 
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6. Please note that the sum of your answers in EACH ROW must equal 100.  
Considering the scenario, please enter the following probabilities 
 
The probability that the type of mobilisiation 
reported by the intelligence agency is 
When the actual 
mobilization of reserves is  
None Partial Full 
None    
Partial    
Full    
 
 
7. Please note that the sum of your answers in EACH ROW must equal 100.  
Considering the scenario, please enter the following probabilities 
 
The probability that the enemy force deployment 
reported by the intelligence agency is 
When the actual enemy 
force deployment is  
Concentrated Not concentrated 
Concentrated   
Not concentrated   
 
 
8. Please note that the sum of your answers in EACH ROW must equal 100.  
Considering the scenario, please enter the following probabilities 
 
The probability that Soviet citizens in Egypt are 
reported by the intelligence agency to be  
When Soviet citizens in 
Egypt (diplomats, etc) 
are actually Leaving Staying 
Leaving   
Staying   
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9. Please note that the sum of your answers in EACH ROW must equal 100.  
Considering the scenario, please enter the following probabilities 
 
The probability that the Egyptian-Syrian air 
defence capability will be reported by the 
intelligence agency to be  
When the development of 
an Egyptian-Syrian air 
defence capability is  
None Limited Extensive 
None    
Limited    
Extensive    
 
 
10. Please note that the sum of your answers in EACH ROW must equal 100.   
For each part of question 10 you are asked to express your agree of belief in each 
hypothesis as a percentage probability given that you have received ONLY the 
intelligence report(s) specified in the first column of the table from your intelligence 
agency. 
 
Hypothesis A = The Egyptian and Syrian coalition are capable of a hostile attack 
against Israel within the next few months. (Imminently hostile) 
 
Hypothesis B = The Egyptian and Syrian coalition is NOT planning a hostile 
attack against Israel within the next few months. (Not imminently hostile)  
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Probability that the 
hypothesis is true  
Intelligence reports available  
A 
(imminently 
hostile) 
B (Not 
imminently 
hostile) 
Egypt has extensively built up its air defence 
capability 
  
Egypt has ordered a partial mobilisation of 
reserves 
  
Egypt has ordered a concentration of its forces   
Egypt has ordered the removal of Soviet 
Citizens 
  
Egypt has extensively built up its air defence 
capability and ordered a partial mobilisiation of 
reserves 
  
Egypt has extensively built up its air defence 
capability, ordered a partial mobilisiation of 
reserves and concentrated its forces 
  
Egypt has extensively built up its air defence 
capability, ordered a partial mobilisiation of 
reserves, concentrated its forces and Soviet 
Citizens are leaving 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
